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ABSTRACT
Great powers have often sought to achieve their strategic goals through the allocation of
military aid. The United States is no exception, as it has frequently used military aid to
influence the policies and military capacity of its allies and partners. However, our
understanding of the effects of US military aid on the conflict behavior of recipient states—
and especially the mechanisms underlying these effects—remains poorly understood. The
results of previous studies of U.S. military aid are often contradictory, and are mostly based
on over-aggregated, country-level data. In this dissertation, I argue that examining the
individual-level effects will give us a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying
country-level associations between US military aid and recipient behavior. I examine three
research questions related to the manner in which military aid influences conflict in recipient
countries. First, I explore the individual effects of U.S. IMET using semi-structures in-depth
interviews and an original survey of Hungarian military officers and non-commissioned
officers. This paper investigates the transmission of professional values and “democratic”
norms to individual participants through the U.S. IMET programs. Second, I investigate the
effects of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration. I argue that government forces
with more robust U.S. IMET participation will accumulate more and better military human
capital, which incentivize rebels to hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged
civil conflict. Finally, while exploring recipient states international conflict behavior I
theorize that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home with a
better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, civilmilitary relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. I argue that these military
personnel advise their political masters against the use of military force during international
disputes leading to a decreased probability of MID initiation. I find support for each of the
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main arguments presented in the dissertation. Overall, this dissertation represents one of the
first attempts to move beyond country-level data and explore the micro-foundations of US
military assistance.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Different forms of military aid have been used by donors to influence recipients` behavior
since the beginnings of human history. The Greeks, the Romans, the Ottomans, and different
European empires all employed different forms of military aid to achieve their political goals.
(Mott, 1999). The United States is not an exception since it has been using different military
aid programs to augment its military strategy and achieve its foreign policy goals since World
War II. Mott (1999) argues that the U.S. military aid programs are traditionally “discrete,
coherent, type or mode of international relations, not simply an obsolescent policy tool”
(Mott 1999: xiv) and with that these programs have been and are central instruments in
American military strategy and foreign policy.
U.S. military aid programs consist of arms and equipment transfers as well as foreign
military education and training programs (Mott, 1999). This dissertation focuses on the latter
version of U.S. military aid and investigates how these programs affect participating
individuals and through them the recipient states` behavior both domestically and
internationally. The scope of this project is limited to investigating the effects of only one of
the fourteen1 U.S. foreign military education and training efforts, the International Military
Education and Training programs (hereafter, U.S. IMET).
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The U.S. foreign military education and training programs include the Foreign military sales, Foreign military
financing, International military education and training, International narcotics and law enforcement, Global
peace operations initiative, regional centers for security studies, Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities,
Mine action programs, Disaster response, Regional defense combating terrorism fellowship program, Section
2282 Global train and equip, Service-sponsored activities, Foreign assistance act, Department of homeland
security/U.S. Coast guard activities. I specifically explore the effects of U.S. IMET programs and collect data on
these programs because as Savage and Caverley (2017) argue these programs are “the most transparent and
receives the largest amount of scrutiny” (Savage and Caverley, 2017:548) meaning that they present the
strongest test to my theory. Based on these characteristics I suggest that the relationship I find between the U.S.
IMET programs and the participating individuals are likely to be the same for all other U.S. foreign military
education and training programs as well.
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Better understanding the effects of the U.S. IMET programs is important for several
reasons. First, these programs have been the subject of several Congressional investigations
since their establishment in 1976, because both individual graduates of these programs and
recipient states have demonstrated quite a variance in their behavior which led to the
questioning of the effectiveness of these programs. This still seems to be an ongoing issue
since the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act codifies the requirement for the U.S.
Department of Defense to evaluate the effectiveness of the different security assistance
programs, including the U.S. IMET programs, however no such evaluation mechanism exists
yet. Second, recent U.S. administrations have been giving a significant role in their national
security strategies to activities through, by and with allied and partner militaries without a
clearly established and effective feedback mechanism regarding the actual effects of the U.S.
security assistance programs. Third, international relations literature investigating the
potential effects of the U.S. IMET programs seem to leave some room for improvement and
expansion due to challenges related to the availability of limited data, issues with research
designs, limited theoretical contribution, weak empirical evidence, and contradictory results.
Finally, collecting useful and coherent data that effectively demonstrates the value of the U.S.
IMET programs has been a long-lasting challenge for researchers which presents an
opportunity for major contribution.
Although this dissertation intends to address all of these issues its primary focus is
policy relevance. The primary aim of this dissertation is to provide scientifically investigated
and well-supported evaluation of the value and effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs by
answering the question how these programs affect the participating individuals and through
them the recipient states` behavior. For this reason, rather than explaining the variation in a
single phenomenon from different angles this project is connected through the independent
variable. The dissertation answers the posed research question through the investigation of
2

three independent but interrelated sub-questions where all dependent variables are directly
derived from the legislatures and policy documents codifying the goals of the U.S. IMET
programs. Answering the three research questions provide evidence for policy makers
whether the U.S. IMET programs are valuable and effectively fulfil their purposes. At the
same time the project also offers an overarching theoretical framework by arguing that U.S.
IMET participation improves the quality of the individual military personnel attending these
programs and through them the recipient states` military human capital becomes better. This
improvement in the quality of military human capital of the recipient states influences their
international and domestic behavior.
The first paper investigates the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs
and explores whether participation in these programs is associated with improvement in
individual qualities. According to the 1978 and 1992 amendments to the 1976 International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act one of the main goals of the U.S. IMET
programs is to transmit the U.S. military`s professional values and norms such as the respect
of democratic values, human rights, and civil control to participating foreign military
personnel and with that to improve their personal qualities. Although previous literature
assumes that this transmission actually happens at the individual level only one of these
studies offers a theory of norms transmission. Additionally, the literature does not seem to
provide convincing empirical evidence demonstrating that the norm transmission actually
happens. The first paper intends to address these issues by further improving the existing
norms transmission theory and test the untested assumptions of prior literature. The study
employs semi-structured, in-depth interviews and an original survey conducted in Hungary
with 350 military respondents (140 U.S. IMET graduates and 210 Non-U.S. IMET graduates)
to determine whether U.S. IMET participation is associated with an improvement in personal
qualities. The results of the analysis of the responses demonstrate that the professional norms
3

and values of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to participants and with that the
military human capital of the recipient states improves. Additionally, the study provides
initial evidence for further norm diffusion within the military as a whole.
The second study investigates how improved military human capital due to U.S.
IMET participation affects recipient states` behavior during domestic conflicts. I theorize that
participation in U.S. IMET programs improves the military human capital of the government
forces. This improved military human capital makes the overall military more capable and
effective which incentivizes rebels to disperse, hide and minimize their operations leading to
a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I use a new dataset that includes detailed
information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation between 1976 and 2003. The
results show that militaries with more U.S. IMET participation fights significantly longer
civil conflicts. As further support to the theory I also find that more U.S. IMET participation
corresponds with a higher probability of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner.
To provide further support to the findings of the statistical analysis I illustrate the theoretical
argument through a case study as well.
Finally, the third paper investigates the relationship between better military human
capital due to U.S. IMET participation and the probability of recipient states international
conflict behavior. The research question that is being explored in this paper is once again
derived from the goals of the U.S. IMET programs related to the aim to improve regional
stability and reduce the probability of interstate conflict. Investigating this question is also
important because the potential effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military
education and training on states` international conflict behavior has never been investigated
previously. In this paper I argue that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET acts differently
than other forms of military aid and instead of increasing the probability of conflict initiation
it rather restrains countries` from aggression. I argue that better military human capital due to
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more U.S. IMET participation reduces the probability of the recipient states becoming an
interstate dispute initiator because the American trained and educated military leaders advise
their political masters against the offensive use of the military forces. I test this theory
through the employment of several logistic regression models and find that the more U.S.
IMET support a country receives the less likely it initiates interstate conflicts. Additionally, I
find that more U.S. IMET participation is associated with decreased probability of escalating
violence during ongoing conflicts. Besides providing support regarding the U.S. IMET
programs effectiveness in reducing recipient states` aggression the findings also contribute to
the ongoing debate about how U.S. military aid affects interstate conflict initiation.
Taken together, the results of this dissertation provide strong evidence that U.S.
military aid in the form of U.S. IMET indeed fulfill the goals established by the U.S.
Congress. The results show that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET improves the
individual qualities of participating foreign military personnel and with that the military
human capital of the recipient states. The improved military human capital affects the
recipient states conflict behavior both domestically and internationally and with that supports
the achievement of U.S. military strategy and foreign policy goals. Besides providing a direct
feedback about the effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs these findings might urge policy
makers to consider paying more attention to this less tangible form of U.S. military aid and
invest more efforts and resources to support the further improvement of these programs. In
addition to the policy related benefits this dissertation makes significant contributions to the
growing body of academic literature on the effects of U.S. military aid. First, the dissertation
presents original, individual level data about the effects of the U.S. IMET programs. Next,
the dissertation further develops the theory for international norm transmission at the
individual level in a military setting and tests previously untested assumptions. Third, through
the employment of a combination of qualitative exploration techniques and large-N statistical
5

analyses the dissertation further expands and improves previous literature by providing
stronger empirical evidence in support of the findings of several prior studies. At the same
time the dissertation presents novel insights on how U.S. military aid in the form of U.S.
IMET programs affects the recipient states` domestic and international conflict behavior.
Finally, through its findings the dissertation contributes to the wider international relations
discussion about the effects of foreign aid as well.
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CHAPTER TWO: U.S. IMET PROGRAMS AND REVIEW OF
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
The first official U.S. military aid program started during World War II. with the Lend-Lease
Act that authorized the transfer of American weapons, supplies and services to several
countries2 that were fighting against Nazi Germany (Mott, 1999). This program was
terminated on 2 September 1945 after providing $48.5 million in arms to 42 countries
(Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, 1967). The next major U.S. military
aid program was initiated on 12 March 1947 when President Truman asked the U.S. Congress
to authorize $400 million worth of surplus arms to be transferred to Greece and Turkey, and
in 1948 to China. The general framework for grant based foreign military education and
training as an additional form of U.S. military aid was established in 1949 with the passing of
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.3
While during the next couple years the American military aid programs included both
the transfer of surplus weapons from World War II4 and foreign military education and
training programs the total value of U.S. military aid in the 1950s was still less than $1
billion. However, with the developing communist threat and the need to contain the Soviet
Union quickly raised the importance of military aid programs and their scope was also
significantly extended. Till the mid-1970s the term military assistance was officially used to
describe the military aid programs, which only referred to the transfer of “U.S. military
weapons, equipment, and training to recipient governments” (Mott 1999:4). With the 1976
Congressional amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 additional political and

2

The Lend-Lease Act authorized military assistance for Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, Free
France, the Soviet Union (after 1941) and China (after 1942).
3
This legislation is generally called the Military Assistance Program (hereafter, MAP), which allowed the U.S.
government to provide military aid in the form of education and training to selected countries to help them
defend themselves from aggression.
4
4000 surplus Navy vessels were transferred to 60 countries during this time period (Mott, 2002).
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economic aspects were added to these programs and a new term, security assistance5 was
introduced. This same legislature also established a new framework for foreign military
education and training in the form of International Military Education and Training Programs
(hereafter, U.S. IMET). With the inclusion of political and economic aspects into military aid
and with the reorganization of education and training efforts the U.S. military aid increased to
an average $12 billion per year by the end of the 1970s. The next decade saw an even more
significant increase in these programs with a $21 billion per year value. Although the end of
the Cold War brought some serious reduction in U.S. military aid efforts the Global War on
Terror that followed the events of 11 September 2001 once again has put a lot of emphasis on
developing allied and partner countries` military capabilities through arms transfer and
training. Although as Figure 1. demonstrates there has been significant fluctuation in the
allocation of resources for the U.S. military aid programs, the overall average between fiscal
year 2006 and fiscal year 2017 remained around $20 billion annually which is very close to
the Cold War years.

Figure 1. U.S. Military Aid Funding Trends, FY 2006 – FY 2017

5

From now on this study uses the term military aid and security assistance interchangeably. These terms contain
all forms of military aid programs including weapons, equipment, training and education transfers and other
political and economic activities.
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Besides its significant annual dollar value over the last couple decades the better
understanding the effects of U.S. military aid is important for several other reasons. First,
recent U.S. administrations have been giving a significant role in their national security
strategies to activities through, by and with allied and partner militaries, which includes
significant military aid efforts. Second, since the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act
requires the U.S. Department of Defense to evaluate the effectiveness of all U.S. security
assistance programs the investigation of the effects of these programs carries an opportunity
for significant policy relevant contribution. Third, international relations literature
investigating the effects of these security assistance efforts demonstrate contradictory results.
While some studies find positive relationship between U.S. military aid and the achievement
of foreign policy goals, others argue that military aid in fact negatively affects U.S. strategic
interest. Finally, the better understanding of military aid related considerations might also
have some valuable contributions to the more general international relations discussion about
the potential effects of foreign aid.
While the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer have
been studied extensively in international relations literature (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983;
Huth and Russett, 1984; Huth, 1988; Kinsella, 1994, 1995; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995;
Kinsella and Tillema, 1995; Craft and Smaldone, 2002; Krause, 2004) much less attention
has been given to explore the effects of the other type of U.S. military aid, foreign military
education and training. This dissertation intends to contribute to the latter literature by
focusing on improving our understanding of the effects of a specific version of the U.S.
foreign military education and training programs, the International Military Education and
Training programs.
Although there are fourteen programs providing military education and training for
foreign military personnel the centerpiece of these efforts is the U.S. IMET programs. The
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investigation focuses on these programs for several reasons. First, the author has personnel
experience in these programs since he participated in three different U.S. IMET courses.6
Second, the most reliable and transparent data related to the U.S. foreign military education
and training efforts is the U.S. IMET data. This is due to the ongoing Congressional interest
in the effects of these programs.7 Third, all previous studies that have investigated the effects
of U.S. foreign military education and training programs exclusively employed and analyzed
U.S. IMET data. Finally, as Savage and Caverley (2017) argue due to U.S. IMET`s size,
budget and significance it is safe to assume that if one finds a relationship between U.S.
IMET and the subject of the investigation than this same relationship is true for the entire
U.S. foreign military education and training efforts.
While the U.S. Congress established the general framework for grant based foreign
military education and training as early as 1949 with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act8 the
U.S. IMET program was only born in 1976 when the 94th Congress passed the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, which was an amendment for the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (Cope, 1995). Since its early days U.S. IMET has been overseen by
the Department of State while most sub-elements are administered by the Department of
Defense (Atkinson, 2010). From their beginnings the U.S. IMET programs have been seen as
a fundamental instrument supporting broad national security goals through developing
partner nations` military capabilities and promoting peace and stability both regionally and
within the recipient states. Today the U.S. IMET programs provide education and training for
foreign personnel in around 4,000 different courses both within the United States and

USMC Basic Officer School April 2004 – September 2004; USMC Infantry Officer School September 2004December 2004; USMC Expeditionary Warfare School July 2005-May 2006.
7
Since its establishment in 1976 U.S. IMET programs have been a subject to numerous Congressional
investigations due to their mixed empirical results.
8
This legislation is generally called the Military Assistance Program (hereafter, MAP), which allowed the U.S.
government to provide military aid in the form of education and training to selected countries to help them
defend themselves from aggression.
6
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overseas. Although U.S. IMET focuses on Professional Military Education (PME) mostly
conducted at higher level military educational institutions like the war and staff colleges it
also includes short term practical training focused courses as well (Atkinson, 2010). The U.S.
IMET programs do not seem to be a particularly expensive effort (especially when compared
to the multi-billion-dollar arms and equipment transfers) since as Atkinson (2010) notes it
only accounts for about 0.2 percent of the budget of the State Department. According to
Savage and Caverley (2017) in Fiscal Year 2015 the program only cost $876.5 million while
about 76,400 students participated in it from 154 countries (Savage and Caverley, 2017).
Figure 2. shows the number of students trained in U.S. IMET compared to funding
appropriated between 2000 and 2010.

Figure 2. Number of Students Trained Compared to U.S. IMET Funding Appropriated,
Fiscal Years 2000 and 20109
Although traditionally European and Eurasian countries have been receiving the
majority of U.S. IMET support all other regions have seen a continuous increase in U.S.
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Source: State Congressional Budget Justification.
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IMET funding during recent years. Figure 3. demonstrates the changes in U.S. IMET funding
per region between fiscal year 2000 and 2010.

Figure 3. U.S. IMET funding appropriated, by Region, for Fiscal Years 2000 and 201010
The goals of the U.S. IMET program have evolved over time. When the 94th Congress
established the original framework for U.S. IMET its primary goals were to avoid the
controversies associated with the original Military Assistance Program (hereafter, MAP) and
to support countries that could not afford to buy U.S. military education and training through
the Foreign Military Sales (hereafter, FMS) Act (Cope, 1995). Congress assigned two goals
to the U.S. IMET program in the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act:
1. to encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding
between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of goals of
international peace and security.
2. to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources,
including defense articles and defense services obtained from the United States, with
maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such
countries (Cope, 1995: 11).
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Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Budget Justifications.
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In 1978 the program goals were extended to improve the awareness of U.S. IMET
participants about issues related to universal human rights (Goodman, 1990; Allen, 1982).
Further legislations in 1991 authorized the expansion of the program leading to the creation
of Expanded U.S. IMET (hereafter, E-U.S. IMET) that provides education and training for
foreign non-military personnel to accommodate the defense related interest of foreign nondefense ministries and nongovernmental organizations. E-U.S. IMET courses specifically
focus on:
1. Responsible defense resource management.
2. Greater respect for and grasp of democracy and civilian rule of law, including the
principle of civilian control of the military.
3. Military justice systems in a democracy.
4. Better understanding of internationally recognized human rights (Cope, 1995: 12).
More recent policy documents as the Department of State and the Department of
Defense Foreign Military Training Joint Report, Fiscal Year 2012 and 2013 summarizes the
current official goals of the U.S. IMET program as to:

1. Further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to
military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation
between the United States and foreign countries.
2. Provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations’ military forces
to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S. forces; and
3. Increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain
democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own
government and military (U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State,
2012/13).

The understanding of the U.S. IMET goals and their evolution are important because
the few previous studies derived their research questions from these goals and the follow-on
investigation also utilizes these goals when exploring the potential effects of U.S. IMET
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programs both at the individual and state levels. To explain how previous literature is
connected to the U.S. IMET programs` goals and identify potential areas for expansion and
improvement, next, I review those studies that have investigated the effects of these efforts.
First, early studies are looking at the institutional effects of the U.S. foreign military
education and training programs within the recipient states. Lefever (1976) investigates
whether the early version of U.S. foreign military education and training called Military
Assistance Program11 (hereafter, MAP) met the goal of increasing interstate stability. Lefever
(1976) argues that the MAP is a “low-cost, low-risk foreign policy instrument that has served
the United States interest in interstate stability” (Lefever, 1976: 85). The author finds support
for the achievement of one of the assigned goals and argues that MAP program increases the
professional performance and readiness level of the participant countries` militaries leading
more security and stability. Through the assessment of the effects of MAP in Latin American
countries Fitch (1979) finds somewhat contradictory results. Although the author argues
along similar lines as Lefever (1976) regarding the effects of the MAP on the military, he
also suggests that MAP increases the political involvement of the military and
institutionalizes the coup d’état as a form of political progress. Fitch (1979) finds that U.S.
MAP increases the level of professionalism of the recipient states` military by improving
technical skills, providing managerial and administrative experience, extensive training in
nonmilitary matters and enhancing self-confidence. According to the author due to these
factors the military might see itself as an alternative solution to the civilian government in
times of political crisis which results in the institutionalization of coup d’état. These results
seem to be contradictory with the stated goals of MAP, however in several Latin American
cases (especially during the Cold War) encouraging military backed coups were indeed the

11

In 1976 renamed as U.S. IMET.
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interest of the U.S foreign policy. This contradiction between the goals included in legislature
and “facts on the ground” created an ongoing interest from scholars even after the MAP
programs were replaced by U.S. IMET.
Using the idea that U.S. IMET participation improves the military human capital of
the recipient states as their theoretical foundation, Ruby and Gibler (2010) and Savage and
Caverley (2017) explore whether U.S. IMET programs achieve the goal of creating domestic
stability. According to Ruby and Gibler (2010) the U.S. IMET programs develop the
recipient countries` militaries` human capital through the transmission of the U.S. military`s
professional norms and values. According to the authors this improvement in military human
capital leads to improved domestic stability because it decreases the probability of military
backed coups in the recipient countries. The authors argue that foreign military personnel
trained and educated in the United States absorb the idea of civilian control over the military
and this is the primary casual mechanism behind the decreased probability of coups. On the
other hand, Savage and Caverley (2017) argues that U.S. IMET actually leads to less
domestic stability. While the authors use the same theoretical framework as Ruby and Gibler
(2010) and argue that U.S. IMET participation indeed improves the military human capital of
recipient states they suggest that this improvement has the opposite effects to what Ruby and
Gibler (2010) suggest. According to Savage and Caverley (2017) the norm most likely to be
transmitted through the U.S. IMET programs to the participating foreign military personnel is
the U.S. military`s distinct and highly professional identity. Savage and Caverley (2017)
argues that this improved professionalism increases the recipient militaries` capabilities
relative to the regime in a way that no other foreign aids do (human capital cannot be
redirected to coup-proofing), and this improved capability doubles the probability of militarybacked coup attempts. Another set of studies investigating whether U.S. IMET programs
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meet the stated goals focus on the exploration of the relationship between U.S. IMET
participation and democratic values and human rights both at the individual and state levels.
Reynolds (2001) investigates whether U.S. IMET programs successfully improve
individual participants` attitudes towards internationally recognized human rights. Through
surveying actual U.S. IMET participants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua
Reynolds (2001) finds promising but inconclusive results suggesting that U.S. IMET
participation facilitates improvement in individuals` respect for internationally recognized
human rights. Along similar lines, but with the inclusion of democratic values into the scope
of their investigation Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) present a study that explores the effects of
U.S. IMET on participating individuals. Employing a pair of pre and post participation
surveys for the international students of the 2010 U.S. National Defense University class the
authors find that participation in this PME course significantly improves the foreign military
personnel`s appreciation for both democratic values and human rights.
In her two studies Atkinson (2010, 2015) argues that the U.S. IMET programs are
effective soft power (Nye 1990; Williams 2004) tools in the hands of the United States since
they effectively promote American values and help diffusing democratic norms. According to
Atkinson (2010, 2015) U.S. IMET programs in general, but more specifically the professional
military education element in it (hereafter, PMEs) achieves this goal, because it improves the
participants` respect for democratic norms and human rights. Finally, using Reynolds (2001)
and Atkinson`s (2015) findings as their fundamental assumptions Omelicheva et al. (2017)
investigate how U.S. IMET affects the probability of human rights violations in conflict at the
state level. The authors find that more U.S. IMET participation is associated with less
atrocities against civilians during conflict.
While arriving to contradicting empirical findings all the reviewed studies seem to
share the same fundamental idea that U.S. IMET participation improves the professional
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qualities of the participating military personnel through the transmission of the professional
norms and values of the U.S. military and the improvement of personal qualities also leads to
an improvement in the military human capital of the recipient states. While Lefever (1976),
Fitch (1979), Ruby and Gibler (2010), and Savage and Caverley (2017), Omelicheva et al.
(2017) all use the idea of norm transmission as their theoretical framework they provide
neither a theory of norm transmission nor empirical evidence demonstrating whether this
transmission happen. Reynolds (2001) and Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) actually offer a test
to investigate whether norms are transmitted and how they change the U.S. IMET graduates
professional qualities. Although Reynolds` (2001) cross-national survey and Jungdahl and
Lambert`s (2012) pre and post-participation surveys at the U.S. National Defense University
both make significant contributions to the ongoing debate by providing empirical evidence of
attitude change among U.S. IMET graduates they do not explain the mechanisms through
which the norms are transmitted. Atkinson (2010, 2015) seems to be the only one till now
who proposes a theory for norm transmission and test that theory. She argues that two factors
influence the transmission of U.S. military norms and values to U.S. IMET participants.
According to the author these conditions are the depth and extent of social contacts, and
shared common identity. Atkinson (2010, 2015) argues that U.S. IMET programs allow
foreign military personnel and their families to directly interact with the American society for
an extended period of time which leads these soldiers and their families to absorb the
American values resulting in participants` improved respect of democratic norms and human
rights. Atkinson (2010, 2015) also suggests that these norms and values also diffuse in the
home countries because upon the U.S. IMET graduates` return home they promote the
learned values and norms to the rest of their society.
Although the reviewed studies provide significant contributions to better understand
the effects of U.S. foreign military education and training programs both at the individual and
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state levels they also leave room for expansion and further improvement. Further research can
provide both theoretical and methodological improvements leading to a stronger theory of
norms transmission and more convincing empirical evidence regarding the effects of U.S.
IMET participation.
In better investigating the individual level effects of U.S. IMET, further research can
address some of the research design limitations of previous studies (Reynolds 2001; Jungdahl
and Lambert 2012; Atkinson 2010, 2015) by including comparing and contrasting U.S. IMET
graduates with non-U.S. IMET graduates. To have a more comprehensive understanding
about the effects of the U.S. IMET programs, the scope of the investigation can be extended
from looking at the effects of U.S. IMET at the PME institutions (Jungdahl and Lambert
2012, Atkinson, 2010, 2015) or only within the E-U.S. IMET program (Reynolds 2001) to
including all U.S. IMET courses.
All prior studies that investigate the effects of U.S. IMET at the state level look at
domestic behavior and find contradictory results. This generates a need for further analysis
that contributes to the ongoing discussion by providing stronger evidence in support of either
side (Fitch 1979, Savage and Caverley 2017, and Ruby and Gibler 2010). At the same time,
the prior focus on domestic behavior and the ignorance of international effects requires
further investigation with regards to the effects of U.S. IMET on states` international conflict
behavior. An assessment of such relationship is a major contribution to international relations
literature.
The dissertation proceeds with the investigation of three independent but interrelated
questions with the aim to improve and expand existing research along the discussed
opportunities as well as to provide direct feedback to policymakers about the effectiveness of
the U.S. IMET programs.
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CHAPTER THREE - IMPROVING FOREIGN MILITARIES – THE
EFFECTS OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
AND TRAINING PROGRAMS ON PARTICIPATING INDIVIDUALS
Abstract
How do the U.S. IMET programs affect the participating individuals? While the studies that
investigate the effects of the U.S. IMET programs at the participating individual level all
seem to assume that participation in these programs improves the personal qualities of the
participants through the transmission of the professional norms and values of the U.S.
military such as respect for democratic values, human rights and civil control, no studies have
provided either a strong theory of norm transmission or convincing empirical evidence
whether this process actually happens. This study indents to fill this void. I theorize that the
norms and values of the U.S. military are transmitted to U.S. IMET participants through the
mechanisms of formal learning, direct exposure, and common professional identity and with
that the personal qualities of participants indeed improve. I test the proposed theory through
the employment of a survey conducted in Hungary with 350 military respondents and indepth interviews of 14 Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates. The results of the analysis
demonstrate that the professional norms and values of the U.S. military are indeed
transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. Since graduates of these programs demonstrate higher
respect for human rights, democratic values and civilian control than their non-U.S. IMET
graduate peers the findings of this study support the argument that U.S. IMET participation is
associated with improved personal qualities and with that better military human capital of the
recipient states. I also find initial promising results showing that the transmitted values
further diffuse within the participants` military organizations.
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Introduction
How do the U.S. IMET programs affect the participating individuals? While one of the main
goals of the U.S. IMET programs is to improve the military human capital of the recipient
states through the transmission of the U.S. military`s professional norms and values such as
the respect of democratic values, human rights, and civil control to participating individuals
(Cope, 1995; Atkinson, 2010; Ruby and Gibler 2010; Savage and Caverley 2017), whether
and how this norm transmission to participating individuals actually happens has not yet been
convincingly established in international relations literature. Besides the lack of a strong
theory of norm transmission and convincing empirical evidence in support of the existence of
such process, answering this research question is also important because the 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act codifies the requirement for the Department of Defense to
evaluate all security assistance programs, including the U.S. IMET programs to determine
whether these programs effectively meet their assigned goals yet due to resource constrains
this has not been done yet. Furthermore, the fact that the empirical records of U.S. IMET
graduates` behavior regarding those three international norms demonstrate quite a variance
makes this question even more interesting. While throughout the U.S. IMET programs`
history graduates have demonstrated high level personal qualities by playing crucial roles in
their home countries` democratic political transformations (Mali 1991), championing the
cause of human rights (Thailand 1992) and putting down numerous attempts against
democratically elected civil governments (Venezuela 1992, Guatemala 1993) one can easily
find several unpleasant examples as well (Cope, 1995). The U.S. IMET programs graduated
several Latin American officers who later became well known human rights abusers
(Grimmett and Sullivan, 2001), leaders in coup attempts (Honduras, 2009 or Mali 2012) as
well as infamous terrorist leaders like Abu Omar al-Shishani, the Islamic State terrorist
group`s “minister of war” (Savage and Caverley, 2017).
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Additionally, besides all the discussed factors the fact that all recent U.S.
administrations have been giving a significant role in their national security strategies to
activities through, by and with allied and partner militaries, also increases the importance of
better understanding the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on the participating individuals.
Finally, a clearer understanding of U.S. IMET related considerations might also have some
valuable contributions to the more general international relations discussion about the
potential effects of U.S. foreign aid.
Prior studies (Lefever 1976; Cope, 1995; Miller, 2006; Atkinson, 2010, 2015; Ruby
and Gibler 2010; Savage and Caverley 2017; Omelicheva et al., 2017) that evaluate the value
and effectiveness of the U.S. foreign military education and training efforts all seem to
assume that during the participation in these programs; the recipient states` military human
capital is being improved due to the fact that the professional norms and values of the U.S.
military are transmitted to the participating individuals. At the same time, none of these
studies provide neither a strong theory of norm transmission at the individual level nor
convincing evidence that these processes actually occur. This study intends to fill some of
this void. Using prior arguments from the socialization literature I theorize that the
professional norms of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted during the U.S. IMET
programs through the mechanisms of formal learning, direct exposure, and common identity,
and with that the military human capital of the recipient states improves. I test this theory by
employing a survey conducted in Hungary with 350 military respondents and in-depth
interviews of 14 Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates. Empirically, I find that U.S. IMET
participants indeed show more respect for human rights, democratic values, and civil control
than those who have not participated in such U.S. military education and training programs.
Besides providing support for norm transmission the results also suggest that the U.S. IMET
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programs meet those goals that Congress assigned to them and effectively improve the
military human capital of the recipient states.
The paper proceeds in six parts. It starts with a short introduction of international
norms and a review of the literature that has explored the effects of the U.S. IMET programs.
Next, the study proposes a theory of norm transmission during the U.S. IMET programs and
then proceeds with the introduction of the research design which includes the discussion of
the data collection techniques and the method of analysis. Next, I discuss the results of the
analysis. Using a sample of Hungarian military personnel I find that the professional norms
of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. Since graduates of
these programs demonstrate higher respect for human rights, democratic values and civilian
control than their non-U.S. IMET graduate peers the findings of this study support my
argument that U.S. IMET participation is associated with improved personal qualities and
with that better military human capital of the recipient states. Next, I address some potential
limitations and criticisms. Then close the study with a short summary of the findings and
discussion of contributions.

International Norms and U.S. IMET
Numerous studies in the international relations literature argue that norms cross over borders
and influence behavior both at the individual and state levels. Scholars have offered several
definitions of these international norms. Krasner (1983) and Cortell and Davis (1996) suggest
that norms “represent standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations”
(Cortell and Davis, 1996: 452). Farrell (2001) argues that “norms are intersubjective beliefs
about the social and natural world which define actors, their situations and the possibilities of
action. Norms are intersubjective in that they are beliefs rooted in, and reproduced through,
social practice” (Farrell, 2001: 71). Towns (2012) argues that norms are “essentially about
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value—they validate certain kinds of behavior for speciﬁc sorts of actors and devalue other
sorts of behavior” (Towns, 2012: 187). Among many others, internationally recognized
norms include free trade (Finlayson and Zacher, 1983), human rights (Risse and Sikkink,
1999), sovereignty (Kratochwil, 1989), and collective security (Ruggie, 1992).
There are also internationally recognized norms that are considered fundamental
characteristics of a professional military. As Farrell (2001) notes these norms “are beliefs
held by military officers, expressed and codified in military literature, reinforced in military
education, and embodied in military practice about how militaries that aspire to be
professional should organize themselves and act” (Farrell, 2001: 73) He also suggests that
“military norms provide cognitive and normative frames to guide professional practice that
are history contingent” (Farrell, 2001:78). When referring to these transnational military
norms I do not talk about beliefs about specific tactics, techniques, and procedures, but rather
fundamental norms and values that considered the core of transnational military practice.
As Avant (2000) argues transnational military norms were not developed during a
natural, Darwinian evolution rather they were created through social interaction and
collective learning during several centuries. Additionally, Avant (2000) suggests that the
actual content of these norms and how this content is applied also evolved over these
centuries. For the purposes of this study I focus on three of these transnational military
norms: respect of democratic values, human rights, and civilian supremacy over the military.
These norms evolved over time in individual states and started becoming
transnational military norms with the spread of the western style state from the 16th century
onwards. The three norms in question experienced especially strong international diffusion
and acceptance during the second half of the 20th century when they were codified in a series
of international treaties (Farrell, 2001).
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Based on Atkinson (2010) Ruby and Gibler (2010), and Savage and Caverley (2017) I
argue that respect of democratic values, human rights, and civilian supremacy over the
military are the core values of the U.S. military and integral part of its professional identity.
The 1978 and 1992 amendments to the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act specifically directs the foreign military education and training efforts,
especially the U.S. IMET programs to spread these norms among the foreign participants.
Prior studies exploring whether these norms are transmitted to the participating foreign
military personnel (Lefever, 1976; Atkinson, 2010; Ruby and Gibler, 2010; Savage and
Caverley, 2017) seem to leave some room for improvement and expansion because they
neither provide a mechanism for such transmission nor present convincing empirical
evidence to effectively support the existence of such processes.
In an early study Lefever (1976) proposes that U.S. foreign military education and
training increases the personal qualities and professional performance of participating
individuals but does not support his assertions with convincing empirical evidence. Based on
his study that focuses on Latin American countries, Fitch (1979) also argues that participation
in U.S. IMET programs increases the level of professionalism of the participants but suggests
that this improvement in personal qualities lead to negative consequences. Fitch (1979)
suggests that U.S. educated and trained foreign military personnel see themselves as an
alternative solution to the civilian government in times of political crisis which results in the
institutionalization of coup d’état. Similarly to Lefever (1976) Fitch`s (1979) argument seems
to require further supporting evidence to make their argument stronger because their scope is
limited to only Latin America and explore the relationship in a very specific timeframe.
Savage and Caverley (2017) presents a similar argument about the relationship between U.S.
IMET and military backed coups. The authors argue that the norm most likely to be
transmitted through the U.S. IMET programs to the participating foreign officers and non24

commissioned officers is the U.S. military`s distinct and highly professional identity, which
ultimately increase the recipient militaries` capabilities relative to the regime in a way that no
other foreign aid does, by improving military human capital. According to Savage and
Caverley (2017) because the improved military human capital cannot be redirected to coupproofing by the regime, it doubles the probability of military-backed coup attempts. Although
the authors present a convincing argument regarding the potential effects of the U.S. IMET
program they do not discuss how the norms are transmitted and do not provide empirical
evidence to support the existence of such process. Ruby and Gibler (2010) presents a
challenge to Fitch`s (1979) and Savage and Caverley`s (2017) argument and suggest that U.S.
IMET participation is associated with a decrease in probability of military backed coups.
According to the authors U.S. IMET programs develop the recipient countries` military
human capital because U.S. IMET participants absorb the professional norms and values of
the U.S. military. While Ruby and Gibler (2010) argue that U.S. IMET graduates return home
with better respect of democratic norms and civil control, which ultimately leads to decreased
probability of military backed coups within the recipient countries similarly to Fitch (1979)
and Savage and Caverley (2017) they offer neither a theory of norm transmission nor
evidence for the existence of the process. Several studies that explore the individual level
effects of U.S. IMET participation seem to address some of the theoretical issues and the lack
of evidence of these studies.
While not offering an actual theory of norms transmission Reynolds (2001)
investigates the relationship between U.S. Enhanced IMET program (hereafter, U.S. EIMET) participation and respect of human rights. The author argues that U.S. E-IMET
participation facilitates improvement in individuals` respect for internationally recognized
human rights and test this assertion through cross-national surveys. Using a sample of actual
U.S. E-IMET participants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, Reynolds finds
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promising but inconclusive results regarding the positive effects of U.S. E-IMET
participation on attitudes towards human rights.
Along similar lines, but with the inclusion of democratic values into the scope of their
investigation Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) present a study that explores the effects of U.S.
IMET on participating individuals. Employing a pair of pre and post participation surveys for
the international students of the 2010 U.S. National Defense University class the authors find
that participation in this PME course significantly improves the foreign military personnel`s
appreciation for both democratic values and human rights. Although similarly to Reynolds
(2001), Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) do not offer a theory of norms transmission their results
provide a strong evidence that U.S. IMET participation indeed affects the participating
individuals and positively changes their attitudes towards democracy and human rights.
Atkinson (2015) seems to be the only one who both proposes a theory of norms
transmission and conducts empirical testing of her theory. Similarly to Jungdahl and Lambert
(2012) Atkinson`s (2015) investigation focuses on exploring how U.S. IMET participation
affects individual level respect of democratic values and human rights. According to
Atkinson (2015) U.S. IMET, especially the professional military education program
(hereafter, PMEs) allows foreign military personnel and their families to directly interact with
the American society for an extended period of time which leads these soldiers and their
families to absorb the American norms and values resulting in participants` improved respect
of democratic norms and human rights. Atkinson (2015) also suggests that upon their return
to their home countries U.S. IMET participants promote the learned values and norms to the
rest of their military and even the entire society. Using Reynolds (2001); Jungdahl and
Lambert (2012) and Atkinson`s (2015) findings as fundamental assumptions Omelicheva et
al. (2017) investigate how U.S. IMET programs affect the probability of human rights
violations in conflict. The authors argue that U.S. IMET participants “acquire a better
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understanding of the ways in which the U.S. military operates, an appreciation of its
foundational values, personal connections to the people espousing those values, and,
possibly, even a desire to emulate them” (Omelicheva et al. 2017:129). The authors argue
that due to this norms transmission more U.S. IMET participation is associated with less
atrocities against civilians during conflict.
Although the reviewed studies provide significant contributions to better understand
the effects of the U.S. IMET programs at the individual level they also leave room for
expansion and further improvement. Further research can provide both theoretical and
methodological improvements leading to a stronger theory of norms transmission and more
convincing empirical evidence regarding the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on
participating individuals.
First, while Reynolds (2001) makes significant initial contributions to the literature
through his cross-national12 investigation and finds promising results regarding the individual
level positive effects of the U.S. IMET programs his limited scope generates a need for
further improvement. The author limits his investigation only to participants of eight U.S. EIMET courses with a very small sample size.13 These issues generate some opportunities to
further improve Reynolds` (2001) research by offering a theory of norms transmission and
including non-graduates into the sample to compare their attitudes with the U.S. IMET
graduates. Finally, extending the scope of the investigation to all U.S. IMET courses can
provide stronger evidence regarding the effect of these programs.
Additionally, while Atkinson`s (2015) study offers both a theory of norms
transmission and empirical testing of this theory her work can also be further expanded. Both

12

The author surveys E-U.S. IMET graduates from three Latin-American countries including El Salvador,
Guatemala and Nicaragua.
13
68 respondents from El Salvador, 12 respondents from Guatemala and 35 respondents from Nicaragua
bringing the total number of participants to 115 E-U.S. IMET graduates.
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Atkinson (2015) and Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) investigate the effects of U.S. IMET
participation by only looking at PME institutions. These studies only include U.S. IMET
courses with very specific curriculum and high-ranking foreign participants. These factors
generate potential selection bias by excluding a large number of U.S. IMET participants and
with that their samples are also not representative. These factors limit the validity of the
findings of these studies. Additionally, similarly to Reynolds (2001), both Atkinson (2015)
and Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) only include U.S. IMET graduates in their assessment
while missing the opportunity to compare and contrast the attitudes of U.S. IMET
participants with those who never participated in the U.S. IMET programs.14 The expansion
of the scope of these studies by including additional U.S. IMET courses and adding non-U.S.
IMET graduates to the sample of the investigation generates an opportunity to provide a
stronger theory of norms transmission and further empirical evidence regarding the individual
level effects of the U.S. IMET programs.
The next section of this paper intends to expand and further improve these prior
arguments by presenting a theoretical framework for norm transmission at the individual
level and testing both this theory and some previously untested assumptions of previous
studies with the aim to provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs.

Theoretical Argument
Farrell (2001) argues that militaries and individual military professionals admire the norms,
ideas and procedures of those foreign militaries that have won victories in recent wars or
have gone through major technological developments. According to Farrell (2001) military
organizations emulate the norms and procedures of those victorious examples even if those

14

Jungdahl and Lambert`s (2012) pre and post survey address this issue to a certain extent, but the inclusion of
non-graduates can provide stronger support to the findings.
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norms and procedures do not fit the strategic interest of the given countries. The author
argues that the implementation of an American style military, following the U.S. dramatic
victory in the Gulf Wars, in countries like Botswana, Monaco or Micronesia are clear
examples of such norm emulation (Farrell 2001; Goldman 2003, 2006). Based on this
argument I propose that most military and with that most individual military personnel
around the world admire the recent victories and technical advancement of the U.S. military
and want to emulate its norms and values.
According to several institutionalist studies (Katzenstein 1996; Farrell, 2001;
Goldman 2003, 2006) transnational norms transmitted among the members of professional
organizations when they socialize “in professional networks and come to share norms of
appropriate behavior and identity” (Goldman, 2006: 72). Katzenstein (1996), Farrell (2001)
and Goldman (2003) and Giraldi (2012) argue that military norms are shared in the same way
through the process of learning15 and suggest that the worldwide spread of the norm of
conventional warfare is one example of such diffusion through the learning process (Farrell,
2001). Atkinson (2010) proposes two additional mechanisms through which professional
military norms are transmitted at the individual level. According to the author the success of
norm transmission depends on the extent of social interactions between the U.S. IMET
participants and the American society and the sense of common identity the participants share
with their fellow American service members16 (Atkinson, 2010). Combining the arguments

15

Giraldi (2012) suggests that diffusion mechanisms can be categorized into four groups: coercion, competition,
learning, and emulation. According to Giraldi (2012) norm diffusion through coercion happening when a strong
country or an international organization forces policy change within a country. The author suggests that
competition happens when the different countries influence each other either for economic or security reasons.
In Giraldi`s (2012) framework diffusion happens through learning when “experience of other countries can
supply useful information on the likely consequences of a policy” (Giraldi, 2012: 13) while “emulation means
that the normative and socially constructed characteristics of policies matter more than their objective
consequences” (Giraldi, 2012: 13).
16
Atkinson (2010) also suggests a third condition, namely whether upon their return to their home countries the
participants attain influential military or policy positions, but since this condition relates to the question whether
the norms further diffuse within the recipient states` military organization I do not discuss that in this study.
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of Katzenstein (1996), Farrell (2001), Goldman (2003) and Atkinson (2010) I theorize that
the U.S. IMET programs are unique opportunities for the U.S. military to socialize its norms
in a multinational professional network and to share appropriate forms of behavior and
identity with foreign military personnel. I propose that the professional norms of the U.S.
military are transmitted to the participating individuals through three mechanisms: formal
learning, direct exposure, and common identity. These three mechanisms do not act in a
vacuum, but rather reinforce each other`s effects. As Atkinson (2010) argues the U.S. IMET
programs act as unique “socialization channel through which formal programs and informal
interactions reinforce ideas on civil-military relations in a democratic state” (Atkinson, 2010:
6).
The first mechanism that enables the transmission of the three norms investigated here
is formal learning. The U.S. IMET programs are education and training events that are
uniquely designed to facilitate learning and demonstration of appropriate behavior. Although
the majority of the U.S. IMET courses do not focus on the investigated three norms they still
contain several short lectures, discussions and practical exercises that are designed with the
sole purpose to educate participants about the importance of these fundamental beliefs and
provide opportunities to U.S. military personnel to demonstrate appropriate behavior.
Additionally, the E-U.S. IMET courses` curriculum`s single focus is to educate participants
about the norms of respect of democratic values, human rights and civil control. Beyond
these elements in the curriculum there are several other factors that makes the U.S. IMET
program a unique platform for norm transmission compared to any other foreign military
training efforts. First, U.S. IMET receives the largest number of foreign military personnel
which creates a unique professional networking opportunity. Second, the execution of the
U.S. IMET program`s curriculum and the achievement of its educational goals are supported
by the world`s largest military education and training infrastructure, the biggest training
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budget and the most experienced military education and training cadre (Savage and Caverley,
2017). Besides the learning specific factors of the U.S. IMET program, the norm transmission
is also supported by a less formal factor, the so-called Informational Programs (hereafter, IP).
These programs are integral part of the U.S. IMET experience and exclusively focus
on exposing foreign participants to the ideas of democracy and human rights (Cope, 1995;
Atkinson 2015). The IP are purposefully designed to expose foreign military personnel to
American social and cultural events such as visits to historical sites, culture centers and
museums. During these events foreign military personnel and their families are exposed to
U.S. society, culture, and history. Although the IP is not mandatory for U.S. IMET
participants since they can take their entire families to these events for free of charge the
majority of U.S. IMET participants take advantage of these events (Cope, 1995; Atkinson
2015). These IPs are important elements in the transmission of norms because as several
studies from different disciplines find the type and extent of the social interaction between
foreign participants and the host country influence the attitudes of these individuals toward
the norms and values of that country (Selltiz et al. 1963; Sunal and Sunal 1991; Ye 2001;
Miller 2006, Atkinson, 2010). Besides formal learning and direct exposure, the shared
professional identity also plays a crucial role in the transmission of the norms of the U.S.
military.
Atkinson (2010) argues that although the level of the individual-to-individual
interaction matters, it is even more important with whom this interaction happens. Several
studies from different disciplines (Selltiz et al. 1963; Ye 2001, Akerlof and Kranton, 2005)
establish that sharing a common identity and belonging to the same professional community
affects the participants` individual attitudes toward different norms and values. Akerlof and
Kranton (2005) specifically argue that the U.S. military purposefully develops a common
identity as a professional motivator and immerses foreign military personnel into them
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completely during their U.S. IMET participation. According to Atkinson (2010) U.S. IMET
programs “all share a deeply imbedded common identity” (Atkinson, 2010: 6) which
incentivize foreign military personnel to emulate such norms.
The findings of Cope`s (1995) survey based study seems to provide some empirical
evidence for the presented three mechanisms since he suggests that foreign military personnel
learn about democracy, human rights and appropriate civil-military relationship during the
U.S. IMET programs through dedicated courses, contact with U.S. service members and
civilians, as well as just from living in the U.S. One of Cope`s (1995) respondent summarized
the value of the U.S. IMET program participation as the “education, exposure and breadth of
understanding” (Cope, 1995: 21).
Of course, these mechanisms do not affect everyone the same way. As the examples
discussed in the introduction suggest U.S. IMET attendance might have an opposite effect or
no effects at all on the participating individuals. No doubt, there are several U.S. IMET
graduates whose actions do not reflect positive attitudes towards the investigated three norms.
There may also be individuals who come to the U.S. from countries and cultures with strong
traditions that cannot be changed through those mechanisms to which these individuals are
exposed during their U.S. IMET participation. Cope (1995) argues that there always are U.S.
IMET participants who have neither interest in learning the professional norms of the U.S.
military nor are interested in sharing a common professional identity with their American
peers. Additionally, the author also suggests that some foreign military participants might
refuse to participate in programs that expose them to the American way of life. Although
Cope (1995) suggests that these U.S. IMET students are atypical and represent only a small
portion of the graduates of the U.S. IMET programs the existence of such examples makes
the better understanding of the mechanisms of the norm transmission and the overall effects
of the U.S. IMET programs even more important.
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Based on the above discussion I propose that the norms of respect of democratic
values, human rights and civil supremacy indeed transmitted to foreign military personnel
during their participation in the U.S. IMET programs and this transmission happens through
the mechanism of formal learning, direct exposure and shared professional identity. These
assertions lead me to the following three testable hypotheses.
H1. In comparison of individual military personnel, U.S. IMET graduates
demonstrate more respect for democratic values than non-graduates.
H2. In comparison of individual military personnel, U.S. IMET graduates
demonstrate more respect for human rights than non-graduates.
H3. In comparison of individual military personnel, U.S. IMET graduates are less
likely to support military intervention into domestic politics than non-graduates.
Research design
This study was conducted using a survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews on a sample
of Hungarian military personnel.17 The survey was conducted in Hungary in Hungarian
between 18 June and 8 July 2019. The in-depth interviews were conducted between 26
October and 15 November 2019. The survey`s primary purpose is to measure whether a
difference exists between U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates` attitudes towards the
investigated three norms and to identify potential mechanisms through which the U.S.
military`s professional norms are transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. The interviews are
conducted to provide additional support to the findings of the survey and to help better
understanding the mechanisms of norms transmission.
Hungary and the Hungarian military were chosen as a case for this research project
for several theoretical and practical reasons. First, although following the end of the Cold
War the U.S. has provided significant military aid to former Eastern Bloc countries in the

17

Military personnel who participated and did not participate in U.S. U.S. IMET programs.
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form of international military education and training, these countries have never been the
subject of U.S. IMET related research. Hungary is not only one of these countries, but it is an
interesting case regarding democratic norms and human rights. Hungary played a crucial role
towards the end of the Cold War in the democratization process of the former Eastern Bloc,
and for years served as an example for the rest of the former Warsaw Pact countries in the
implementation of international democratic values and respecting human rights. However, the
country`s recent history has shown some serious backsliding in those universal norms (Agh,
2016). Hungary has been recently accused by several members of the international
community of activities that violate basic democratic values and limit universal human rights
(Agh, 2016). As Agh (2016) reports the European Union has initiated several investigations
into these claims and is looking into whether recent Hungarian governmental actions indeed
restrict the freedom of the press, limit the activities of civil organizations, or create unfair
conditions for opposition parties.
Additionally, Hungary has participated in the U.S. U.S. IMET program since 1991.
The almost 30 years of participation and the fact that the majority of the Hungarian senior
military leaders are graduates of the U.S. IMET program provide an appropriate case for the
purposes of this investigation. Furthermore, according to the U.S. Office of Defense
Cooperation18 (hereafter, ODC) in Budapest approximately 3,00019 Hungarian military
personnel has participated in the U.S. IMET program since 1991. From the 3,000 military
personnel about 500 were female while the remaining 2,500 were male. While the male

18

According to the website of the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, The Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) is
responsible for: “promoting, developing, coordinating and executing the following programs with Hungary:
Security Assistance, Foreign Military Financing/Sales (FMF/FMS), International Military Education and
Training (U.S. IMET), Defense Cooperation in Armaments (DCA), Engagement Activities, Hungary-Ohio State
Partnership Program (SPP), Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), Marshall Center, and Counter Terrorism
Program” (https://hu.usembassy.gov/embassy/budapest/sections-offices/defense-cooperation/)
19
This study has exact data about the number of participants between 1991 and 2015. During this timeframe
2112 Hungarian military personnel attended U.S. IMET programs.
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participants mostly attended combat arms courses, the females mostly participated in training
and education events that were related to language training, logistics, defense management,
communication, medical and air traffic controller occupational specialties. Command and
staff college and military university level education has been exclusively attended by male
military personnel till 2019, however this year the first Hungarian female officer is attending
the U.S. National Defense University in Washington D.C.20 Additional information about the
specific number of Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates and the annual U.S. IMET budget
dedicated to Hungary can be found in Savage and Caverley`s (2017) dataset and the U.S.
State Department`s Archive website.21 Table 1. depicts the number of Hungarian U.S. IMET
participants and U.S. IMET budget allocation between 1991 and 2015.
Although the curriculum of the courses, in which Hungarian military personnel have
attended do not exclusively focus on the respect of democratic values, human rights and civil
control all these courses included presentations and briefs regarding those three norms.
Additionally IP events were integral part of all these programs meaning that most Hungarian
participants22 and their families could participate in social and cultural events that were
specifically designed to improve foreign participants appreciation of democratic values and
human rights. These facts are important for the argument of this paper, because if I find
support for my expectations than it means U.S. military norms transmitted to foreign
participants even if the formal education and training they received did not specifically focus
on democratic values, human rights and civil control. Besides Hungary being an interesting

20

The information provided by the ODC in Budapest is approximate. ODC could not provide any additional
details regarding the demographic data of the participants or the distribution of courses among different
services. Additionally, the ODC informed me that it does not maintain a comprehensive dataset about the
participants in the U.S. IMET programs and it does not have knowledge about the existence of such dataset in
any U.S. records.
21
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm
22
Only 8 respondents out of the 140 U.S. IMET graduates reported that they did not participate in any IP event,
while 111 respondents answered that they attended in three or more such activities.
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case because of its 30 years of participation in the U.S. IMET program, it’s close to 3,000
U.S. IMET graduates and its turbulent history with democratic values and human rights,
some additional practical reasons also affected the case selection.
First, as a former Hungarian military officer accessing military personnel, sites and
other necessary resources, securing approval for the execution of the survey and making sure
that appropriate type and number of respondents were selected for the purposes of the study
was easier for me than conducting the same type of research in other countries.
Table 1. Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates and Annual U.S. IMET Budget Dedicated to
Hungary Per Fiscal Year23
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

23

Number of
Students
18
49
60
44
35
58
49
60
197
143
103
132
170
251
111
113
90
68
110
53
37
45
42
37
37

Annual U.S. IMET Budget
in $Thousands
334
836
892
875
975
1243
1198
1573
1314
1576
1536
1940
2006
2109
1985
1632
1372
1088
1014
1060
1077
947
1044
1000
1000

Sources are Savage and Caverley (2017) dataset, State Department Archive Website and ODC in Budapest.
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Second, as a native Hungarian speaker I could quickly and accurately respond to the
questions of the respondents which prevented potential misunderstandings and helped
minimizing potential measurement errors. The easier access to respondents and other
resources also enabled me to conduct a pilot survey before the actual survey was fielded to
address potential question design issues and give me a chance to modify questions if they
were necessary further mitigating potential measurement errors.
The pilot survey was conducted on 16 June 2019 with 12 respondents. The
respondents were handpicked from the author`s personal professional network and
represented all demographic groups that were expected to participate in the main survey.
These respondents were asked to fill out the survey through the internet and they were not resurveyed in the actual data collection. The participants in the pilot did not report any concerns
and suggested that all questions were clear and understandable which led me to field the
survey unchanged.24
The actual survey contains 37 questions, which can be divided into four parts. The
first part focuses on gathering data from the respondents on their demographic details with
the aim to collect information on potential control variables. The second part of the survey
intends to gather information on how respondents consider their level of military skills and
experience. The third part includes sensitive questions that are aiming to gather information
for testing the above proposed hypotheses. The final part of the survey gathers U.S. IMET
specific information to allow the identification of variance within the group of U.S. IMET
graduates. The actual survey questionnaire can be reviewed in Appendix A while the code
book for the questionnaire is included in Appendix B.

24

The pilot was also useful to determine the average time needed for conducting the survey (7 minutes and 35
seconds). Based on the pilot results the time was set for 10 minutes. This information was included in the
heading of the final questionnaire for respondents` awareness.
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The sample size of for the survey was determined based on the actual size of the
Hungarian military. While the authorized size of the Hungarian Defense Forces is 25,000,
only about 18,000 positions are filled by military personnel because the remaining positions
are either unfilled (around 4,500) or filled by civilians. Additionally, about 8,000 to 9,000
soldiers are enlisted who are normally not eligible to participate in U.S. IMET25 leaving the
potential population of this study around 9,000 officers and non-commissioned officers.
Considering the number of potentially available U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates
during the time period when the survey was planned to be administered, and to make sure
that the results of this analysis are robust the sample size for this study was set to 350 military
personnel26 including 140 U.S. IMET graduates and 210 non-graduates.
To ensure the validity of the survey results I used multi-level random selection
method. First, I randomly assigned two-digit numbers to each Hungarian military
organization in three categories: land forces (10-30), air forces (40-60), command and
supporting organizations (70-90). After that I randomly chose one from each group by pulling
out numbers from each group. Since the Hungarian special forces has only one unit I added
this site without any random selection to the other three selected locations. This selection
method enabled me to ensure that all three services of the Hungarian Defense Forces were
represented in the sample as well as the higher-level command organizations that has oversite
over all three services. In each location I was presented by all available personnel on the
given day when I visited the organization. I asked individuals to tell me whether they
participated in U.S. IMET training or not. After receiving their answers I selected individuals

Enlisted personnel are usually only eligible to participate in U.S. IMET if they belong to “unconventional”
formations such as Special Forces, where enlisted personnel act in similar capacity as non-commissioned
officers in conventional formations. Their number is quite low in the Hungarian military and were ignored for
the purposes of this study.
26
The sample size represents approximately 3.9% of the entire population.
25
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as respondents by tossing a coin (I changed the “winner” side at each location). In each case I
originally over selected the potential participants to allow me to match U.S. IMET graduates
and non-graduates based on their rank, gender, and age. Due to the fact that different group of
people were available at the given times at the different locations and because in the
Hungarian military the representation of different demographic groups are not balanced
(disproportionately large number of older, male, senior officers; significant number missing
from middle-aged mid-rank officers) the sample is not perfectly balanced on demographic
information, however it does represent the actual characteristics of the Hungarian Defense
Forces. The final distribution of U.S. IMET graduates in the sample is 47 from the Land
forces, 18 from Special Forces, 30 from the Air force and 45 respondents from higher
command. That brings the total number of U.S. IMET graduate respondents to 140. In the
group of non-U.S. IMET graduates 69 Land forces representative, 27 Special Forces
respondents, 46 Air force personnel and 68 respondents from higher commands were selected
randomly bringing the total number of non-U.S. IMET graduates to 210. The numbers of
both U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates are proportional to the actual number of the
members of these organizations within the Hungarian Defense Forces. The selected
respondents represent between 5 and 10% of the manning of the organizations which makes
the sample strongly representative.
The survey was fielded in four different physical locations at four different times (two
days at each location). At three locations I administered the survey personally while at the
fourth location it was administered by a Hungarian military officer who was personally
trained by me. In all four cases the survey was conducted using a paper-based form. The
respondents filled out the survey either in a classroom/briefing room or an office like setting.
The in-depth interviews contain 17 semi-structured questions. The first 8 questions
focus on gathering demographic data from the respondents while the remaining 9 questions
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collect information about the U.S. IMET graduates experiences during their participation in
these programs. The goal of these latter questions was to help better understanding the
mechanisms of norms transmission. The actual interview questions can be reviewed in
Appendix C. The in-depth interviews were conducted via phone and social media platforms
(Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, and Windows Messenger) with 14 Hungarian military personnel.
The number of interviewees were determined as 10% of the overall Hungarian U.S. IMET
graduates chosen for the survey. The 14 respondents were handpicked from the author`s
personal professional network from those who participated in the survey. These participants
were chosen to represent all demographic groups of the Hungarian U. S. IMET graduates
including gender, rank and the three services. The individual information of the interviewees
can be reviewed in Appendix D.

Dependent and Independent Variables
There are three dependent variables in this study. The first dependent variable is respect of
democratic values. This variable is measured in a scale ranging from 1 to 10 where 10 is the
highest respect for democratic values. The second dependent variable is respect for human
rights and similarly to the first dependent variable it is measured on a scale from 1 to 10 with
10 being the most respect. The last dependent variable is respect of civil supremacy over the
military also measured the same way as the previous two outcome variables. The actual
wording of the questions related to each dependent variable can be reviewed in Figure 4. My
main independent variable is U.S. IMET participation. This is a dichotomous variable which
takes the value of 0 if the respondent has not participated in any U.S. IMET programs and 1 if
he has attended such training.
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Control Variables
Since the primary objective of this study is to measure individual level sentiments towards
democratic values, human rights, and civil supremacy over the military the analysis controls
for standard individual level variables including age, gender, and level of education. Several
studies (Barro, 1999; Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Papaioannou
and Siourounis, 2005) suggest that older people, females, and more educated individuals are
more likely to have higher respect for democratic values.
Dependent Variables
DV#1: Democratic Values
1-10 (Strongly DisagreeStrongly Agree)
DV#2: Human Rights
1-10 (Strongly DisagreeStrongly Agree)
DV#3: Civil Control
1-10 (Strongly DisagreeStrongly Agree)

Question
To what extent do you agree with the following
statement?
Freedom of speech, free elections, and justice for
all must be respected under every circumstance.
To what extent do you agree with the following
statement?
Universal human rights must be respected under
every circumstance.
To what extent do you agree with the following
statement?
The military should be involved in the
formulation of domestic policies.

Figure 4. Actual Survey Questions for the Dependent Variables
I also include these same variables into the models that assess the level of respect of human
rights and civil control. Age is divided into five age groups starting with 18 to 25, 26 to 35,
36 to 45, 46 to 55 and 55+ categories. The gender variable is binary and assumes the value of
0 for males and 1 for females. The education variable contains five categories including basic
education, high school, college, university, and PhD level education. This variable is ranked
from 1 (basic education) to 5 (PhD school). As an additional indicator for the level of
education within the military I also control for the number of languages the individuals speak.
To account for potential military specific effects I include control variables that measure the
individuals` rank and their years of service. I use these control variables because I expect that
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higher-ranking individuals with more rights and responsibilities should have more respect for
the three norms and rank might serve as an alternative explanation independent from U.S.
IMET participation. Duration of service is also used as a control variable because the more
time a soldier spends in a military organization the more opportunities he might get where he
can interact with soldiers from the U.S. (multinational exercises, mobile training teams,
military-to-military events, etc.) which can serve as a reinforcing mechanism for the norm
transmission. Finally, I include two additional binary variables to account for respondents`
combat deployment and additional foreign training other than U.S. training. The former
variable is included because Hungarian soldiers who have participated in combat deployment
have always been deployed as part of a multinational force and most of the time alongside
their U.S. peers. I argue that these deployments might also serve as reinforcement
mechanisms to further deepen the individual attitudes towards the investigated three norms.
Last, but not least the other foreign military training and education variable is included
because the effective isolation of the effects of the U.S. IMET programs from other
international education and training efforts can provide strong support to the findings of this
analysis. Both of these variables assume the value of 0 if individuals did not participate in
either combat deployment or other foreign training and the value of 1 if they did. The
summary statistics of the variables can be reviewed in Appendix E.

Estimation Method
Since the participants of this survey were randomly selected the first set of models assess the
effects of U.S. IMET participation on the three dependent variables using linear regression
technique. However, since in observational studies one of the potential inferential issues is
that the selection into the treatment group (in this case participation in U.S. IMET programs)
might be influenced by the subjects` base line characteristics I also estimate the effects of
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U.S. IMET participation by employing propensity score matching technique. This method
was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and designed to address selection bias and
move researchers towards more casual estimates.
The first step of this method is the calculation of the probability (propensity score) of
an individual experiencing the treatment, in other words being selected for U.S. IMET
participation. The next step is using the calculated propensity scores and match individuals
who has similar probability of participating in U.S. IMET. This allows one to have a more
convincing comparison where the treated and untreated groups are similar on their observable
characteristics. Next, it is necessary to evaluate the quality of the match by using statistical
techniques to ensure that there is an acceptable level of balance of covariates. Finally, the
process concludes with the evaluation of the effects of the treatment on the outcome variables
(Pan and Bai, 2015).

Results and Discussion
Table 2. contains the results of nine linear regression models that assess the effects of U.S.
IMET participation on individuals` attitudes towards democratic values, human rights, and
civil control over the military. The first three models explore the relationship between U.S.
IMET participation and individuals` level of respect for democratic values. The results of all
three models support H1 and show that U.S. IMET graduates on average have higher respect
for democratic values than those Hungarian soldiers who have not participated in U.S. IMET
programs. Besides the key explanatory variable age seems to have a positive effect on the
respect of democratic values, which supports the findings of previous literature (Barro, 1999;
Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2005).
Next, participation in combat deployment seems to have a strong positive effect on individual
attitudes towards democratic values.

43

Table 2. The Effects of U.S. IMET participation on individual attitudes towards democratic values, human rights, and civil control

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET
Rank
Age
Gender
Edu
Language
Dur. of service
Deployment
Non-US Train.
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
(3)
Democratic Democratic Democratic
values#1
Values#2
Values#3
1.740***
1.587***
1.522***
(0.257)
(0.264)
(0.282)
0.335
0.259
(0.280)
(0.280)
0.441**
0.413*
(0.223)
(0.222)
0.414
0.162
(0.328)
(0.339)
-0.192
-0.123
(0.314)
(0.312)
0.627*
0.524
(0.329)
(0.329)
-0.308
-0.359
(0.226)
(0.228)
0.841***
(0.318)
0.0166
(0.283)
6.095***
3.823***
3.807***
(0.163)
(0.880)
(0.874)
350
350
350
0.116
0.149
0.167

(4)
(5)
Human
Human
Rights#1 Rights#2
0.883*** 0.665***
(0.245)
(0.252)
0.567**
(0.267)
0.133
(0.213)
0.255
(0.313)
-0.348
(0.299)
0.339
(0.313)
0.0995
(0.215)

(6)
Human
Rights#3
0.523*
(0.271)
0.548**
(0.269)
0.140
(0.213)
0.215
(0.326)
-0.329
(0.300)
0.321
(0.316)
0.0460
(0.219)
0.0237
(0.306)
0.376
(0.272)
6.638*** 4.746*** 4.745***
(0.155)
(0.840)
(0.840)
350
350
350
0.036
0.070
0.076

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(7)
Military
Interv.#1
-0.414*
(0.225)

(8)
Military
Interv.#2
-0.520**
(0.233)
0.135
(0.247)
0.230
(0.197)
-0.140
(0.289)
-0.271
(0.277)
0.495*
(0.290)
0.0473
(0.199)

3.529***
(0.142)
350
0.010

2.393***
(0.776)
350
0.028

(9)
Military
Interv.#3
-0.559**
(0.251)
0.163
(0.248)
0.248
(0.197)
-0.0360
(0.301)
-0.295
(0.277)
0.536*
(0.292)
0.0455
(0.202)
-0.403
(0.283)
0.181
(0.251)
2.401***
(0.776)
350
0.035

This might be explained by the fact that Hungarian soldiers are exclusively deployed into
combat as part of a multinational coalition and almost always together with the U.S. military
which might act as an extra reinforcing mechanism to diffuse U.S. norms and values.
Additionally, the models also suggest that while U.S. IMET participation significantly and
positively influence individual attitudes towards democratic values, similar foreign education
and training received in other countries do not have the same effects. This is an important
finding because it suggests the uniqueness of the U.S. IMET programs compared to other
foreign military training efforts. Models 4 to 6 explore how U.S. IMET participation effects
individuals` respect of human rights. The findings of these models support H2 since as they
demonstrate U.S. IMET participation is associated with higher respect of human rights. In
these models besides the independent variable only respondents` rank show a statistically
significant positive relationship with respect of human rights. Once again the models suggest
that foreign military education and training programs received in other countries do not have
a statistically significant effect on individuals` respect of human rights.
The last three models in Table 2. assess the relationship between U.S. IMET
participation and respect of civil supremacy over the military. The findings of these models
support H3 because as the results demonstrate U.S. IMET graduates are less likely to support
military intervention into domestic politics than non-graduates. From the other assessed
factors only the number of spoken languages demonstrate a slight negative relationship with
the respect of civil supremacy, because those individuals who speak more languages are more
likely to support military intervention into domestic politics.
I also run the same models to assess whether any variation exist among the members
of the three services (Air Force, Land Forces and Special Forces) of the Hungarian Defense
Forces. The results of the service specific models can be reviewed in Appendix F.

Next, Table 3. depicts the results of the models with matching techniques. Both the
graphical and statistical evaluation of the level of matching can be reviewed in Appendix G.
The first three models (10-12) show the results with basic propensity score matching while
models 13 to 15 demonstrate the results of U.S. IMET participation when nearest neighbor
matching is employed. The results in all these models confirm the findings of the linear
regression analysis and support the three hypotheses proposed.
Table 3. Effects of U.S. IMET Participation, Models with Propensity Score Matching and
Nearest Neighbor Matching

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET
Observations

(10)
(11)
Democratic Human
Values
Rights
1.127***
0.522*
(0.284)
(0.291)
350
350

(12)
Military
Interv.
-0.605**
(0.291)
350

(13)
Democratic
Values
1.267***
(0.295)
350

(14)
Human
Rights
0.529*
(0.285)
350

(15)
Military
Interv.
-0.701**
(0.299)
350

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Additionally, Figure 5. provides a visual demonstration of the average effects of the
U.S. IMET participation on the investigated three dependent variables. The average level of
respect of democratic values within the Hungarian military is 6.095. U.S. IMET participation
increases this level with 1.740 points on a 1-10 Likert scale. The average level of respect of
human rights within the military is 6.638 which is increased by .883 when we compare
U.S.IMET graduates to non-graduates. Finally, the average value of the willingness to
militarily intervene into domestic politics is 3.529 which is already quite low within the
Hungarian Defense Forces, but U.S. IMET participation even further decreases it with .701
points. These changes are quite significant when one considers the actual value of the
attitudes towards the three examined norms.
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Figure 5. Average Effects of U.S. IMET participation on Democratic Values, Human Rights
and Military Intervention
Additionally, I test the three mechanisms presented in the theoretical section to better
understand how the professional norms of the U.S. military are transmitted during U.S. IMET
participation. In these models I use the same three dependent variables while employ four
explanatory variables. Two of these variables proxy for the mechanism of formal learning.
The first is a binary variable that take the value of 0 if U.S. IMET graduates did not
participate in PME course and 1 if they did. The second variable measures participation in
technical and tactical courses and coded the same way as the PME variable. The next
explanatory variable serves as a proxy for social interaction and measures whether the U.S.
IMET graduates participated in social activities. This variable is coded 0 if U.S. IMET
graduates participated 1 or less social events and 1 if they participated in 2 or more events.
The last independent variable accounts for shared identity. It measures on a 1 to 10 scale
whether the U.S. IMET participants considered the U.S. IMET experience a professional
development opportunity.
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The models in the mechanism tests also control for additional factors that I propose
effecting the stickiness of the investigated three norms. These variables include the number of
U.S. IMET courses participated by an individual, the time since graduation, the duration of
service, combat deployment, whether been commanded by another U.S. IMET graduate, and
keeping in touch with American classmates from the U.S. IMET programs. Table 4. shows
the results of these models.
The results show that the type of the U.S. IMET program has a significant effect on
the participating individuals attitudes towards the three assessed norms. The analysis provide
support to Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) and Atkinson`s (2015) previous arguments and show
that PME graduates have a higher respect for democratic values and human rights than those
who participated in other programs. At the same time, while the results are not significant
they also demonstrate that tactically and technically focused training events are associated
with a decrease in the respect of those investigated norms. The results of the in-depth
interviews seem to provide additional support to these findings. While those interviewees
who participated in U.S. IMET PME courses all report that they think these courses contain
much more information (readings and practical exercises) regarding the investigated three
norms when compared to similar Hungarian courses, those U.S. IMET graduates who
attended only tactical level courses do not report significant differences. While for example
Respondent#2, a U.S. IMET PME course graduate specifically reported that “I think U.S.
IMET PME courses are doing a better job than the Hungarian courses that I have participated
in making sure that their graduates leave the course with a lot of knowledge about democratic
values human rights and civil control,” Respondent#10 a non-PME, tactical course
participant reported that “I did not really find any difference between Hungarian course and
U.S. IMET courses regarding what and how they teach about democratic values, human
rights and civil control.”
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Table 4. The Effects of U.S. IMET type, social interaction and professional identity sharing on attitudes towards democratic values, human
rights, and civil control

VARIABLES
Tech. Training

(16)
Democratic
Values
-0.727**
(0.304)

PME

(17)
Human
Rights
-0.306
(0.318)

(18)
(19)
Military Democratic
Interv.#1
Values
-0.00517
(0.332)
1.038***
(0.304)

(20)
Human
Rights

(21)
Military
Interv.#2

0.642**
(0.321)

0.170
(0.338)

Social
Constant
Observations
R-squared

8.116***
(0.188)
140
0.040

7.640*** 3.116***
(0.197)
(0.206)
140
140
0.007
0.000

7.473***
(0.180)
140
0.078

7.297*** 3.055***
(0.190)
(0.200)
140
140
0.028
0.002

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(22)
Democratic
Values

(23)
Human
Rights

(24)
Military
Interv.#3

0.0972
(0.372)
7.759***
(0.331)
140
0.000

0.919**
(0.375)
6.793***
(0.334)
140
0.042

0.318
(0.398)
2.862***
(0.354)
140
0.005

VARIABLES

(25)
Democratic
Values

(26)
Human
Rights

(27)
Military
Interv.#4

-0.159
(0.139)

0.0610
(0.143)

-0.0793
(0.149)

9.263***
(1.257)
140
0.009

6.973***
(1.298)
140
0.001

3.828***
(1.352)
140
0.002

Tech. Training
PME
Social
Professional
Grad. time
Dur. of serv.
Deployment
U.S. IMET_C2
Intouch
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(28)
Democratic
Values
-0.168
(0.389)
1.037**
(0.436)
-0.216
(0.391)
-0.167
(0.139)
0.692***
(0.248)
-0.324
(0.234)
0.435
(0.396)
-0.733
(1.008)
-0.104
(0.326)
9.351***
(1.662)
140
0.182

(29)
Human
Rights
0.0775
(0.410)
0.635
(0.460)
0.762*
(0.412)
-0.0214
(0.146)
0.871***
(0.262)
-0.247
(0.247)
-0.635
(0.417)
0.166
(1.062)
0.520
(0.343)
6.156***
(1.751)
140
0.143

(30)
Military
Interv.#5
-0.0999
(0.446)
0.0515
(0.500)
0.253
(0.448)
-0.0911
(0.159)
0.633**
(0.285)
0.0934
(0.268)
-0.301
(0.454)
-0.339
(1.156)
0.606
(0.373)
2.708
(1.905)
140
0.064

The results of the social interaction variable also demonstrate some promising results.
Although the results are mixed and mostly insignificant, when they are significant, they
demonstrate the expected relationship. Once again in-depth interview respondents seem to
provide some support for the effects of social interactions. All 14 respondents report that they
participated in IP programs and these programs not only positively changed their sentiments
about the U.S. as a country and American society, but also improved their understanding
about democratic values and the importance of human rights. Respondent#7 specifically
states “IP programs were great. I had a lot of opportunity to visit historical sites and
American landmarks. I also went to a military ball and was invited several times to dinner by
my American peers. These events taught me a lot about how the American society is and
what they value.”
The effects of the shared identity variable are mixed and not statistically significant.
At the same time all in-depth interview respondents report that they think the U.S. military is
a highly professional military organization and its norms and values should be emulated by
all other militaries. For example Respondent#9 suggests “the behavior of the individual
American soldier, the military`s acceptance of civil supremacy, their merit-based selection
and promotion system and cutting-edge technology were very impressive to me. I think it is
fair to say if you want to be a good military you should try to follow the American example.”
Among those variables that assess how long the transmitted norms affects individual
attitudes only the time since graduation variable demonstrate significant results. While the
more time spent since graduation is positively associated with both respect of democratic
values and human rights it also seems to increase the probability of supporting military
intervention into domestic politics. While the results of the initial models suggest that as
argued the international norms of respect for democratic values, human rights and civil
control that characterize the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to foreign participants
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during the U.S. IMET programs the results of the mechanisms tests although promising in
some cases do not provide a strong support to the overall argument. While the findings
clearly demonstrate that the U.S. IMET programs are meeting their fundamental aims and
improve the participants` attitudes towards the investigated three norms the actual
mechanisms of norms transmission require further investigations.

Diffusion of Norms Within National Militaries
Although it is outside of the original scope of this study, the investigation whether the
transmitted norms further diffuse within the U.S. IMET graduates` national militaries provide
some valuable insights into the logic of the initially proposed theory. Since many studies
investigating the effects of U.S. IMET (Lefever 1976; Fitch 1979; Ruby and Gibler 2010;
Savage and Caverley, 2017) assume that this diffusion occurs but do not provide any
empirical evidence to support it, therefore the empirical testing of norm diffusion can make
significant contribution to the existing literature. If the professional norms of the U.S.
military that are transmitted to the U.S. IMET participants indeed further diffuse throughout
their national militaries, than one can expect that the respect of the three investigated norms is
going to be higher among those non-U.S. IMET graduates who have been commanded and
trained by U.S. IMET graduates than those who has never been led by U.S. IMET alumni.
Table 5. shows the results of the analysis of the relationship between U.S. IMET graduates`
leadership and their subordinate soldiers` attitudes towards the three investigated norms.
The results demonstrate that those non-U.S. IMET graduates who has been led and
trained by U.S. IMET graduates indeed have more respect for both democratic values and
human rights across all models. They also show a reduced probability of supporting the
military`s intervention into domestic policy making when compared to those who have never
been commanded by U.S. IMET alumni. Although the relationship demonstrated by the
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models is exactly what the previous U.S. IMET literature suggests, these results are not
statistically significant, which suggests that further investigation is needed to provide stronger
evidence for norm diffusion.
At the same time in-depth interview respondents once again seem to provide some
potential evidence in support of norm diffusion. All 14 respondents reported that they feel
that they have been able to share what they learned with their fellow Hungarian soldiers.
However, it is also clear that rank played a crucial role in the U.S. IMET graduates` ability to
diffuse the learned skills among other soldiers.
Table 5. Norm Diffusion Within National Militaries

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET_C2

(31)
Democratic
Values
0.578
(0.580)

(32)
Human
Rights
0.579
(0.539)

(33)
Military
Interv.#1
-0.485
(0.468)

5.583***
(0.546)
210
0.005

6.125***
(0.507)
210
0.006

3.958***
(0.440)
210
0.005

Rank
Age
Gender
Education
Language
Dur_service
Deployment
Non-US training
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(34)
(35)
(36)
Democratic Human Military
Values
Rights Interv.#2
0.192
0.648
-0.416
(0.623)
(0.575)
(0.504)
0.468
1.074***
0.250
(0.401)
(0.370)
(0.324)
0.161
-0.0150
0.117
(0.319)
(0.294)
(0.258)
-0.337
-0.0605
0.795*
(0.518)
(0.478)
(0.419)
-0.567
-0.866** -0.410
(0.455)
(0.420)
(0.368)
0.446
0.319
0.654*
(0.451)
(0.416)
(0.364)
-0.278
0.110
0.0623
(0.335)
(0.309)
(0.271)
1.017**
0.192
-0.268
(0.469)
(0.432)
(0.379)
-0.141
0.311
0.259
(0.396)
(0.365)
(0.320)
5.113*** 4.720*** 2.664***
(1.258)
(1.160)
(1.017)
210
210
210
0.056
0.070
0.050

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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While higher ranking officers report that they feel they were very effective in sharing U.S.
norms and values by including them into Hungarian manuals and training requirements,
lower ranking soldiers seem to feel less confident in their ability to share the learned tactics,
techniques and procedures with their peers. For example while Respondent#2 reports that “I
managed to include the learned values and norms into our leader seminars, training manuals
and exercises,” Respondent#8 suggests that “I talked with my immediate subordinates about
what I learned during my U.S. IMET course, but still looking for the means to share it with
more soldiers.”
To further investigate whether the professional norms of the U.S. military diffuse into
the national militaries of the U.S. IMET graduates I assess the U.S. IMET participants` ability
to positively influence individuals` professional improvement, organizational change within
their military establishment and doctrinal improvement compared to those who never
participated in the U.S. IMET programs. I propose that if U.S. IMET graduates demonstrate
higher abilities in these categories than it would provide a strong support for relationships
presented in Table 6 and through that for norm diffusion.
The results in Table 7. demonstrate the expected relationships. U.S. IMET
participation significantly improves the individuals ability to influence other soldiers`
individual professional qualities, implement doctrinal changes and contribute to positive
organizational changes. The findings of the norm diffusion analysis provide support to those
prior studies that argued beyond U.S. IMET`s positive effects on the participating individuals
and suggested that these programs also positively affect the recipient countries` military as a
whole. The results demonstrate that the professional norms and values of the U.S. military are
not only transmitted to the U.S. IMET participants but through them they diffuse and
positively affect the entire national military organizations as well.

54

Limitations and Potential Criticism of the Study
I foresee a number of potential criticisms regarding my study both from a theoretical and
methodological point of view. First, the study might be criticized for its limited scope and
focus on a single case study. Although Hungary is indeed only one case it is a valuable one
for the purposes of this investigation due to all of those theoretical and practical conditions
that I discuss in the research design section. Since this study is one of the first attempts to
conduct a deep investigation into the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs the
primary aim is rather the identification and testing of potential mechanisms than strong
external validity.
Table 6. U.S. IMET Graduates` Effects on Individuals, Doctrine and Organization
(37)
VARIABLES Individuals
U.S. IMET
0.912***
(0.206)
Rank

(38)
Doctrine
2.510***
(0.251)

(39)
Organization
2.364***
(0.246)

3.476***
(0.159)
350
0.223

3.471***
(0.156)
350
0.210

Age
Gender
Edu
Language
Dur_service
Deployment
Non-US train.
Constant
Observations
R-squared

6.867***
(0.130)
350
0.053

(40)
Individuals
0.465**
(0.215)
0.542**
(0.213)
0.104
(0.169)
-0.459*
(0.259)
-0.428*
(0.238)
0.529**
(0.251)
-0.211
(0.174)
1.029***
(0.243)
0.517**
(0.216)
5.054***
(0.637)
350
0.192

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(41)
Doctrine
2.073***
(0.271)
0.496*
(0.268)
0.560***
(0.213)
-0.312
(0.325)
-0.221
(0.300)
0.358
(0.315)
0.0187
(0.218)
0.182
(0.305)
0.296
(0.271)
0.440
(0.801)
350
0.292

(42)
Organization
1.906***
(0.264)
0.107
(0.262)
0.693***
(0.208)
0.295
(0.317)
0.386
(0.292)
0.136
(0.307)
-0.309
(0.213)
0.0648
(0.298)
0.566**
(0.265)
0.446
(0.782)
350
0.286

Since this study is one of the first attempts to conduct a deep investigation into the individual
level effects of the U.S. IMET programs the primary aim is rather the identification and
testing of potential mechanisms than strong external validity.
Second, due to the fact that the subjects of my study are military personnel critiques
might suggest potential inferential issues regarding my survey. I address this potential
criticism through several measures. First, since military professionals usually tend to do their
best to please authority, whether it is formal command or academic authority I had to avoid
potential measurement error due to such social desirability bias. To mitigate this potential
issue during the introduction to the survey goals I highlighted the fact that the survey is
anonymous without any chance of identification of the respondents and explained how
important it is to answer the questions truthfully. Then I asked the participants whether they
understood what I said, and would they answer all questions truthfully. I also made sure that
the respondents sat in an order preventing them to see the answers of their peers.
Additionally, the survey was conducted in an environment in which immediate superiors and
higher-ranking individuals were either not present or could not see which essay belonged to
which respondent. Furthermore, to avoid any additional inferential issues like processing
error, I personally coded the results of the survey and input the data into the dataset.
Additionally, since the survey was conducted with professional military respondents the
chances of coverage errors (neither erroneous inclusion nor exclusion) were assessed as
minimal.
The next criticism of this study might suggest that the results of my analysis are being
driven by the fact that Hungarian military personnel who are being selected for U.S. IMET
participation already has an increased respect for democratic values, human rights and civil
supremacy over the military and these factors driving their selection into this program.
Although it is a valid concern it does not seem to be the case for several reasons. First, I
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corrected for this potential bias via matching. Second, the Hungarian military does not collect
data about its members` attitudes towards those three norms. Superiors who nominate their
subordinates to U.S. IMET participation does not know about their level of respect towards
democratic values, human rights, and civil control. Furthermore, the selection of the
nominated individuals is a multilevel process that includes at least two Hungarian higher
command and the U.S. ODC before the participant is cleared to participate in any U.S. IMET
program. During my years of service I personally attended three U.S. IMET events and went
through the selection process three times. Later I was responsible for three years for
reviewing the nominated Special Forces soldiers` applications and select them for U.S. IMET
participation. During all these years I never experienced that individual attitudes toward those
three values played any role in the selection of U.S. IMET participant.
Another potential criticism relates to the role of the U.S. ODC in the selection process
of U.S. IMET participants. The U.S. ODC in Budapest informed me that it has never tried to
influence the selection process of Hungarian participants. The U.S. ODC does not require and
does not have any information about the nominated individuals` attitudes towards the three
norms in question and the approval of U.S. IMET participation has never been subject to
these norms. Additionally, during Hungary`s almost 30 years history in the U.S. IMET
program and out of its roughly 3,000 U.S. IMET graduates, the U.S. ODC requested only
three times that the Hungarian nominees be replaced by other soldiers. These replacements
were requested because the nominees professional background (and expected future career
path) and the training event they were selected for showed no justifiable connections.27
Finally, some might argue that the research design overlooks some important
variables that correlates with the selection of the Hungarian military personnel to participate

27

One example for such replacement request was when a fighter jet pilot was nominated to attend the U.S.
Army`s armored reconnaissance course. Source: ODC representative.
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in the U.S. IMET programs. This seems to be a valid concern especially because instead of
their attitudes towards democratic values, human rights and civil control Hungarian soldiers
are being selected to U.S. IMET participation based on two conditions: English language
skills and physical requirements. It is indeed a valid concern that these variables might
correlate with socioeconomic variables that this study does not account for. For example, one
might argue that it is possible that individuals who are coming from wealthier families are
more likely to speak English or be physically fit than those who are coming from less wealthy
background. Although such criticism seems to be fair it does not seem to effect U.S. IMET
selection for several reasons. First, individuals are not required to know English before they
join the Hungarian military and they are provided with multiple opportunities to learn English
throughout their career. Officers learn English in military college and cannot receive their
commission before securing an intermediate level language certificate. For NCOs annual
English courses are being run in every military base to provide equal learning opportunity to
all members of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Finally, similar to the U.S. military`s Military
Occupational Specialty (hereafter, MOS) code each position in the Hungarian military is
associated with a unique code that includes specific language and physical requirements
which everybody who fills the given position must meet regardless of the soldiers
background. These “MOS” requirements are at least equal or in most cases higher than the
requirements associated with eligibility for U.S. IMET participation meaning that everyone
who is an active member of the Hungarian military should meet these requirements.

Conclusion
Although international relations literature has extensively explored the potential effects of
U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer it mostly overlooked the effects
of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and training programs. The
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limited number of studies that have assessed the effects of the U.S. IMET programs mostly
focus on country level outcomes and use the same dataset (Ruby and Gibler, 2010) where the
key explanatory variables are simply the number of U.S. IMET participants per year and the
annual cost of the U.S. IMET programs per country. These studies assume that the U.S.
military`s professional norms are transmitted to the U.S. IMET participants, but neither
present a strong theory explaining how this transmission happens nor offer empirical
evidence in support of the norms transmission assumption. Furthermore, although those
studies that investigate the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs make some
significant contributions to improve our understanding of the relationship between U.S.
IMET participation and individual attitudes towards democratic values and human rights due
to some research design issues and methodological limitations they leave some room for
expansion and improvement. This study intended to address some of these issues and
contributes to the research program of U.S. military aid in several ways.
First, it presents a novel dataset that contains individual level variables regarding U.S.
IMET participation and with that enables other researchers to explore research questions that
have been either overlooked in the literature or have not been studied due to lack of data.
Second, with the proposed theoretical framework and the findings of the statistical
models this study provides support to prior literature both in case of international norms
transmission and U.S. IMET specific studies. Furthermore, this analysis provides evidence in
support of prior assumptions and strengthens the findings of several prior studies (Reynolds
2001; Atkinson 2010, 2015; Jungdahl and Lambert 2012).
Beyond its contributions to the research agenda the study has significant policy
implications as well. Although the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act clearly defines the goals of the U.S. IMET program there are no measures of
effectiveness in place to provide objective feedback about the actual effects of these
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programs to policy makers. The timeliness of this issue is clearly demonstrated in the fact that
the 2017 National Defense Authorization Acts once again codifies the requirement to
establish a functioning evaluation mechanism for the investigation of the effects of the U.S.
security assistance programs. This study provide feedback directly for this requirement and
proposes that the U.S. IMET programs indeed meet the goals established by Congress and
with that effectively support the achievement of U.S. national security and foreign policy
goals.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE SMARTER THE SOLDIERS, THE LONGER
THE CIVIL WARS – U.S. IMET PARTICIPATION AND CIVIL
CONFLICT DURATION
Abstract
Why does civil conflicts` duration varies so widely? While some conflicts last for years
others end in just days. Several studies have argued that foreign military aid provided to the
incumbent governments plays a crucial role in civil conflict duration but always
operationalized this military aid in the form of weapons and equipment transfers. In this
paper I explore how a different type of military aid - U.S. IMET programs - affects the
duration of civil conflicts. I theorize that participation in U.S. IMET programs improves the
military human capital of the government forces. This improved military human capital
makes the overall military more capable and effective which incentivizes rebels to disperse,
hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this
argument, I use a new dataset that includes detailed information on insurgencies and U.S.
IMET participation between 1976 and 2003. The results show that militaries with more U.S.
IMET participation fights significantly longer civil conflicts. I also find that more U.S. IMET
participation corresponds with a higher probability of civil conflicts being fought in an
irregular manner.

Introduction
Although there were 50 active armed conflicts around the world as of 2015 only one was
fought between states (India and Pakistan). The other 49 were intrastate civil conflicts that
resulted in about 97,000 battle related deaths annually (Melander et al., 2016). Additionally,
40% of these conflicts were internationalized meaning that at least one of the combatants of
these civil conflicts were supported by external states (Melander et al., 2016). These facts
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suggest that civil wars are the dominant form of conflict of our days and external state
support plays a key role in shaping the characteristics of these conflicts. One of these
characteristics that have demonstrated a remarkable variation throughout the history of civil
conflicts is their duration. While the Yemeni government defeated the rebels in 1994 in about
two months and Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi`s forces were crushed by the insurgents
in just eight months in 2011 insurgencies in Sri Lanka and Colombia lasted for decades. In
addition to this dramatic variation in the duration of civil conflicts the fact that the U.S. has
provided military assistance to over 140 governments since 1945 and it also has been
involved in its history`s longest war in Afghanistan create a strong incentive for better
understanding the relationship between U.S. military aid and civil conflict duration.
Prior studies argue that the variance in civil conflict duration can be explained by
factors that include regime type, government and rebel military capabilities, rough terrain,
availability of natural resources, the difference in the belligerents` strategies and external
support to the different sides (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; DeRouen and Sobek 2004;
Cunningham 2006; Buhaug et al. 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012, Caverley and Sechser
2017). This paper contributes to this literature by further exploring how external support,
more specifically U.S. military assistance to the incumbent government affects the duration
of civil conflicts.
Previous studies (Mason et al, 1999; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Caverley
and Sechser, 2017) assessing the effects of U.S. military assistance only focused on aid in the
form of arms and equipment transfers while completely ignored the potential effects of the
less tangible form of U.S. military aid the International Military Education and Training
programs (hereafter, U.S. IMET). The primary goal of these programs is to improve the
recipient states` military human capital and through these better trained and more capable
military professionals improve the military capabilities of the incumbent governments.
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Although the U.S. spends close to a billion dollars on these programs annually and trains over
70,000 foreign military personnel from more than 150 countries every year (Savage and
Caverley 2017), whether these programs meet their fundamental goals have not been
explored effectively in international relations literature. While scholars seem to have
developed a good understanding of how U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment
transfer affects the characteristics of civil conflicts the same cannot be said about the
potential effects of the U.S. IMET programs.
Can better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation be associated with
swift conflict resolution or does it prolong the civil conflict? I argue that better military
human capital due to U.S. IMET participation increases incumbent government’s military
capability and effectiveness, and with that it prolongs the civil conflict. Building on Hendrix
and Young (2014) I theorize that improved military capability increases the cost of direct
engagement for the rebels and incentivizes them to disperse and hide making it extremely
difficult for the government forces to deliver a fatal blow to the rebellion and end the civil
conflict. Additionally, improved military capability forces the rebels to switch their tactics
from open military engagements to low level terrorist activities (Hendrix and Young, 2014)
which also prolongs the duration of the conflicts. Based on this argument I propose that the
availability of better human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is associated with longer
civil conflicts.
To test my theory I employ a merged dataset (Caverley and Sechser 2017; Savage and
Caverley 2017) containing detailed information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation
between 1976 and 2003. The results of the analysis demonstrate that improved military
human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is correlated with longer civil conflicts and
when this variable is included into the investigation then all the hardware-based military
capability variables used in previous studies lose significance. Additionally, my analysis also
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demonstrates that more U.S. IMET participation corresponds with higher probability of civil
conflicts being fought in an irregular manner.
These findings suggest that the availability of quality military human capital due to
U.S. IMET participation might be more important factor than other tangible military
capabilities in explaining the variation in civil conflict duration and the type of civil conflicts.
The paper proceeds in seven parts. It starts with a critical overview of previous
literature on the duration civil conflicts. Next, the analysis reviews the previous
measurements of military capability and introduces military human capital as an alternative to
prior concepts. Then the paper discusses the relationship between U.S. IMET participation
and military human capital. Next, I present my theory which is followed by the introduction
of the research design, the data sources, and the empirical strategy. Then, the analysis
presents the empirical results from a series of event-history models and logistic regressions
and discusses the main findings. Next, I illustrate my argument through a case study. Finally,
I offer a summary of my contributions and discuss the potential implications.

Previous Research on Civil War Duration
The growing literature that seeks to explore the factors influencing the duration of civil
conflicts can be organized into four groups. The first group consists of those studies that
theorize that civil war duration is affected by the rebels` abilities to evade government forces
and sustain their operations. This literature includes rebel external support, rebel military
capabilities and rebel strategy as critical factors that affect how long civil wars last. DeRouen
and Sobek (2004) and Cunningham (2010) find that external support received by the rebels
enable them to prolong civil wars. Fearon (2004) and Lujala (2010) argue along similar lines
when they suggest that rebel access to primary commodities or natural resources result in
longer civil conflicts. On the other hand, these findings are challenged by Humphreys (2005)
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who finds that the availability of natural resources is associated with shorter civil conflicts.
Other studies argue that rebel military capabilities (Cunningham et al., 2009; Hultquist, 2013)
and guerilla strategies (Balcells and Kalyvas 2012) are also associated with longer civil war
duration. Rebels` capacity to sustain their operations often measured through the availability
of rough terrain. Bleaney and Dimico (2011) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) argue that
rebels` access to rough terrain enables them to better hide from the government forces and
prolong the conflicts while Rustad et al. (2008) finds opposite association.
The second group of studies seems to focus on the role of information problems.
Fearon (1995) and Walter (2009) argue civil wars many times happen due to the participants
inability to agree on their relative power or resolve and as Walter (2009) suggests the lack of
information about each other’s` power and resolve is especially acute during the initial phases
of civil conflicts. Referring to Cunningham (2006); Nilsson (2008); Pearlman and
Cunningham (2012); Caverley and Sechser (2017) argue that “the existence of multiple
factions and outside actors can exacerbate the problem, making information about combatants
difficult to obtain and quickly obsolete” (Caverley and Sechser, 2017: 705). The difficulty of
information gathering in such a complex situation prevents government forces to resolve the
conflict quickly leading to prolonged civil wars.
The next group of relevant literature contains those studies that explore how
commitment problems affect the duration of civil conflicts. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Weingast
(1999), and Walter (2002) argue that when the combatants cannot commit to uphold the
agreements it becomes very difficult to end civil wars without one side`s decisive victory.
Additionally, Fearon (2004) argues that combatants will not be able to reach any settlements
if the rebels expect the government forces to become stronger in the future and eventually
abandon the peace deal. Some other scholars also suggest that the commitment problem is

69

stronger in ethnically diverse societies leading to longer civil wars (Collier et al. 2004;
Kirschner 2010; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).
The last group of studies consists of those works that are focusing on the role of state
capacity. This literature includes such factors as regime type and incumbent government`s
military capacity as potential explanatory variables of the variation in civil conflict duration.
Derouen and Sobek (2004) argue that autocratic regimes fight shorter civil conflicts due to
their willingness to destroy the rebels quickly and fully. Caverley (2010) argues that
democracies are less likely to fight long and costly civil wars due to their lower tolerance
level for casualties. As a challenge to these arguments Fearon (2004) finds that regime type
does not have significant effect on the duration of civil conflicts. Mason et al. (1999) argue
that stronger state military capacity increases the duration of the civil conflicts while
decreasing the chance of rebel victory. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) and Hendrix and Young
(2014) argue along the same lines since both find that larger military capacity prolongs the
civil conflict however it does not necessarily increase the likelihood of government success.
Lyall and Wilson (2009), and Lyall (2010) offer another explanation and argue that more
mechanized government military forces lead to longer civil conflicts because they are illequipped to fight unconventional wars. As one can see all these studies find that stronger
military capacity is associated with longer civil conflict. Caverley and Sechser (2017) while
provide further evidence to these arguments also make further contributions to the discussion
by introducing the “combined arms” strategy as a new variable. They operationalize this
concept as an interaction term between the land mechanization and air mechanization
variables of the prior studies and find that the combined arms strategy is associated with
faster conflict resolution leading to shorter civil wars.
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Measures of State Military Capacity in Previous Literature
In the civil war literature states` military capacity seems to be mostly measured through
indicators that capture capacity to wage conventional rather than civil wars (Hendrix, 2010;
Kocher, 2010). Mason et al. (1999) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) operationalize their
military capacity variable as the number of soldiers in the military. Hendrix and Young`s
(2014) military capacity variable is an index that was derived from the number of military
personnel, the annual military expenditure, and the military expenditures per soldier of the
given governments. Lyall and Wilson (2009) and Lyall (2010) measure military capacity as
the level of mechanization of the government`s military forces. This variable is a scaled index
showing the conflict onset soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio. The variable has four values
from 1 to 4. It is coded 1 if the soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio is larger than 834 soldiers
per vehicle. The variable assumes the value 2 if the ratio is between 288 and 833 soldiers per
vehicle. It is coded 3 if there the ration is between 109 and 287 soldiers per vehicle, and 4 if
the number of soldiers is between 11 and 108 per vehicle. Similarly, Sechser and Saunders
also (2010) develop a hardware-based variable they call the National Mechanization Index
which draws data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance
series of publications (1968–2004). The value of the variable is based on the number of
armored vehicles per one hundred soldiers. Caverley and Sechser (2017) further develops the
mechanization-based approach. First, they separate the ground and air mechanization
measure. They calculate the former by “dividing an army’s number of motorized vehicles by
the number of ground soldiers and then calculating the natural logarithm of the resulting
figure” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710) while the latter “represents the natural logarithm of
a country`s ratio of combat aircraft to soldier” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710). The
combined arms variable is an interaction term of the ground and air mechanization measures.
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Although frequently used these variables do not seem to provide an effective measure
for incumbent government’s military capability. The way they are calculated seems to leave
more questions open that they actually answer. I argue that measuring state military capacity
through these indexes is a faulty approach for at least three reasons. First, the number of
actual vehicles does not necessarily reflect the realistically available hardware. In many cases
a large portion of the military vehicles and air platforms are not operational meaning that they
cannot be part of a combined arms strategy since they cannot leave the barracks.
Additionally, some small and poor countries maintain a large amount of 30 and 40-year-old
equipment while others have small number of highly modern vehicles. It seems that in these
indexes only the number of the mechanized vehicles determine the incumbent government’s
military capability and the quality of these vehicles are completely ignored.
Second, the indexes used in the material-based literature are calculated onset of civil
conflicts and do not account for the changes in the vehicle-soldier ratio as the civil conflict
progresses. For example, during long civil wars governments might lose many vehicles and
aircrafts without the ability to replace them which causes that they might go from a heavily
mechanized military at the beginning of the conflict to a much less mechanized military at the
end of the conflict. The contrary also can happen. A government acquires a lot of new
vehicles and aircrafts during the war which changes its forces early low mechanization index
into a high index towards the end of the conflict.
Lastly, the fact that a military relies on and possesses a lot of hardware does not mean
that it can use those capabilities effectively. A good example for this is the 1973 Yom Kippur
War where the attacking Arab forces had ten times as many troops, eight times as many tanks
and ten times as many artillery pieces than the Israelis their offensive still ended up as a
complete failure (Pollack, 2004) This case clearly demonstrates the potential weakness of
using hardware-based measures for military capability. To offer a potential remedy for these
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issues and to explore the phenomena from a completely new angle I introduce a new measure
for incumbent government’s military capability in the form of military human capital.

Improved Military Human Capital due to U.S. IMET Participation
Biddle (2004) argues that military capacity depends not only on the tangible hardware
capabilities of the military but also on other less tangible factors. One of these potential
factors is the quality of the military`s human capital. Biddle and Zirkle (1996) argue that the
quality of the military`s human capital is a key factor in how capable the military forces are.
According to their argument the military forces that have limited access to quality personnel
will be less capable to operate complex weapon systems and implement sophisticated tactics,
techniques, and procedures than those militaries that have quality human capital. Toronto
(2018) finds that the lack of quality military human capital prevents success in modern
combat. He argues that neither sophisticated weapons nor the availability of resources
matters if militaries cannot take the initiative, innovate, and exploit opportunities as
they present themselves. Additionally, Biddle and Long (2004) argue that “troops with no
meaningful formal education will find it harder to draft or carry out instructions for moving
thousands of soldiers over multiple routes to converge on a distant point at the same moment”
(Biddle and Long 2004: 531). They conclude that one can see stronger military performance
from those militaries that have access to better human capital through effective formal
education.
Building on these arguments and the works of economist Gary S. Becker I argue that
one of the most important investment a military organization can do to improve its
performance is to invest into its “workforce.” As Becker (1994) suggests in his seminal work
Human Capital, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education
although the investment into the human capital can take multiple forms the best way is formal
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education and training. Capitalizing on Becker (1994) and Biddle and Long`s (2004)
findings I argue that the best way to improve the military`s human capital is through
participation in formal education and training. Furthermore, I suggest that one of the best
ways to obtain such formal quality education and training for military personnel is through
participation in U.S. IMET programs.
The U.S. Congress established the general framework of foreign military education
and training in 1961 when it passed the Foreign Assistance Act. The primary goal of these
programs is to develop the military human capital of foreign military forces. As Savage and
Caverley (2017) argue U.S. foreign military education and training is foreign aid “in a very
specific form: an increase in the military`s human capital” (Savage and Caverley, 545).
Savage and Caverley (2017) also suggest that U.S. military has accumulated such
experience and knowledge in counterinsurgency operations that are not available in any other
training and education programs and sharing such knowledge significantly increases the
military skills of the U.S. IMET participants especially in case of fighting against insurgents.
Additionally, the U.S. IMET programs provide a unique framework for military human
capital development that cannot be compared to any other similar programs in other
countries. These U.S. programs are unique not only because of the U.S. military`s decades of
war experience but the size of the U.S. training infrastructure, the presence of an experienced
and combat focused training cadre, and the budget available28 for education and training
purposes (Savage and Caverley, 2017).
Huntington (2006) and Barany (2012) argue that the norm most likely to be
transmitted through the U.S. IMET programs to the participating foreign officers and noncommissioned officers is the U.S. military`s distinct and highly professional identity.

28

According to Savage and Caverley (2017) the annual training budget of the U.S. military is bigger than entire
defense budget of 117 countries.
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Furthermore, Savage and Caverley (2017) suggest that trainees returning home with higher
levels of military skills and professionalism and suggest that these training programs improve
“the competence of the trainees within the military and consequently the larger military
within the government” (Savage and Caverley, 2017: 545). Lefever (1976), Taw (1984), and
Ruby and Gibler (2010) argue that the improvement of the capability of the military as a
whole is due to the facts that the U.S. IMET programs graduates usually become either
instructors in their national military training systems (Ruby and Gibler, 2010) or influential
leaders who have the ability to implement changes in their militaries in accordance to the
learned skills (Lefever, 1976). The authors also find that U.S. IMET programs graduates stay
long enough in the military service to effectively share the skills they learned in the U.S.
IMET programs with their peers (Taw, 1984; Ruby and Gibler, 2010). Based on these
arguments I theorize that through the participation in the U.S. IMET programs the quality of
the recipient countries` military human capital increases because foreign military personnel
obtain such skills, knowledge and experience that fundamentally improves their professional
competence.

Improved Military Human Capital and Civil Conflict Duration
Fearon (1995) and Walter (2009) argue that wars occur due to bargaining failure between two
sides. According to these authors bargaining often fails because the two sides cannot agree
about the balance of power. This disagreement is due to the fact that determining the balance
of power between the two sides is difficult without fighting. The power of the different sides
consists of material factors such as tanks, airplanes, artillery and troops; and also less tangible
factors such as strategy, troop discipline and level of training and education (Caverley and
Sechser 2017). While in civil conflicts both the government and the rebels are well aware of
their own capabilities they mostly lack a clear understanding of the other side`s abilities.

75

While gaining information about the other side`s material capabilities is quite easy due to
these factors observable nature understanding the intangible factors takes much more time
and only happens through actual engagements between the two sides.
I argue that U.S. IMET participation improves the quality of the military human
capital of the incumbent government`s forces. The better training and education materialize
in better planned, supported, organized, and more effectively executed military operations
over time. While at the beginning of the civil conflicts the rebels might choose to fight the
incumbent government`s forces in open engagements this changes over time due to the
realization of the changing quality of the government forces. Rebels realize that challenging
the government`s military forces directly is becoming more costly than other, lower scale
operations. This increased cost of direct engagement and the rebels` need to keep the
rebellion alive incentivize them to disperse and hide from government forces. (Hendrix and
Young, 2014). Additionally, the increased cost of direct engagement forces the rebels to
switch their tactics from guerrilla warfare to low level terrorist activities (Hendrix and
Young, 2014) and deters them from making any direct attempts at the capital or political
centers (Bapat, 2011). Additionally, due to its improved military capability the incumbent
government loses its incentives to agree to any settlement and sees an opportunity to fully
destroy the rebellion. I argue that these conditions together lead to prolonged civil conflicts.
Following this logic I propose my first hypothesis as:
H1: In comparison of incumbent governments, those whose military has access to
more U.S. IMET participation will fight longer civil conflicts.
Additionally, if the logic of the above argument holds then the level of U.S. IMET
participation must also affect the type of civil wars the incumbent government is involved in.
According to the theory presented above more U.S. IMET participation improves the military
effectiveness of the incumbent government`s military forces, which incentivizes rebels to
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switch their tactics, techniques, and procedures to irregular military methods. Based on this
argument I propose that more U.S. IMET participation correlates with a higher probability of
recipient government fighting an irregular war. This argument leads to my second hypothesis:
H2: In comparison of incumbent governments, those whose military has access to
more U.S. IMET participation are more likely to fight irregular civil wars.
Data Sources and Variables
I employ the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO)
Armed Conflicts Dataset, v. 3–3005 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) in which conflict-year is the unit
of analysis and merge it with Savage and Caverley (2017) U.S. Foreign Military Training and
Coup dataset. The dataset includes detailed information about 147 insurgencies that happened
between 1976 and 2003.
My first dependent variable is civil conflict duration that is measured in days. UCDP
data uses the twenty-five deaths per year rule to include a conflict in the dataset. The value of
the dependent variable ranges from one day to 9,380 days. The mean value of the duration
variable is 1,710 days. My second dependent variable is conflict termination. This variable is
a binary variable and coded 1 if the civil conflict is terminated and 0 if it is still ongoing. The
third dependent variable is type of civil war. This variable is a binary measure coded 0 if the
civil conflict was fought in a conventional manner and 1 if the conflict was an irregular war.
To operationalize human capital through participation in U.S. IMET programs I
selected data from Savage and Caverley (2017) U.S. Foreign Military Training and Coup
dataset. The IMET programs were established by the U.S. Congress in 1976 by passing the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (Savage and Caverley, 2017).
IMET has been overseen by the Department of State while some sub-elements are
administered by the Department of Defense (Atkinson, 2010). Today the U.S.IMET programs
provide education and training for foreign personnel in around 4,000 different courses both
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within the United States and overseas while it only accounts for about 0.2 percent of the
budget of the State Department annually. I specifically selected the U.S. IMET programs as
my independent variable since as Savage and Caverley (2017) argue this program “is the
most transparent and receives the largest amount of scrutiny” (Savage and Caverley,
2017:548) meaning that they present the strongest test to my theory. I also chose the U.S.
IMET program because although it contains several hands-on technical training events the
majority of U.S. IMET programs belong to the so-called professional military education
(hereafter PME) programs that are uniquely designed to improve organizational, operational
planning, management and leadership skills of the participants.
Based on these characteristics I suggest that if I find any relationship in case of the
U.S. IMET program then it is likely that the same correspondence exists for the U.S. foreign
military education and training programs as a whole as well. To ensure the robustness of my
findings I operationalize my first independent variable in two different ways. First, since
increasing a country`s military capacity through the improvement of its human capital takes
time I utilize the logged five-year sum of IMET students as one version of my first
explanatory variable. Second, because the IMET programs differ in duration and in the
program of instructions it is unlikely that participants receive the same type and amount of
education and training. For this reason, as an alternative measurement for human capital
improvement I also operationalize my independent variable as the logged sum of 5-year total
IMET spending.

Control Variables
According to Fearon (2004) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) there is no clear agreement in
the civil conflict literature on which control variables should be used in formal models. I
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derive my control variables directly from relevant literature. Overall I employ 18 control
variables to assess the most widely cited alternative explanations.
First, to isolate the independent effects of the U.S. IMET programs from hardwarebased U.S. military assistance efforts I employ a control viable for U.S. military aid other
than IMET. This variable measures the amount of U.S. military aid as a percentage of the
recipient country`s GDP (Savage and Caverley 2017).
Next, I employ Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) ground and air mechanization variables
to assess the effects of the hardware-based approach in comparison to the human capitalbased approach. They calculate the values of the former variable by “dividing an army’s
number of motorized vehicles by the number of ground soldiers and then calculating the
natural logarithm of the resulting figure” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710). The air
mechanization variable “represents the natural logarithm of a country`s ratio of combat
aircraft to soldier” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710). I also use their combined arms variable
to control for the effects of combined arms doctrine.
Furthermore, I use several operationalizations of a conflict’s geographic proximity to
the state`s capital. I employ a variable based on Buhaug and Gates (2002) to account for the
distance between the capital and the conflict zone, another one denoting whether the civil
conflict is being fought along international borders (Buhaug et al. 2009) and one that is the
interaction term between these two. Furthermore, using data from Cunningham et al. (2009) I
control for rebel fighting capacity and relative rebel strength. I also included a variable to
account for the availability of lootable resources29 in the conflict area (Lujala et al. 2007;
Lujala 2009; Gilmore et al. 2005). Following Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Buhaug et al.`s
(2009) arguments I control for rough physical terrain. This variable is binary and coded 1 if

29

Lootable resources include diamonds and gemstones, illicit drugs, and petroleum deposits.
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the area where the conflict is fought covered by either 60 percent forest or 60 percent
mountains. Next, to account for the potential effects of regime type I employ the Scalar Index
of Polities (Gates et al. 2006). The variable measures regime type on a scale from 0 to 1.
Furthermore, based on the argument of Fearon (2004), and Balcells and Kalyvas (2012) I
control for the potential effects of economic factors though the inclusion of the gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita. I also account for the potential effects of external
assistance for both the government and the rebels (Cunningham et al. 2009). Lastly, I also
include binary variables to account for Fearon`s (2004) “sons of the soil” civil conflicts,
assess the potential effects of the post-Cold War era and to explore how types of civil
conflicts such as insurgency and irregular conflicts affect their duration (Lyall and Wilson
2009). The summary statistics of the variables are being presented in Appendix K.

Estimation Techniques
First, in order to assess the effects of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration I
employ two statistical methods. I use Weibull accelerated failure time regressions and then I
employ several logistic regressions with timedependence controls. These approaches have
been frequently used to assess civil conflicts` duration. While the Weibull technique is
employed by Fearon (2004); Gates and Buhaug et al. (2009); Balcells and Kalyvas (2012);
and Caverley and Sechser (2017) logistic regression models are used by Derouen and Sobek
(2004); Cunningham (2006); and Caverley and Sechser (2017). Due to the fact that states can
be involved in more than one civil conflict at the same time I estimate all my logistic
regression models with robust standard errors clustered on country.
Finally, since the types of civil war dependent variable is binary I employ simple
logistic regression models to estimate the effects of U.S. IMET participation on this variable.
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Results and Discussion
Table 7. includes the results of my twelve Weibull accelerated failure time regressions
models that estimate the effect of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration.
In the models shown in Table 7. I use the actual number of U.S. IMET participants as my
independent variable. The results can be interpreted simply as variables with positive
coefficients are associated with longer civil conflicts while those that have negative
coefficients are associated with shorter duration.
Model 1 contains only the measures of U.S. IMET participation (the actual numbers
of U.S. IMET participants per country per year) and demonstrates that there is a statistically
significant positive relationship between U.S. IMET participation and civil conflict duration.
One unit increase in the number of U.S. IMET participants increases the duration of civil
conflicts with .0794 days, on average. In order to isolate the effects of U.S. IMET
participation from other forms of U.S. military assistance efforts Model 2 includes only the
variable that accounts for the other types of U.S. military aid. The model shows that although
other types of U.S. military aid seems to reduce the duration of civil conflict the result is not
significant. In model 3 I include both the U.S. IMET participation variables and the other
types of U.S. military aid variable. This model shows the same relationships as the first two
models.
In the next 9 models I follow Caverley and Secher (2017) methodology and gradually
incorporate different sets of controls based on prior civil conflict duration literature. In Model
12 I include all controls to estimate the effects of U.S. IMET participation while controlling
for all prior explanations. When I introduce the different control variables the theorized
relationship between U.S. IMET participation and civil conflict duration remains the same
across all models which provides strong support to Hypothesis 1.
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Table 7. Accelerated failure time hazard analysis of the duration of civil conflicts, 1976-2003

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET
Other Aid

(1)
(2)
(3)
U.S. IMET Other U.S. Aid Total U.S. Aid
0.0794**
0.120***
(0.0404)
(0.0441)
-1.289
-1.131
(1.055)
(0.969)

Ground Mech.
Air Mech.
Combined Arm
Distance to Capital
Conflict at Border
Border X Distance

(4)
(5)
Armor Geography
0.102** 0.0938**
(0.0437) (0.0408)
-1.468
-1.336
(2.074)
(2.152)
0.626
0.866
(0.827)
(0.790)
0.494
0.608
(0.940)
(0.914)
-0.132
-0.157
(0.138)
(0.136)
0.474***
(0.165)
0.977**
(0.423)
-0.463*
(0.241)

Rebel Fighting Cap.
Rebel Strength
Constant
Observations

7.364***
(0.171)
940

7.543***
((0.249)
800

7.156***
(0.235)
760

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.831
(5.475)
496

0.0687
(5.220)
496

(6)
Fighting Capacity
0.0971**
(0.0468)
-1.865
(1.698)
0.701
(0.740)
0.639
(0.873)
-0.147
(0.127)

-0.0254
(0.584)
-0.569
(0.915)
4.410
(4.999)
481

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET
Other Aid
Ground Mech.
Air Mech.
Combined Arm

(7)
Terrain
0.108**
(0.0494)
-0.0350
(2.598)
0.620
(0.881)
0.556
(1.014)
-0.134
(0.149)

(8)
Regime
type
0.0901
(0.0651)
-1.099
(2.358)
0.892
(0.961)
0.644
(1.182)
-0.175
(0.170)

(9)
(10)
(11)
Economy External Sons of soil
Factors
0.122** 0.0990** 0.113**
(0.0494) (0.0454) (0.0467)
-4.326*
-1.588
-1.207
(2.298)
(2.057)
(2.109)
0.638
0.644
0.975
(0.800)
(0.813)
(0.935)
0.361
0.507
1.037
(0.938)
(0.936)
(1.039)
-0.0971
-0.133
-0.214
(0.137)
(0.137)
(0.161)

Distance to Capital
Conflict at Border
Border X Distance
Rebel Fighting Cap.
Rebel Strength
Natural Resources
Rough Terrain

0.532*
(0.319)
0.615*
(0.349)

Incumbent Democ.

0.247
(0.860)

Gdp per capita

-0.770**
(0.348)

Ext. support govern.

-0.280
(0.446)
-0.0389
(0.323)

Ext. support rebels
Sons of soil

1.433*
(0.794)

Insurgency
Post-Cold War
Constant
Observations

3.923
(5.931)
496

3.581
(6.402)
466

10.23*
(5.998)
495

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.909
(5.428)
496

2.458
(5.983)
496

(12)
All
controls
0.146**
(0.0734)
-2.708
(2.564)
1.283
(1.152)
0.985
(1.523)
-0.202
(0.227)
0.615***
(0.186)
0.726
(0.452)
-0.653**
(0.304)
0.230
(0.802)
-0.816
(1.175)
0.320
(0.372)
0.433
(0.312)
-0.0870
(0.723)
-0.666*
(0.387)
-0.0836
(0.595)
-0.0613
(0.320)
1.005
(1.024)
0.478
(0.535)
-0.293
(0.555)
0.919
(9.027)
437

Additionally, my models demonstrate that other forms of U.S. military aid do not have a
significant effect on civil conflict duration. Furthermore, the results of my analysis
demonstrate that when human capital in the form of U.S. IMET participation is included in
models employed in prior analyses the “traditional” measures of state`s military capability
(Mason et al, 1999; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Caverley and Sechser, 2017)
although maintaining the direction of the relationship found in these studies but all of them
lose statistical significance.
Additionally to these primary findings the models yield two additional interesting
results. The distance to capital variable is consistently significant and shows a positive
relationship with civil conflict duration. This finding seems to provide support to the
argument of Rustad et al. (2008) and Buhaug et al. (2009) who suggested that the further the
conflict takes place from a country`s capital the longer it lasts. Furthermore, according to the
results those countries that have higher gdp per capita should expect shorter civil conflicts.
Another interesting finding is that those factors that previous literature has argued to
affect civil conflict duration do not seem to demonstrate reliable effects in my analysis since
none of them show statistical significance.
As a robustness check of the results of my analyses, I conduct several additional tests.
First, I estimate 12 additional models where I use the same independent and control variables
as in my first set of models but this time I use conflict termination, a binary variable as my
dependent variable. In these models I include three time-dependence variables to control for
potential effect of conflict duration. The results of these 12 models are shown in Table 8.
The results once again provide support to the proposed theory since as these models show
more U.S. IMET participation is associated with a decreased probability of conflict
termination.
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Table 8. Logit Analysis of Civil War Termination, 1976-2003

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET

(13)
U.S. IMET
-0.0588**
(0.0284)

Military Aid
Ground mech.
Air mech.
Combined arms
Distance to capital
Conflict at border
Border x Distance

(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
Other U.S. Aid Total U.S. Aid Armor Geography
-0.0826*** -0.0756** -0.0751**
(0.0290)
(0.0323)
(0.0307)
0.951
0.843
0.785
0.283
(0.760)
(0.703)
(2.031)
(2.424)
-0.701
-0.920
(0.649)
(0.666)
-0.491
-0.658
(0.758)
(0.797)
0.126
0.155
(0.112)
(0.117)
-0.326**
(0.145)
-0.747**
(0.304)
0.299
(0.188)

Rebel fighting capacity
Rebel strength
Constant
Observations

-0.887***
(0.172)
940

-1.034***
(0.217)
840

-0.766***
(0.205)
760

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.265
(4.294)
496

5.995
(4.502)
496

(18)
Fighting Capacity
-0.0769**
(0.0330)
1.338
(1.879)
-0.841
(0.665)
-0.703
(0.791)
0.156
(0.118)

-0.121
(0.488)
0.581
(0.816)
3.126
(4.480)
481

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET
Military Aid
Ground mech.
Air mech.
Combined arms

(19)
Terrain

(20)
(21)
Regime Economy
Type
-0.0739** -0.0732* -0.0952***
(0.0347) (0.0425) (0.0319)
-0.290
0.867
2.974
(2.166)
(2.256)
(2.330)
-0.695
-0.819
-0.650
(0.702)
(0.782)
(0.662)
-0.540
-0.504
-0.334
(0.827)
(0.962)
(0.803)
0.126
0.142
0.0927
(0.122)
(0.142)
(0.119)

(22)
External
Factors
-0.0736**
(0.0324)
1.011
(2.118)
-0.741
(0.642)
-0.535
(0.752)
0.131
(0.111)

(23)
Sons of
Soil
-0.0871***
(0.0325)
0.334
(2.134)
-0.802
(0.677)
-0.724
(0.790)
0.157
(0.119)

Distance to capital
Conflict at border
Border x Distance
Rebel fight cap.
Rebel strength
Natural resources
Rough terrain

-0.383
(0.251)
-0.348
(0.252)

Incum. Democ.

-0.0837
(0.583)

Gdp per capita

0.500**
(0.231)

External sup. Govt.

0.331
(0.311)
-0.0308
(0.246)

External sup. Reb.
Sons of soil

-1.189**
(0.538)

Insurgency
Post-Cold War
Constant
Observations

2.879
(4.726)
496

2.729
(5.116)
466

-1.616
(5.094)
495

2.327
(4.287)
496

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.145
(4.423)
496

(24)
All
controls
-0.101*
(0.0524)
1.754
(3.148)
-1.612
(1.122)
-1.333
(1.486)
0.258
(0.219)
-0.488***
(0.184)
-0.657**
(0.312)
0.535**
(0.255)
-0.554
(0.691)
1.186
(1.139)
-0.362
(0.339)
-0.346
(0.276)
0.00103
(0.652)
0.456*
(0.263)
0.308
(0.420)
-0.0474
(0.263)
-1.098
(0.896)
-0.270
(0.440)
0.272
8.570
(8.550)
437

Once again, similarly to the original 12 models neither the other types of U.S. military
variable nor the traditional military capability variables show significant relationship with
civil conflict duration. The findings of these models are consistent with those in Table 7.
While better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is associated with longer
civil conflicts neither the other forms of U.S. military aid nor the traditional military
capability measures show significant effects.
Next, to conduct some more robustness checks and provide additional support to my
theory I run the same two sets of models as in Table 7. and Table 8. but using a different
operationalization of my independent variable. In these models I use the logged sum of 5year total U.S. IMET spending as my independent variable. The results of these models once
again show the same relationships and statistical significance as the first two sets of models.
The actual tables containing these results can be reviewed in Appendix L and M.
As I suggested earlier if the logic of my theory holds than the level of U.S. IMET
participation must also affect the types of civil wars incumbent government fight. If the better
military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation incentivizes rebels to disperse, hide
and minimize their operations than more U.S. IMET participation should lead to a higher
probability of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner rather than conventionally.
To test this argument I once again run the same 12 models as in the previous analyses but this
time using civil war type as my dependent variable. The results of my analysis are shown in
Table 9.
As the results in the table demonstrate U.S. IMET participation is associated with an
increased probability of irregular civil conflicts across all 12 models. One unit increase in the
number of U.S. IMET participants increases the probability of irregular civil conflict with
.146, on average.
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Table 9. Logit Analysis of Civil War Types, 1976-2003

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET

(25)
U.S.
IMET
0.146***
(0.0212)

Military Aid

(26)
(27)
Other U.S. Total U.S.
Aid
Aid
0.185***
(0.0259)
-2.864*** -2.445***
(0.606)
(0.643)

Ground mech.
Air mech.
Combined arms

(28)
Armor

(29)
Geography

0.239***
(0.0597)
-5.288**
(2.070)
1.182
(0.869)
2.540**
(1.220)
-0.369**
(0.168)

0.265***
(0.0690)
-3.340
(2.175)
1.422
(0.867)
3.550***
(1.262)
-0.489***
(0.174)
-0.485
(0.324)
-0.130
(0.559)
1.309***
(0.422)

Distance to capital
Conflict at border
Border x Distance
Rebel fighting capacity
Rebel strength
Constant
Observations

0.901***
(0.0898)
1,014

1.629***
(0.104)
869

1.004***
(0.129)
832

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-6.341
(5.979)
284

-6.097
(6.140)
284

(30)
Fighting
Capacity
0.180**
(0.0749)
-6.534***
(2.418)
2.083**
(1.047)
3.145**
(1.429)
-0.508**
(0.205)

-0.621
(0.562)
-2.949***
(1.044)
-9.009
(7.162)
281

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET
Military Aid
Ground mech.
Air mech.
Combined arms

(31)
Terrain
0.211***
(0.0616)
-4.139*
(2.233)
1.209
(0.898)
3.288**
(1.324)
-0.437**
(0.178)

(32)
Regime
Type
0.172**
(0.0738)
-1.217
(2.409)
0.140
(1.059)
2.831**
(1.347)
-0.292
(0.195)

Distance to capital
Conflict at border
Border x Distance
Rebel fighting capacity
Rebel strength
Natural resources
Rough terrain

0.749
(0.518)
-0.746
(0.466)

Incumbent democracy

2.643***
(0.969)

Gdp per capita
External support govt
External support rebels
Sons of soil
Insurgency
Post-Cold War
Constant
Observations

-7.854
(6.181)
284

-4.167
(6.708)
263

(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
Economy External Sons of
All
Factors
Soil
Controls
0.205*** 0.245*** 0.270*** 0.465***
(0.0658) (0.0599) (0.0633)
(0.166)
-3.472
-5.190** -4.746**
1.739
(2.436)
(2.121)
(2.087)
(4.759)
1.395
1.303
1.132
1.783
(0.915)
(0.910)
(0.861)
(2.173)
2.996**
2.746** 2.885**
5.345*
(1.324)
(1.275)
(1.240)
(3.091)
-0.445** -0.390** -0.389**
-0.703
(0.187)
(0.175)
(0.167)
(0.454)
-0.600
(0.620)
1.234
(1.169)
0.534
(0.948)
-1.113
(0.993)
-5.543*
(2.836)
-0.697
(1.418)
1.871
(1.258)
1.708
(1.604)
0.481
2.060**
(0.359)
(0.988)
-0.507
-1.591
(0.449)
(1.037)
0.155
-0.171
(0.407)
(0.800)
1.271
0.784
(0.837)
(1.891)
-0.497
(0.863)
-2.992**
(1.200)
-11.07
-7.227
-7.150
-21.11
(7.235)
(6.266)
(5.960)
(16.99)
283
284
284
254

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Other type of U.S. military aid seems to decrease the probability of irregular conflict however
this relationship loses significance in several models and even changes direction when all
controls are included in the analysis. From the traditional military capability variables air
mechanization and combined arms strategy demonstrate statistically significant effects on the
type of civil conflicts. While higher level of air mechanization is associated with higher chances
of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner the use of combined arms strategy by
government forces seems to result in a lower probability of irregular conflicts. These results
make sense because air supremacy by the government`s military forces rebels to disperse and
conduct operations in smaller scale and in a faster pace to avoid exposure and potential
destruction by government air platforms. The use of combined arms strategy might lead to more
conventional conflicts because as Caverley and Secher (2017) argue this strategy leads to swift
conflict resolution where the rebels do not have time to switch to irregular methods, because they
are quickly destroyed by the government forces.
From the other variables only rebel strength shows consistent and significant effects on
the type of civil conflict. These results seem to be logical because it makes sense that the
stronger the rebels the less likely they use irregular methods but rather challenge the government
using conventional warfare methods.
Finally, to conduct robustness checks for these results I once again rerun the same models
included in Table 9. but using the other operationalization of my independent variable. The
results of these models once again show the same relationships and statistical significance as
depicted in Table 9. The actual results of these additional models are shown in Appendix N.
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Interaction Between U.S. IMET Participation and Mechanization Levels
The overall results of my analysis seem to support not only my theory but also other prior
theories (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996; Biddle, 2004; Toronto 2018) arguing that who operates the
military technology (human factor) might be more important than the military technology itself.
To provide further support to these arguments I run several additional models where I assess the
effects of interaction between my military human capital variable and the traditional military
capability variables. Figure 6. visually demonstrates the results of the analyses of the interactions
between U.S. IMET participation and the three different mechanization variables.
As Figure 6. demonstrate U.S. IMET participation has a significant effect on civil conflict
duration even when its interaction is assessed with the traditional mechanization variables. All
three graphs in Figure 6. once again demonstrate that as U.S. IMET participation increases the
duration of civil conflicts also increases. Furthermore, the graphs show that the level of ground
mechanization and the level of combined arms strategy only matters if quality military human
capital is available for the government forces.
The first graph shows that when U.S. IMET participation is low then the level of ground
mechanization does not make a significant difference in civil conflict duration. At the same time
when U.S. IMET participation is high then there is a significant difference in the effects of the
level of ground mechanization on civil conflict duration.
The graph shows that when both U.S. IMET participation and ground mechanization level are
high then incumbents government are more likely to fight shorter civil conflicts while high U.S.
IMET participation and low ground mechanization level are associated with longer civil wars.
These results suggest that if the better trained and educated soldiers are provided with
appropriate number of ground equipment they can end the civil conflict earlier.
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Next, the second graph demonstrates the effects of U.S. IMET participation and air
mechanization on the duration of civil conflicts. This graph shows that difference in the level of
air mechanization has a significant effect on civil conflict duration even if the U.S. IMET
participation is low. High level of air mechanization is associated with shorter civil conflicts than
low air mechanization when the U.S. IMET participation is low. When the number of U.S. IMET
participants increases the difference between the effects of the air mechanization levels
decreases. Low level of air mechanization and high level of U.S. IMET participation are still
associated with longer civil conflicts; however the improved military human capital seems to be
closing the gap between high and low level of air mechanization.
Finally, graph three shows the effects of U.S. IMET participation and the combined arms
strategy on civil conflict duration. This graph shows that when U.S. IMET participation is low
then the use of a combined arms strategy does not make a significant difference in civil conflict
duration. At the same time when U.S. IMET participation is high then there is a significant
difference in the effects of the combined arms strategy on civil conflict duration. The graph
shows that when U.S. IMET participation is high and combined arms strategy employed then
incumbents government are more likely to fight shorter civil conflicts while high U.S. IMET
participation and low levels of combined arms strategy are associated with longer civil wars.
These results demonstrate that when the quality of military human capital due to U.S.
IMET participation is introduced into the analysis then higher levels of ground and air
mechanization are actually associate with shorter civil conflicts which seem to contradict the
findings of several previous studies (Mason et al, 1999; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010).
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Figure 6. U.S. IMET participation and the Mechanization Variables
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At the same time the results of the last analysis lend support to Caverley and Sechser`s (2017)
arguments and shows that more effective use of a combined arms strategy is indeed associated
with faster conflict termination.

Case Illustrations – Uganda, India, and El Salvador
To provide further support to the theory proposed in this paper it is important to illustrate the
argument through actual cases as well. Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) dataset includes 147
unique civil conflicts from 1976 to 2003. The duration of these conflicts varies between one day
and 9,380 days with a mean of 1,710 days.
Although the availability of better military human capital through the participation in
U.S. IMET programs seems to be a strong predictor of civil war duration across most cases there
are several particular cases that demonstrate the difference in explanatory power between the
traditional military capability measures and military human capital. Two examples that challenge
the prior explanations while providing support for the theory of this paper are Uganda`s civil
conflicts in 1972 and between 1978 and 1991, and the civil wars in India between 1967 and
1972, and between 1978 to 2003.
According to Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) dataset both of these two countries
experienced a short (shorter than the mean value of the civil conflict variable) and a long civil
war while both countries` militaries` land mechanization, air mechanization and combined arms
indexes (and all other features captured in the control variables) remained almost exactly the
same. The lack of variation in these variables means that they cannot explain the variation in the
duration of the civil conflicts and present an opportunity to explore a better explanation.
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When looking at U.S. IMET participation for both countries one can find that they
significantly vary between the short and long civil wars. Since the U.S. IMET programs did not
exist before or during the short conflicts they could not improve the military human capital of
Uganda or India and with that their effects could not prolong the civil conflict. However, before
and during the long civil wars both Uganda and India have received U.S. military aid in the form
of U.S. IMET training which ultimately led to longer civil wars. Although these conflicts provide
some statistical examples of how land mechanization, air mechanization and combined arms
indexes are all poor predictors of civil conflict duration while U.S. IMET participation is
strongly associated with longer conflicts more evidence is needed regarding the mechanism
through which U.S. IMET participation effects civil conflict duration. To provide such evidence
I present a detailed analysis of another case from Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) dataset, the El
Salvador civil conflict that lasted from 1979 till 1991 (Wood, 2003). Since this civil war lasted
for 12 years and the El Salvador military received significant U.S. military aid in both the forms
of arms transfers and education and training I argue that this conflict is an appropriate case to
further assess the relationship between civil conflict duration and U.S. IMET participation.
Following the overthrow of General Carlos Humberto Romero`s military regime on
October 15, 1979 a weak civil-military junta took the power in El Salvador. The new regime that
included centrist and leftist political parties and some reform-minded, young military officers
pledged to reduce human rights violations, to create a more equal distribution of national wealth,
to hold free elections and to rewrite the constitution (Ladwig, 2016). While these promises never
materialized demands for change quickly grew and became more radical among students,
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peasants and labor unions producing five revolutionary organizations.30 As Ladwig (2016) notes
“large-scale demonstrations, organized strikes, occupation of foreign embassies, bank robberies,
kidnapping for ransom, and bomb attacks became weekly occurrences” (Ladwig, 2016:218).
While the regime struggled for survival, Cuba`s communist leader Fidel Castro brought the five
revolutionary organizations` leaders together in Havana in December 1979 when they joined
their ranks and formed a unified insurgent organization the Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front (hereafter, FMLN) (Onate, 2011).
At the beginning of the civil conflict the FMLN could field 4,000 guerilla fighters whose
operations were supported by an additional 5,000 part-time militia members (Bosh, 1999). By
1983 the number of guerrilla fighters reached 12,000. The FMLN received advice, arms and
training from communist countries including Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and
East Germany (Byrne, 1996). On the other side, the El Salvador Armed Forces (hereafter, ESAF)
consisted of the 8,000 men strong army and the 8,500 men strong Public Security Corps
(Woerner, 1981). Th ESAF entered into the civil conflict with a non-existent noncommissioned
officer corps, with low skilled, short-service conscripts, with military equipment that was in
extremely poor condition and with an officer corps that was not suited for combat operations
(Ladwig, 2016). The ESAF also lacked intelligence gathering capabilities as well as adequate
communication equipment (Ladwig, 2016). Given these conditions during the initial years of the
conflict the FMLN engaged the government forces in open battles and fought more like a
conventional army than a guerilla force. From the early days of the conflict till 1983 using such

These organizations were the Central American Workers’ Revolutionary Party, the People’s Revolutionary Army,
the Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces, the Armed Forces of National Resistance, and the Communist Party
of El Salvador’s Armed Forces of Liberation.
30
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conventional tactics the FMLN could capture ESAF military installations and outposts, close
down important transportation routes, temporarily capture villages and departmental capitals,
force ESAF to be on the defensive (Childress, 1995) and annihilate medium-sized ESAF units
(Ladwig, 2016). However, by the end of 1983 changes in the capabilities of the ESAF slowly
started changing the way the war was fought on both sides. By this time large number of U.S.
IMET educated and trained military officers returned to El Salvador bringing their newly learned
skills into the fight.
Besides a short 3-year period at the end of the 1970s when President Carter suspended all
U.S. military aid programs due to serious human rights violations, El Salvador received
extensive U.S. IMET support from the beginning of the civil conflict. As Childress (1995) notes
“over $1 billion in military aid has been provided to the ESAF [El Salvador Armed Forces] since
1980. In terms of actual training expenditures, El Salvador has received more IMET resources
than any other Third World country, and only two other Third World countries have had more
student trained through IMET since 1980” (Childress, 1995: 21). Figure 7. depicts the changes in
the sum of ESAF participants in the U.S. IMET programs 5 year prior to any given year.
5-year Sum of U.S. IMET Participants, 1975-1997
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Figure 7. 5-year Sum of U.S. IMET participants, 1975-1997
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Such a large U.S. IMET support was due to the realization that without a well-trained officer
corps the war cannot be won (Woerner, 1981). To swiftly increase the number of well-trained
junior officers more than a thousand ESAF officers were brought to the U.S. IMET programs in
1981 (Ladwig, 2016) and by the end of the civil conflict over half of the ESAF officer corps and
each officer under the rank of captain received U.S. IMET education and training in the U.S.
(Childress, 1995).
These officers received training in “individual leadership, small-unit operations, and
counterinsurgency theory” (Ladwig, 2016:245) as well as additional skills that were paramount
to be able to plan, organize, execute, and sustain effective military operations against the
insurgents. Table 10. lists the specific U.S. IMET courses and the number of ESAF participants.
Table 10. List of U.S. IMET Courses Received by ESAF, 1988-1993
Course
Combat Armor Officer
Training Management Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO)
Commando Operations
Officer Candidate Course
Basic NCO Course
Infantry Officer Basic Course
Psychological Operations Officer Course
Instructor Training
Specialized English Language Training
English Language Course
Training Management Officer
Command and General Staff
Battle Staff Operations
Security Assistance Training and Orientation Course
Sapper Course
Operations Training
TOTAL

Number of Students
520
483
285
283
168
192
116
103
94
79
66
39
30
26
23
20
2527

Although as several studies note (Childress, 1995; Bosh, 1999; Ladwig, 2016) the
returning officers met significant pressure from older ESAF officers to ignore U.S. training and
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conduct operations employing ESAF`s traditional conventional approaches the new knowledge
and skills brought home by the U.S. IMET graduates still started to effect ESAF`s overall
combat effectiveness. I argue that although it is true that ESAF did not immediately implemented
the American way of fighting insurgencies, but the U.S. IMET graduates` newly obtained
leadership skills, tactical proficiency, better understanding of how to plan and execute military
operations and how to sustain a force significantly improved the effectiveness even ESAF`s
conventional approach and slowly turned it into a more American counterinsurgency strategy.
This is clearly shown in an assessment conducted by the U.S. General Accountability Office
which found that by the mid-1980s the ESAF clearly became both technically and tactically
more professional due to U.S. IMET training (Childress, 1995). Besides these factors U.S. IMET
graduates` leadership skills also added to the improvement of the combat effectiveness of the
ESAF. Abandoning ESAF`s old centralized decision-making processes and switching to more
decentralized command and control practices gave the freedom of action to tactical unit
commanders to take the initiative and decide how to execute their missions (Ladwig, 2016). Due
to these improvements generated by the U.S. IMET participants FMLN also needed to
implement changes in their approach to the war if they wanted to keep the rebellion alive.
Castellanos (1991) argues that due to the improvements in ESAF`s combat effectiveness
FMLN could not sustain large-unit conventional combat operations and was ultimately forced to
switch to guerilla type hit-and-run tactics. According to Castellanos (1991) a guerilla leader
referred this switch in tactics a very significant turn in the conflict. Ladwig (2016) argues that as
the combat effectiveness of the ESAF improved both the insurgents` morale and prospect for
victory quickly plummeted. Referring to the opinion of a rebel leader Childress (1995) suggests
that due to the improved combat effectiveness of the ESAF the FMLN was beat down by 1985.
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As Childress (1995) find FMLN could not capture territory anymore and to survive it was forced
to switch its modus operandi to hit-and-run guerilla tactics. By this time, as Villalobos (1986)
notes FMLN no longer tried to win the war through militarily defeating ESAF but trying to break
the El Salvadorian economy just to be able to sustain the civil conflict. During the upcoming
years FMLN operations focused on low-level harassing activities such as severing power lines,
attacking plantations, destroying bridges, and damaging economic productions. These activities
led to a several years long military stalemate.
Following the 1989 national elections the new El Salvador government became more
open to negotiations with the FMLN and new President Cristiani called for peace talks two days
after he took office (Ladwig, 2016). FMLN saw the President`s initiative as a major opportunity
and to strengthen their negotiating positions launched a major combat operation against San
Salvador and some other areas across the country on 11 November 1989. Although the operation
was a major surprise for the ESAF, its forces regained control after a three-week campaign
where they mostly employed American counterinsurgency tactics (Schwarz, 1991). While from a
military perspective the offensive became a complete disaster for the FMLN because it was
quickly driven out of the capital while losing 50 percent of its fighters (Thomson, 1994) from a
political perspective it seems to have achieved its goal. Soon negotiations were initiated between
the government and the leadership of FMLN which resulted in an UN-brokered peace-agreement
signed on 16 January 1992 ending the 12-year long civil conflict (Ladwig, 2016).
Beyond the statistical support found in the Uganda and the India cases the detailed
analysis of the El Salvador civil conflict demonstrates how improvement in military human
capital due to U.S. IMET participation prolongs civil conflict duration. The better leadership and
technical skills as well as the better tactical proficiency of the government forces due to U.S.
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IMET participation indeed incentivize rebels to change their modus operandi, to hide, minimize
their operations and avoid engaging government forces in open conventional battles.

Potential Criticism
Some critics might be concerned that potential selection effects are driving the results of my
analysis. They might suggest that incumbent governments have an incentive to try to get access
to more U.S. IMET programs if they see the rise of a strong domestic challenger or if they are
expecting a longer civil war. It is also possible that the U.S. government allocates more U.S.
IMET in support of those governments who are being threatened by potential insurgencies or are
already engaging in civil conflicts. To address these concerns I run several models assessing the
relationship between the occurrence of insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation. In these
models my dependent variable is insurgency. This variable is coded 0 if a country is not involved
in an insurgency and 1 if it does. For my independent variable I once again use the actual number
of U.S. IMET participants and derive my control variables from relevant literature (Fearon and
Laitin, 2003; Blimes, 2006; Thies 2010; Fearon, 2011). The results of these models can be
reviewed in Table 11.
The results in the table demonstrate across all models that the more U.S. IMET support
an incumbent government receives the less likely it becomes involved in a civil conflict and with
that suggest that no selection effects are driving the results of the earlier analysis. As a
robustness check I run the same models with the secondary operationalization of my independent
variable and find the same relationship. The results of these models can be reviewed in Appendix
O.
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Table 11. Logit Analysis of Insurgency Occurrence, 1976-2003

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET

(37)
U.S. IMET
-0.0861***
(0.0180)

(38)
Total U.S. Aid
-0.160***
(0.0228)
-0.344
(0.683)

0.503***
(0.0835)
945

0.799***
(0.127)
761

Other U.S. Aid
Military Expenditure
Military Personnel
Population
Regime Type
GDP per Capita
Natural Resources
U.S. Affinity
Oil Exporter
Ethnic Fractionalization
Constant
Observations

(39)
All Controls
-0.134***
(0.0511)
-3.278**
(1.342)
-2.18e-08*
(1.18e-08)
-8.78e-06
(8.06e-06)
-0.268**
(0.105)
-1.650***
(0.500)
-0.144
(0.258)
0.731**
(0.308)
1.296***
(0.444)
-0.0960
(0.446)
-1.755**
(0.723)
7.384***
(2.244)
378

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Another potential challenge to the presented argument might be why the civil conflict
drags on when the insurgents realize that the incumbent government`s military is becoming more
effective and impose more cost on them. In this situation the insurgents would be incentivized to
look for settlement as soon as possible which would be associated with shorter civil wars. This
argument has some merit; however I suggest that the incumbent government also realizes the
improvement in its military capabilities, and it is not interested in resolving the conflict trough
settlement rather through the complete destruction of the rebel movement to avoid the
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reemergence of the insurgency. The insurgents will try to keep the rebellion alive as long as
possible through dispersion, hiding and small-scale operations and try to secure external support
or wear the government out over time which will be associated with an increase in the duration
of the civil conflicts.
Finally, critics might suggest that this study overlooked several additional factors that might
affect the duration of civil conflicts. These might include prior war experience of the incumbent
government`s forces, military skills and experience gained by both sides during the actual civil
conflict, changes in the external support of the rebels due to U.S. support to the government and
the specifics of the U.S. IMET training received by the government military personnel. I
acknowledge that these factors can have significant effects on civil conflict duration, but due to
the very limited availability of such data and space limitations of this paper they could not be
considered in appropriate extent. They will be subjects of my future data collection efforts and
topics for upcoming papers.

Conclusion and Implications
Several studies have already argued that external support and more specifically military aid to
the incumbent governments affects the duration of civil conflicts. Prior literature suggested that
foreign military aid improves the military capability of the government which prolongs civil
conflict duration. These prior studies always operationalize this improved military capability
through tangible, hardware-based measures (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman,
2011; Caverley and Secher, 2017). In this paper I introduce a new measure for state military
capacity in the form of military human capital and argue that it is rather the availability of highly
trained and educated military personnel than military technology that effects the duration of civil
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conflicts. I theorize that better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation increases
the government military`s capability which incentivize rebels to hide and minimize their
operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I use a new dataset that
includes detailed information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation between 1976 and
2003.
The results of my analysis contribute to the literature of civil conflicts in four ways. First,
my results support the previous claim (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011)
that better military capability is associated with longer civil wars. Second, I show that when
military human capital is included in the models than neither military mechanization (Lyall and
Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) nor the combined arms strategy (Caverley and
Secher, 2017) are significant predictors for civil conflict duration. This result clearly suggests
that who is operating the military hardware is more important than the hardware itself. Third, I
find that better military human capital is not only associated with longer civil wars, but it also
increases the probability of incumbent government`s fighting civil conflicts in an irregular
manner. Lastly, by using U.S. IMET data as a proxy for availability of quality military human
capital I provide feedback about the potential effects of these education and training programs
and with that I contribute to the literature of U.S. foreign military aid.
In addition to assessing civil conflict duration my study also shed some light on the
importance of bringing military human capital into the research programs of armed conflicts in
general. While many studies have explored the effects of military technology (Lyall and Wilson,
2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) and strategy employed by the belligerents (Biddle 2004;
Balcells and Kalyvas 2012; Caverley and Secher, 2017) on the duration and outcome of civil
conflicts the question assessing the effects of who is employing those technologies and strategies
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has remained mostly unexplored. Bringing the military human capital into the analysis offers
several questions that might be answered by future research.
Additional research could help us understand the effects of better trained and educated
military personnel and the level of both military casualties and civilian collateral damage.
Further research could isolate the relationship between military human capital and civil conflict
outcomes. To address these questions better data is needed about military human capital.
Although U.S. IMET participation seems to be a strong proxy for quality military human capital
even more reliable new data would enable researchers to better assess the effects of military
human capital in civil conflicts.
On a similar note, my study only assessed the military human capital available for the
incumbent government while ignored the same variable in case of the rebels. Since in many
conflicts the insurgents are coming directly from the military or have previous military
experience including a variable that accounts for how educated and trained the rebel forces are
would make an important addition to research. New data about rebel military human capital
would enable scholars to specify the relationship more effectively between human capital and the
duration of civil conflicts.
In sum, the findings of this analysis underscore the significance of including military
human capital into the theoretical models of civil conflict research programs. An effective
explanation of the dynamics of civil conflict requires researchers to better understand how the
human factor interacts with military technology, terrain, political and economic factors. Further
exploring the role of military human capital is likely to highlight several new insights helping
scholars to better understand the dynamics of civil conflicts and potentially enable policymakers
to make more informed decisions when preparing or involved in such wars.

105

References
Atkinson, Carol (2010) Does soft power matter? A comparative analysis of student exchange
programs 1980–2006. Foreign Policy Analysis 6(1): 1–22.
Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N. Kalyvas. 2012. “Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and
Outcomes of Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (8): 1390–418.
Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, and Andrew J. Enterline. 2000. “Killing Time: The World Politics of
Civil War Duration, 1820–1992.” International Studies Quarterly 44 (4): 615–42.
Bapat, Navin A. "Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent."
Journal of Peace Research 48.3 (2011): 303-318.
Barany, Zoltan (2012) The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in
Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Becker, S. Gary. 1994. Human Capital, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special
Reference to Education, Third Edition.
Bleaney, Michael, and Arcangelo Dimico. 2011. “How Different Are the Correlates of Onset and
Continuation of Civil Wars?” Journal of Peace Research 48 (2): 145–55.
Biddle, Stephen, and Robert Zirkle. "Technology, civil‐military relations, and warfare in the
developing world." The Journal of Strategic Studies 19.2 (1996): 171-212.
Biddle, Stephen. 2004. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Biddle, Stephen, and Stephen Long. "Democracy and military effectiveness: A deeper look."
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48.4 (2004): 525-546.
Blimes, Randall J. "The indirect effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the likelihood of civil war
onset." Journal of Conflict Resolution 50.4 (2006): 536-547.
Bosch, Brian J. The Salvadoran officer corps and the final offensive of 1981. McFarland, 1999.
Buhaug, Halvard, Scott Gates and Peaivi Lujala. 2009. “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the
Duration of Civil Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (4): 544–69.
Byrne, Hugh. El Salvador's civil war: a study of revolution. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1996.
Castellanos, Miguel. The Comandante speaks: memoirs of an El Salvadoran guerrilla leader.
Westview Pr, 1991.

106

Caverley, Jonathan D, and Todd S. Sechser. (2017) Military Technology and the Duration of
Civil Conflict, International Studies Quarterly (2017) 61, 704–720
Childress, Michael. The Effectiveness of US Training Efforts in Internal Defense and
Development. The Cases of El Salvador and Honduras. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA,
1995.
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom. 2004. “On the Duration of Civil War.”
Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 253–73.
Cunningham David E. 2006. “Veto Players and Civil War Duration.” American Journal of
Political Science 50 (4): 875–92.
Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. “It Takes Two: A
Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4):
570–97.
Cunningham, David E. 2010. “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong
Civil Wars.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (2): 115–27.
De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. JR. and Barry R. Weingast.1999. “The Rationality of Fear: Political
Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict.” In Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, edited by
Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, 261–302. New York: Columbia University Press.
DeRouen, Jr., Karl R. and David Sobek. 2004. “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and
Outcome.” Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 303–20.
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (3):
379–414.
Fearon, James & David Laitin, 2003. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', American Political
Science Review 97(1): 75-90.
Fearon, James D. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?”
Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 275–301.
Friedman, Jeffrey A. 2011. “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for
Theory and Doctrine.” Security Studies 20 (4): 556–91.
Gates, Scott, Havard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Havard Strand. 2006. “Institutional
Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000.” American Journal of
Political Science 50 (4): 893–908.

107

Gilmore, Elisabeth, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Paivi Lujala and Jan Ketil Rod. 2005. “Conflict
Diamonds: A New Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (3): 257–72.
Gleditsch, Nils, Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Margareta Sollenberg and Havard Strand. 2002.
“Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 39 (5): 615–37.
Hendrix, Cullen S. “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the
Study of Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 273–85.
Hendrix, Cullen and Young, Joseph. 2014. “State Capacity and Terrorism,” Security Studies,
23:2, 329-63.
Hultquist, Philip. 2013. “Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War
Settlement.” Journal of Peace Research 50 (5): 623–34.
Huntington, Samuel P (2006) Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering
the Mechanisms.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4): 508–37.
Kirschner, Shanna. A. 2010. “Knowing your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in
Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (5): 745–70.
Kocher, Matthew Adam. “State Capacity as a Conceptual Variable,” Yale Journal of
International Affairs 5, no. 2 (2010): 137–45.
Ladwig III, W. C. (2016). Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency: US Involvement in El
Salvador's Civil War, 1979–92. International Security, 41(1), 99-146.
Lefever, E. W. (1976). The military assistance training program. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 424(1), 85-95.
Lujala, Paivi, Jan Ketil Rod and Nadja Thieme. 2007. “Fighting Over Oil: Introducing a New
Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 24 (3): 239–56.
Lujala, Paivi. 2009. “Deadly Combat Over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the
Severity of Armed Civil Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (1): 50–71.
Lujala, Paivi, 2010. “The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural
Resources.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (1): 15–28.
Lyall, Jason. 2010. “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing
Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration.” International Organization 64 (1): 167–
92.

108

Lyall, Jason, and Isaiah Wilson. 2009. “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in
Counterinsurgency Wars.” International Organization 63 (1): 67–106.
Macdonald, Paul K. 2013. “‘Retribution Must Succeed Rebellion’: The
Colonial Origins of Counterinsurgency Failure.” International Organization 67 (2): 253–86.
Mason, T. David; Joseph Weingarten Jr. & Patrick Fett, 1999. 'Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting
the Outcomes of Civil Wars', Political Research Quarterly 5 2(2): 239-268.
Melander, Erik Therése Pettersson & Lotta Themnér. 2016. “Organized violence, 1989–2015.”
Journal of Peace Research 53(5): 727–742.
Nilsson, Desire`e. 2008. “Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War
Settlements.” Journal of Peace Research 45 (4): 479–95.
Pearlman, Wendy, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2012. “Nonstate Actors,
Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (1): 3–15.
Pollack, Kenneth M. Arabs at war: military effectiveness, 1948-1991. U of Nebraska Press,
2004.
Rustad, Siri Camilla AAS, Jan Ketil Rod, Wenche Larsen and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2008.
“Foliage and Fighting: Forest Resources and the Onset, Duration, and Location of Civil War.”
Political Geography 27 (7): 761–82.
Savage, Dillon J. and Caverley, Jonathan D. 2017. “When human capital threatens the Capitol:
Foreign aid in the form of military training and coups.” Journal of Peace Research 2017, Vol.
54(4) 542–557.
Schwarz, Benjamin. American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations
of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building. Rand Corporation, 1991.
Secher, Todd S., and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2010. “The Army You Have: The Determinants of
Military Mechanization, 1979–2001.” International Studies Quarterly 54 (2): 481–511.
Smith, Niel A., and Nathan W. Toronto. 2010. “It’s All the Rage: Why Mechanization Doesn’t
Explain COIN Outcomes.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 21 (3): 519–28.
Taw, Jennifer M. Thailand and the Philippines: Case studies in US IMET training and its role in
internal defense and development. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1994.
Thies, Cameron G. "Of rulers, rebels, and revenue: State capacity, civil war onset, and primary
commodities." Journal of peace research 47.3 (2010): 321-332.

109

Thompson, Leroy. Ragged war: the story of unconventional and counter-revolutionary warfare.
Arms and Armour, 1994, P. 79.
Toronto Nathan W. 2018. How Militaries Learn Human Capital, Military Education, and
Battlefield Effectiveness. Rowman and Littlefield.
Oñate, Andrea. "The Red Affair: FMLN–Cuban relations during the Salvadoran Civil War,
1981–92." Cold War History 11.2 (2011): 133-154.
Villalobos, Joaquin. The War in El Salvador (San Francisco: Solidarity
Publications, 1986), p. 17.
Walter, Barbara F. 2002. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of
Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Walter, Barbara F. 2009. “Bargaining Failures and Civil War.” Annual Review of Political
Science 12: 243–61.
Woerner, Frederick Frank. Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team:(draft).
1981.
Wucherpfenning, Julian, Nils W. Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede
Gleditsch. 2012. “Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War.” World Politics 64 (1): 79–
115.

110

CHAPTER FIVE: TRAINING FOR PEACE – U.S. IMET AND MID
INITIATION, 1976-2007
Abstract
How does U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs affect the likelihood of recipient
states becoming involved in militarized interstate disputes (hereafter, MIDs)? While the
relationship between U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer and MID
involvement has been studied extensively in international relations literature the effects of U.S.
military aid in the form of foreign military education and training on the same phenomena has
been completely ignored. This study intends to fill some of this gap by systematically assessing
the effects of this latter form of U.S. military aid on the recipient states` international conflict
behavior. I theorize that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home
with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power,
civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. These military personnel
advise their political masters against the use of military force during international disputes
leading to a decreased probability of MID initiation. To test this argument I use data from the
Correlates of War Project`s MID data set (version 4.3) and the most prominent U.S. foreign
military education and training program the International Military Education and Training
(hereafter, U.S. IMET) and I find that more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely
it initiates MIDs. I also find that countries that receive U.S. IMET support are less likely to
escalate ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility.
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Introduction
How does U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs affect the likelihood of recipient
states becoming involved in MIDs? While the relationship between U.S. military aid in the form
of arms and equipment transfer and MIDs has been studied extensively in international relations
literature the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and training on
the same phenomena has been completely ignored. Besides leaving this less tangible, but
important variable out from previous studies this research agenda requires further exploration
due to the contradicting results of prior research. While theoretically all previous studies agree
that U.S. military aid improves the military capabilities of the recipient states some studies argue
that this improved military capability is associated with higher probability of interstate conflict
initiation (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983; Brzoska and Pearson, 1984; Pearson, Brzoska, and
Crantz, 1992; Kinsella, 1994; Hartung, 1994; Craft and Smaldone, 2002) while others find the
opposite relationship (Huth and Russett, 1984; Huth, 1988; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995).
Additionally, Durch`s (2000) analysis suggest that there is no relationship between arms and
equipment transfer and armed conflict involvement.
This paper intends to contribute to this ongoing debate about the relationship between
military aid and conflict involvement by systematically assessing how U.S. military aid in the
form foreign military education and training programs influence the probability of recipient
states becoming interstate conflict initiators. The scope of this investigation focuses only on
militarized interstate disputes (hereafter, MID) and one of the fourteen U.S. foreign military
education and training programs31, the International Military Education and Training programs
31

The U.S. foreign military education and trainings programs are: the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign
Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement, Global Peace Operations Initiative, Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies,
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because the U.S. IMET programs are the most prominent of these efforts. It is the largest in size
and budget; has the most clearly defined goals and subject to continuous scrutiny from
policymakers and the U.S. Congress. Given these facts I suggest that the relationship found
between the U.S. IMET programs and MID involvements also applies to the U.S. foreign
military education and training effort as a whole.
Since one of the goals assigned to the U.S. IMET programs by Congress is to support
regional stability and decrease the likelihood of armed conflict between countries32 this
investigation does not only contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate about the effects of U.S.
military aid on MIDs but potentially provides direct feedback to policy makers whether the U.S.
IMET programs meet the goals assigned to them by Congress.
To be able to investigate the research question and provide policy feedback related to the
U.S. IMET programs I build on the general theoretical frameworks of the previously listed
studies and suggest that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs also improves the
military capabilities of the recipient states. However, I propose that while military aid in the form
of arms and equipment transfer improves the more tangible, hardware related elements of the
recipient states` militaries, the U.S. IMET programs improve a less tangible factor, the military
human capital. I argue that the improvement in the military human capital acts differently than
capability improvement through the reception of arms and equipment. I propose that the more
education and training foreign military personnel receive in the U.S. IMET programs the better

Section 1004 – Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Training Support, Mine Action Programs, Disaster Response,
Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, Section 2282 – Global Train and Equip Program,
Service-Sponsored Activities, Foreign Assistance Act and the Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard
Activities Program.
32
Department of State and the Department of Defense Foreign Military Training Joint Report, Fiscal Year 2012 and
2013.
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understanding they will have about the role of the military as an instrument of national power,
civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. Based on this improved
understanding the graduates of the U.S. IMET programs advise their civilian masters against the
offensive use of military force in case of an interstate dispute, which reduces the probability of
interstate conflict initiation. Empirically I find that indeed the more U.S. military aid countries
receive in the form of U.S. IMET participation the less likely that they initiate interstate
conflicts. Additionally, the results of my analysis also show that more U.S. IMET participation is
also associated with a decreased probability of escalating ongoing MIDs to the higher levels of
hostility. The study proceeds in six parts.
To establish a strong foundation for the further discussion this paper starts with a review
and discussion of the most significant previous literature that explores the causes of conflict
initiation. Next, the paper proceeds with the development of a theoretical argument to explain
how participation in the U.S. IMET programs improves the military human capital of the
recipient states and why this improved military capability is associated with a decreased
probability of interstate conflict initiation. Next, I discuss the research design, the data sources,
measurements, and my empirical strategy. Then, the study presents the empirical analysis and
discusses the main findings. The analysis concludes with a short summary of the findings and
contributions alongside with some potential policy implications and ideas for further research.

Theories of MID Initiation
Militarized interstate disputes are military conflicts among two or more sovereign states
involving nonaccidental, government-sanctioned, overt, and explicit threats, displays, or uses of
military force, with the potential of escalating to war (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996). In
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international relations scholarship the question of why some countries are becoming involved in
such conflicts has been studied extensively. Some scholars suggest that the variation in this
phenomenon can be explained by the difference in countries` regime types (Snyder 1991; Downs
and Rocke, 1994; Van Evera 1994, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Reiter and Stam,
2002; Caverley, 2014). Other experts argue that changing power balance due to different growth
rates of states are the possible sources of conflict and might lead to MIDs (Organski and Kugler,
1980; Gilpin, 1981; Maoz, 1982; Wallerstein, 1984; Midlarsky, 1990; Geller, 1992).
Furthermore, building on Vasquez`s (1993) argument Huth (1996) and Krause (2004) argue that
countries that are involved in territorial disputes are more likely to initiate MIDs. Others argues
that alliances play a crucial role in states` international conflict behavior. While according to the
findings of several studies membership in alliances increase the probability of countries
becoming aggressive others suggest that certain types of alliances prevent its members to
become instigators of MIDs (Morrow, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Leeds, 2003; Benson, 2011).
Additionally, several researchers find that military capabilities that states possess determine
whether a country becomes involved in MIDs (Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1984, 1993; Jervis
1989; Blair 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur 2005; Bell and Miller, 2015). In relation to the military
capabilities argument several studies also investigate the effects of foreign military aid on MIDs.
This study intends to contribute to this latter literature by exploring their theoretical arguments
from a different angle and expanding on their empirical methods and findings.
The studies that assess the relationship between foreign military aid and probability of the
recipient countries` international conflict involvement can be divided into two groups from a
theoretical perspective: the encouragement and the discouragement arguments. Those studies
that belong to the former group (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983; Brzoska and Pearson, 1984;
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Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz, 1992; Kinsella, 1994; Hartung, 1994; Craft and Smaldone, 2002)
argue that more foreign military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer increases the
probability of MID involvement. According to these studies several mechanisms might drive this
relationship. First, Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz (1992) suggest that “arms deliveries are a factor
in decisions to go to war because of considerations of military superiority” (Pearson, Brzoska,
and Crantz, 1992: 399). Additionally, Craft and Smaldone (2002) argue that “the importation of
weapons may increase the perceived military capability of the state in the minds of its leadership,
making it more confident of a favorable military-political outcome in armed confrontations, and
therefore more likely to initiate or participate in them” (Craft and Smaldone, 2002: 704). Finally,
Craft and Smaldone (2002 ) also propose that “weapons acquisitions may heighten the prestige
and institutional role of the military in society and government policy determination and lead to
more aggressive responses to perceived security threats” (Craft and Smaldone, 2002: 704). These
studies find empirical support to their claims and argue that more foreign military aid in the form
of arms and equipment transfer increases the probability of MID involvement.
Contradictory to these arguments the restraint literature (Huth and Russett, 1984; Huth,
1988; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995) proposes that military arms and equipment transfer reduces
the probability of MID involvement of the recipient states. These studies suggest that this type of
military aid improves the recipient countries` military capabilities and with that improves the
military balance with potential adversaries (Kinsella and Tillema, 1995). Furthermore, this
improved capability enables the recipient states to deter potential foreign aggressors and
increases the recipient states` perception of security. According to the restraint studies the
increased perception of security reduces the incentive to initiate MIDs and because of that the
more military aid a country receives in the form of arms and equipment transfer the less likely it
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will be involved in MIDs (Kinsella and Tillema, 1995). Finally, Durch (2000) argues that both
groups of studies are wrong because there is no relationship between arms and equipment
transfer and recipient states` involvement in armed conflicts.
Although all these studies make significant contributions to the overall research agenda
they also leave some room for potential improvement and expansion. I suggest that the
contradicting results of the previous studies are due to their different research designs (case
studies versus large-N analysis) and their use of different proxies for foreign military aid.
Furthermore, the authors` limited regional scopes and the small number of cases compared to
“world-wide” large-N studies might also contribute to the contradicting empirical findings.
Besides these challenges all of these studies only assess the relationship between foreign military
aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers and MID involvement, while systematically
ignore the potential effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and
training. The inclusion of this variable into this research agenda is important for several reasons.
First, the U.S. foreign military education and training effort makes up quite a substantial
part of the overall U.S. military aid efforts since for example in fiscal year 2015 the U.S.
provided $876.5 million worth of IMET training to about 76,400 students from 154 countries
(Savage and Caverley, 2017). Second, Biddle and Zirkle (1996) argue that without well trained
and educated military personnel the availability of complex modern weapons or large military
budget are not sufficient to increase a country`s military capabilities. Furthermore, Biddle (2004)
suggests that state military capabilities do not only depend on tangible factors such as number of
military personnel, number of major weapon systems (tanks, airplanes, ships, etc.), possession of
nuclear capability (Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1984, 1993; Jervis 1989; Blair 1993; Sagan 1994;
Kapur 2005) or military expenditure (Hendrix, 2010; and Kocher, 2010) but also on less tangible

117

elements including the availability of well trained and educated military personnel. Finally,
Toronto (2018) suggests that without highly trained and educated military personnel states`
military forces cannot be successful in modern conflict.
Through the introduction of the U.S. IMET programs into the investigation of the
relationship between U.S. military aid and MID involvement and focusing on the effects of
military human capital this study establishes a new approach within this research agenda.
Furthermore, the introduction of a different type of military aid might also help decide the debate
between the encouragement and the discouragement literature or sides with Durch`s (2000)
argument by providing further empirical evidence to either side. Next, besides its contributions
to the ongoing scholarly debate assessing the effects of U.S. IMET programs on the recipient
states` international conflict behavior also has significant policy implications. Since one of the
major goals of the U.S. IMET programs is to support regional stability and minimize the
probability of interstate conflict initiation the results of this study can provide direct feedback to
policy makers whether the U.S. IMET programs meet the assigned goals.

Theory of U.S. IMET and MID Initiation
The U.S. military aid is being delivered to the recipient states in two forms: arms and equipment
transfers and foreign military education and training programs. One of the main goals of both
types of U.S. military aid is to improve the military capabilities of the recipient states so they can
deter foreign aggression and defend themselves in case of an armed conflict (Cope, 1995;
Atkinson, 2010; Savage and Caverley, 2017). While U.S. military aid in the form of arms and
equipment transfer improves the recipient states` military capabilities through better hardware
the U.S. IMET programs improve the recipient states` military human capital (Savage and
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Caverley, 2017). Since as Biddle and Zirkle (1996); Biddle (2004) and Toronto (2018) argue
without well trained and educated military personnel the availability of complex modern
weapons is not sufficient to increase a country`s military capabilities countries that rely on U.S.
foreign military aid are incentivized to also improve their military human capital to U.S. IMET
participation. These programs provide a unique framework for foreign militaries to improve their
military human capital for several reasons.
Atkinson (2010) and Savage and Caverley (2017) argue that the U.S. military is currently
the best military force in the world and possess the best military educational and training
programs. Additionally, the U.S. IMET programs are unique because the U.S. military
accumulated decades of war experiences. Furthermore, the size and modernity of the U.S.
training infrastructure, the availability of an experienced and combat focused training cadre, and
the size of the budget available33 for education and training purposes cannot be compared to any
other country`s similar programs (Savage and Caverley, 2017). Besides these factors foreign
military also send their military personnel to the U.S. IMET programs, because as Farrell (2001)
argues militaries around the world admire the professional norms, values and procedures of those
foreign militaries that have won victories in recent wars or have gone through major
technological developments. According to Farrell (2001) military organizations emulate the
norms and procedures of those victorious examples even if those norms and procedures do not fit
the strategic interest of the given countries. The author argues that the implementation of an
American style military, following the U.S. dramatic victory in the Gulf Wars, in countries like
Botswana, Monaco or Micronesia are clear examples of such norm emulation (Farrell 2001;

33

According to Savage and Caverley (2017) the annual training budget of the U.S. military is bigger than entire
defense budget of 117 countries.
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Goldman 2003, 2006). Based on this argument I propose that most foreign militaries admire the
recent victories and technical advancement of the U.S. military and want to emulate its norms
and values.
Savage and Caverley (2017) suggest that the foreign military personnel who participates
in the U.S. IMET programs absorb the U.S. military`s distinct and highly professional identity as
well as its core values, which significantly improves the professionalism of the recipient states`
military as a whole. Furthermore, Stepan (1986), Huntington (2006), and Barany (2012) argue
that the more professional a military considers itself, the higher the temptation to be involved in
state affairs both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, Atkinson (2010) argues that the
U.S. IMET programs teaches participants about the role of the military as an instrument of
national power, about appropriate civil-military relations and the potential cost of an interstate
war. Additionally, as a part of their training U.S IMET graduates learn about the importance of
quality military advice in the foreign policy making process and how even low or mid-level
military leaders can indirectly affect high level decisions34. Finally, based on interviews
conducted with U.S. IMET graduates from the country Georgia, Phadnis (2019) finds that these
graduates are catalyzing and leading their country`s defense transformation and argues that U.S.
IMET graduates` “impact at the highest levels of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and General
Staff cannot be overstated” (Phandis, 2019).
Based on these arguments I theorize that U.S. IMET program graduates return home as
more professional and more capable soldiers with the ability and willingness to influence

34

Based on the National Security Act of 1947 which was amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 the
highest-ranking military leader, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the "principal military advisor" to
the President of the United States. However, the advice delivered by the Chairman is based on the assessment and
analysis of numerous low and mid-level military leaders who all provide input into this product.
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political leaders` decisions directly or indirectly. Due to their participation in the best and most
respected military education and training programs (Atkinson, 2010; Savage and Caverley, 2017)
U.S. IMET graduates improve the military`s respect within their home society and increase the
military`s role in government policy determination. In support of this assertion Lefever (1976)
suggests that the graduates of the IMET programs do not only become more professionals, but
also senior military leaders with significant political influence and responsibility.
I also suggest that recipient states` political leaders listen more to the military advise of
the U.S. IMET graduates than those military leaders who has never attended American education
and training. This is the case because the political leaders send military personnel to the U.S.
with the goal to obtain better educated and trained military human capital. They understand that
the U.S. IMET programs are the best military education and training opportunity in the world
and because of that they listen to the advice of the U.S. IMET graduates more than those who
were never educated or trained in the U.S. The military advice given by the U.S. IMET graduates
are driven by the norms and values they learn in these programs. They return home with a better
understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, about
appropriate civil-military relations, the importance of diplomacy and international cooperation,
and the potential cost of an interstate war. Due to these factors when time comes to advise
political leaders regarding the potential use of military force in an international dispute U.S.
IMET graduates are more likely to caution their political masters against such aggression than
those military leaders who has not participated in such U.S. education and training programs.
These assertions lead to my first two hypotheses:
H1: In comparison of countries, those receiving U.S. IMET support are less likely to initiate
MIDs.
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H1a: In comparison of countries, the more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely
it initiates MIDs.

If the U.S. IMET graduates are less likely to promote the use of military in case of an
international dispute than those military leaders who has never participated in such programs
than it is also logical that they will advise against escalating ongoing MIDs to higher levels of
hostility. According to Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) MIDs can be divided into five
categories based on the level of hostility in an ongoing conflict. These five categories include no
militarized action, the threat of use of force, display of force, use of force and full war (Jones,
Bremer, and Singer, 1996). I argue if the politician leaders of the recipient states indeed listen to
the advice of the U.S. IMET graduates and these military personnel based on the norms and
values they learn in the U.S. IMET programs advocate for the use of military force only as the
last resort in international disputes than U.S. IMET participation must be associated with less
likelihood of conflict escalation. Based on this argument I propose two additional hypotheses:
H2: In comparison of countries, those receiving U.S. IMET support will be less likely to escalate
interstate conflicts to the higher levels of hostility.
H2a: In comparison of countries, the more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely
it escalates interstate conflicts to the higher levels of hostility.
Research Design
To assess the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on MID involvement and escalation I employ
large-N statistical analysis through a series of logistic regression models. The interpretation of
these models is being discussed in detail in Long (1997).
To conduct a rigorous assessment of the effects of U.S. IMET programs on the recipient
states` international conflict behavior and to ensure to include all potential alternative
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explanations presented in the previous studies I generate a new dataset by merging five
frequently used datasets. First, I use the Correlates of War (hereafter, COW) Militarized
Interstate Dispute data set version 4.3 (Glenn, et al, 2015) and the COW National Material
Capabilities dataset version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). Next, I derive my regime
type variable from Boix et al. (2012). and my U.S. IMET related variables from Savage and
Caverley (2017) whose IMET data ranges from 1976 to 2007. Finally, I use several variables of
the COW Formal Alliances dataset version 4.1 (Gibler, 2009). The new dataset contains 3558
observations. The unit of analysis is country-year.
To operationalize my first dependent variable, conflict initiation I use the COW MID
dataset initiator variable. This is a dichotomous variable which is coded 0 if a country did not
initiate the given conflict within a given year and 1 if it did initiate the MID. The frequency of
occurrence of conflict initiators can be reviewed in Table 12.
Table 12. Frequency of MID Initiator variable
Initiator
0
1
Total

Frequency
320
3,238
3,558

Percent
8.99
91.01
100.00

Cum
8.99
100.00

My second dependent variable is COW MID dataset`s levels of hostility variable. This
variable is coded from 1 to 5. 1 is being no militarized action, 2 is the threat of use of force, 3 is
display of force, 4 represents the use of force and finally 5 is full war. The frequency of the
hostility level variable can be reviewed in Table 13.
My key explanatory variable is participation in U.S. IMET programs. I use Savage and
Caverley`s (2017) IMET variables. To ensure the robustness of my findings I operationalize the
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U.S. IMET variable three different ways. My first independent variable is a binary variable
coded 0 if the country does not receive any U.S. IMET support and 1 if the country does receive
military education and training from the U.S. My second independent variable is the number of
U.S. IMET students. Since increasing a country`s military capacity through the improvement of
its human capital takes time I use the logged five-year sum of U.S. IMET students measuring the
total number of U.S. IMET participants of a given country during the five years prior before the
actual MID started. Finally, since the U.S. IMET programs are different both in their content and
their duration I employ a different measure as well to account for this variance. I use the logged
sum of 5-year total U.S. IMET spending as my second operationalization.
Table 13. Frequency of Hostility Level variable
Hostility Level

Frequency

Percent

Cum.

1
2
3
4
5
Total

914
71
1,320
1,220
33
3,558

25.69
2.00
37.10
34.29
0.93
100.00

25.69
27.68
64.78
99.07
100.00

Next, I aggressively control for potential cofounding variables and derive my controls
from the most widely cited literature addressing the potential causes of militarized interstate
dispute initiation and escalation. The first alternative explanation I control for is other types of
U.S. military aid. I use Savage and Caverley`s (2014) military aid variable to account for the
effects of U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer. This variable measures
the amount of U.S. military aid as a percentage of the recipient country`s GDP. Savage and
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Caverley (2014) generated this variable by including “US Military aid (USAID), deflated to
2005 dollars and divided by total GDP” (Savage and Caverley, 2014: 549) of any given country.
My next control variable is regime type (Snyder 1991; Downs and Rocke, 1994; Van
Evera, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Reiter and Stam, 2002; Cavelrey, 2014;)
To account for the potential effects of regime type I utilize the regime type variable of Boix et al.
(2012). This variable was developed through the consideration of multiple factors using
information from 219 countries between 1800 and 2007. This binary variable is coded as 1 if the
regime qualifies as democracy based on the authors` requirements and 0 if it does not.
I derive my next control variable from the literature that argues that alliances play a
crucial role in states` international behavior (Morrow, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Leeds, 2003; Benson,
2011). To account for the potential effects of different alliances this analysis employs three
alliance variables (defense, nonaggression, and entente) from the Correlates of War Formal
Alliances dataset version 4.1 (Gibler, 2009) and also accounts for neutrality. All three alliance
variables are dichotomous and coded as 0 if a country is not a member of the given alliance and
1 if it is a member. The neutrality variable is also binary coded 0 if a country not neutral and 1 if
it is. Since it is also being argued in previous literature (Krause, 2004) that U.S. affiliation might
improves states` security perceptions and reduces their incentives to initiate interstate conflict I
also control for this potential effect. This variable is continuous and measured on a scale between
-1 and +1 where -1 means no U.S. affiliation, while +1 means U.S. security guarantee for the
given state.
The next variable controls for the possession of nuclear capabilities (Waltz, 1981;
Mearsheimer, 1984, 1993; Jervis, 1989; Blair, 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur, 2005) I use a binary
variable to control for the effects of the possession of nuclear capabilities. The variable is coded
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0 if the country does not have nuclear weapons and 1 if the country possesses such capabilities.
Additionally, following the controls used in previous studies I control for the potential effects of
national capabilities. I use the gdp, the iron and steel production ability, the total population size,
the military expenditure, and military size data from the Correlates of War National Material
Capabilities dataset version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). All of these variables are
interval variables. Last, but not least to address potential endogeneity problem I included Savage
and Caverley`s (2017) ongoing conflict variable as well among my controls. This variable is
coded 0 if a country is not involved in a civil war and 1 if it does. The summary statistics for all
my variables can be reviewed in Appendix P.

Results and Discussion
Table 14. exhibits the findings from eleven logistic regression models assessing the effects of the
U.S. IMET programs on the probability of becoming the initiator of MIDs. In the models I use
the three different operationalization of U.S. IMET participation. The results can be interpreted
simply as variables with negative coefficients are associated with a decreasing probability of
becoming an interstate conflict initiator. Model 1 includes only the binary measure of U.S. IMET
participation. In the second model I include the actual number of U.S. IMET participants while
the third model assesses how changes in the annual IMET spending effects the probability of
MID initiation. In Model 4 I show how the other form of U.S. military aid (arms and equipment
transfer) variable effects the recipient states` international conflict behavior. In Model 5 through
8 I assess the different U.S. IMET variables and the other form of U.S. military aid variable
when I control for all the factors that previous literature argues having significant effects on
becoming the instigator of an interstate conflict.
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Table 14. U.S. IMET participation and MID initiation, 1976 - 2007.

VARIABLES
IMET
IMET(stud.)

(1)
(2)
IMET
IMET
Binary
Students
-0.722***
(0.121)
-0.105***
(0.0183)

IMET(spend.)

(3)
IMET
Spending

(4)
Other
Aid

(5)
IMET
Binary
-0.745***
(0.178)

(6)
IMET
Students

-0.133***
(0.0276)
-0.0708***
(0.0135)

Other Aid

2.948***
(1.132)

Defense

-0.182
-0.201
(0.191)
(0.191)
0.173
0.177
(0.161)
(0.162)
-0.179
-0.143
(0.155)
(0.156)
-0.325*
-0.347*
(0.191)
(0.192)
1.52e-08** 1.29e-08*
(6.68e-09) (6.69e-09)
-0.000639* -0.000626*
(0.000345) (0.000348)
1.25e-05
1.54e-05*
(8.25e-06) (8.31e-06)
4.58e-06*** 4.56e-06**
(1.70e-06) (1.79e-06)
-0***
-0***
(0)
(0)
-0.0973
-0.0377
(0.198)
(0.199)
0.856***
0.960***
(0.161)
(0.165)
-0.437
-0.526
(0.328)
(0.330)
-0.922***
-0.997***
(0.218)
(0.220)
2.115***
2.305***
1.972***
(0.0730)
(0.238)
(0.209)
2,863
2,696
2,696

Non-aggr.
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.
Army size
Iron/Steel
Total Pop.
GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap.
U.S. Affinity
Constant
Observations

2.705***
(0.0947)
3,558

2.431***
(0.0654)
3,558

2.493***
(0.0720)
3,558

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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VARIABLES

(6)
IMET
Students

(7)
IMET
Spending

(8)
Other Aid

IMET
IMET(stud.)
IMET(spend.)
Other Aid
Defense
Non-aggr.
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.
Army size
Iron/Steel
Total Pop.
GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap.
U.S. Affinity
Constant
Observations

(9)
IMET
Binary
-0.821***
(0.180)

-0.133***
(0.0276)

(10)
IMET
Students

(11)
IMET
Spending

-0.144***
(0.0278)
-0.0765***
(0.0202)

-0.0847***
(0.0204)
3.634**
4.801***
4.980***
4.735***
(1.533)
(1.664)
(1.715)
(1.684)
-0.201
-0.181
-0.287
-0.278
-0.299
-0.273
(0.191)
(0.191)
(0.192)
(0.195)
(0.195)
(0.195)
0.177
0.189
0.177
0.107
0.113
0.128
(0.162)
(0.161)
(0.161)
(0.162)
(0.163)
(0.162)
-0.143
-0.162
-0.231
-0.192
-0.151
-0.170
(0.156)
(0.155)
(0.153)
(0.156)
(0.156)
(0.156)
-0.347*
-0.342*
-0.391**
-0.274
-0.302
-0.294
(0.192)
(0.191)
(0.187)
(0.191)
(0.192)
(0.191)
1.29e-08* 1.39e-08** 1.73e-08*** 1.45e-08**
1.19e-08*
1.29e-08*
(6.69e-09) (6.60e-09)
(6.39e-09)
(6.76e-09)
(6.75e-09)
(6.66e-09)
-0.0006*
-0.0006*
-0.0006*
-0.0007**
-0.0007**
-0.0007**
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0003)
(0.004)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
1.54e-05*
1.31e-05
1.04e-05
1.88e-05** 2.20e-05*** 1.92e-05**
(8.31e-06) (8.25e-06)
(8.10e-06)
(8.45e-06)
(8.53e-06)
(8.45e-06)
4.56e-06** 4.51e-06*** 3.92e-06** 5.02e-06*** 5.01e-06*** 4.93e-06***
(1.79e-06) (1.74e-06)
(1.52e-06)
(1.76e-06)
(1.88e-06)
(1.81e-06)
-0***
-0***
-0**
-0***
-0***
-0***
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
-0.0377
-0.0914
-0.108
0.0391
0.111
0.0445
(0.199)
(0.198)
(0.201)
(0.206)
(0.208)
(0.206)
0.960***
0.887***
0.786***
0.895***
1.008***
0.928***
(0.165)
(0.162)
(0.157)
(0.164)
(0.168)
(0.164)
-0.526
-0.425
-0.146
-0.530
-0.608*
-0.507
(0.330)
(0.326)
(0.303)
(0.328)
(0.328)
(0.325)
-0.997***
-0.948***
-0.880***
-0.811***
-0.900***
-0.849***
(0.220)
(0.217)
(0.217)
(0.221)
(0.222)
(0.220)
1.972***
2.045***
1.638***
2.061***
1.677***
1.778***
(0.209)
(0.214)
(0.221)
(0.250)
(0.229)
(0.231)
2,696
2,696
2,696
2,696
2,696
2,696
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In the last three models I combine the U.S. IMET variables with the other U.S. military aid
variable while keep controlling for the alternative explanations.
The results of my models provide evidence for the proposed theory and support H1 and
H1a. All three forms of U.S. IMET variables show the expected negative relationship with MID
initiation and all results are statistically significant. This means that those countries that receive
U.S. IMET support are less likely to become the initiators of MIDs. Besides demonstrating that
U.S. IMET participation is associated with a decreasing probability of interstate conflict
initiation my models also show some additional interesting empirical findings.
First, across all my models the other U.S. military aid variable demonstrates a statistically
significant positive relationship with interstate conflict initiation. These findings provide support
the arguments of the encouragement literature (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983; Brzoska and
Pearson, 1984; Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz, 1992; Kinsella, 1994; Hartung, 1994; Craft and
Smaldone, 2002) and suggest that U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer
indeed associated with a higher probability of MID initiation.The difference between the effects
of the two types of the U.S. military aid might be explained by the two different potential
interpretation of how their effects on the recipient states` military capabilities. At one hand, the
presence of state-of-the-art American weapons and equipment might “increase the perceived
military capability of the state in the minds of its leadership, making it more confident of a
favorable military-political outcome in armed confrontations and therefore more likely to initiate
or participate in them” (Craft and Smaldone, 2002:704). On the hand, U.S. IMET participants
change the military capabilities of the recipient countries through a different way. Due to their
American education and training they have a better understanding about the role of the military
as an instrument of national power, about appropriate civil-military relations, the importance of
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diplomacy and international cooperation and the potential cost of an interstate war. Due to these
factors U.S. IMET graduates are more likely to caution their political masters against military
aggression than those military leaders who has not participated in such U.S. education and
training programs decreasing the likelihood of MID initiation.
Furthermore, since variables employed to account for different alliances do not
demonstrate any clear and significant association with MID initiation my results do not seem to
support those arguments suggesting that alliances play a crucial role in a state becoming a MID
initiator (Morrow, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Leeds, 2003; Benson, 2011). At the same time close
affinity to the U.S. seems to be a strong predictor for a decreased probability of initiating a
conflict. This might be explained either by states being afraid of U.S. punishment in case they
initiate an interstate conflict or by trusting U.S. protection, which reduces the incentives for
affiliated states to take preventive actions against potential adversaries.
Additionally, regime type related arguments are not supported by the results of my
models because my regime type variable show mixed results. From those variables that are used
to account for the effects of states` national capabilities all seems to have some significant effects
on the probability of MID initiation. The analysis suggests that as a country`s military
expenditure, population size and iron and steel production capability increase the likelihood of
being a MID initiator also increases. These findings can be explained in several ways. Larger
military expenditure, iron and steel production, and population size are necessary resources of
war making and when more is available from these essential resources the more likely that
decision maker elites become more aggressive in disputes. At the same time countries with larger
army size seems to be less likely to become the instigators in interstate conflicts. This might be
the case, because countries with larger military forces can be more successful in pre-conflict
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bargaining due to the deterring effects of the sheer size of their military. Furthermore, wealthier
countries with higher GDP seems to be associated with a decreasing probability of MID
initiation.
Next, while the results of my models do not support those arguments (Waltz, 1981;
Mearsheimer, 1984, 1993; Jervis, 1989; Blair, 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur, 2005) suggesting that
the possession of nuclear weapons effects whether a state becomes the instigator in interstate
conflicts they do provide support to the findings of prior research suggesting that ongoing civil
wars make it more likely that countries become involved in MIDs. This result might be explained
by the fact that in many cases leaders who struggle with an internal conflict try to get their
countries involved in an international conflict in order to deviate the domestic audience`s
attention away from the internal issues and try to unify the population against a foreign enemy.
Finally, as argued by Krause (2004) U.S. affiliation is associated with a decreased probability of
MID initiation because close relationship with the U.S. might improve the security perception of
the countries.
Since COW MID dataset is frequently criticized for including a lot of low level disputes
that do not really qualify as interstate conflicts I re-run all my models to ensure the robustness of
my findings after dropping the low levels of disputes and including only those conflicts in which
military forces are actually used. 35 These models demonstrate the same relationships as the
original models and their results can be reviewed in appendix R.
Next, I run another 11 models (Model 14 to 24) to assess the relationship between U.S.
IMET participation and MID escalation. The results of these models are shown in Table 15.

35

Level1 - no militarized action, Level2 - the threat of use of force, Level3 - display of force, Level4 - use of force
and Level5 - full war. In this case I run my models by using only level 3, 4 and 5.
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Table 15. U.S. IMET participation and MID escalation, 1976 - 2007.

VARIABLES
IMET

(14)
IMET
Binary
-0.127**
(0.0618)

IMET (stud.)

(15)
IMET
Students

(16)
IMET
Spending

(17)
Other
Aid

-0.0390***
(0.00966)

IMET (spend.)

-0.0215***
(0.00697)

Other Aid

0.519
(0.441)

Defense
Non-aggr.
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.
Army size
Iron/Steel
Total Pop.
GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap.
U.S. Affinity
Constant
Observations

(18)
IMET
Binary
-0.130
(0.0806)

3,558

3,558

3,558

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2,863

0.0124
(0.0934)
0.138
(0.0903)
-0.0624
(0.0828)
-0.385***
(0.0959)
-1.62e-08***
(2.69e-09)
0.001***
(0.0002)
-1.52e-05***
(2.45e-06)
-1.45e-07
(2.71e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.0628
(0.108)
0.254***
(0.0842)
-0.0857
(0.149)
-0.0409
(0.116)
2,696

VARIABLES

(19)
IMET
Students

(20)
IMET
Spending

(21)
Other Aid

IMET
IMET (stu.)
IMET (spend.)
Other Aid
Defense
Non-aggr.
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.
Army size
Iron/Steel
Total Pop.
GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap,
U.S. Affinity
Constant
Observations

(22)
IMET
Binary
-0.128
(0.0806)

-0.0730***
(0.0133)

(23)
IMET
Students

(24)
IMET
Spending

-0.0729***
(0.0133)
-0.0379***
(0.00965)

-0.526
-0.507
(0.541)
(0.543)
0.0237
0.0239
0.0137
0.0189
(0.0936)
(0.0936)
(0.0935)
(0.0936)
0.121
0.128
0.156*
0.148
(0.0906)
(0.0904)
(0.0908)
(0.0910)
-0.0508
-0.0548
-0.0623
-0.0614
(0.0829)
(0.0828)
(0.0828)
(0.0828)
-0.333***
-0.349***
-0.420***
-0.397***
(0.0960)
(0.0961)
(0.0956)
(0.0967)
-1.99e-08*** -1.86e-08*** -1.54e-08*** -1.62e-08***
(2.76e-09)
(2.76e-09)
(2.65e-09)
(2.70e-09)
0.00142*** 0.00137*** 0.00131*** 0.00132***
(0.000165)
(0.000164)
(0.000164)
(0.000164)
-1.40e-05*** -1.45e-05*** -1.55e-05*** -1.53e-05***
(2.38e-06)
(2.41e-06)
(2.48e-06)
(2.47e-06)
-3.07e-07
-2.21e-07
-1.33e-07
-1.31e-07
(2.72e-07)
(2.71e-07)
(2.71e-07)
(2.71e-07)
0***
0***
0***
0***
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
-0.00740
-0.0330
-0.0864
-0.0708
(0.108)
(0.108)
(0.108)
(0.108)
0.361***
0.312***
0.228***
0.252***
(0.0865)
(0.0856)
(0.0827)
(0.0842)
-0.128
-0.0953
-0.0853
-0.0969
(0.149)
(0.149)
(0.149)
(0.149)
-0.0907
-0.0696
-0.0455
-0.0510
(0.116)
(0.116)
(0.116)
(0.116)
2,696
2,696
2,696
2,696
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.509
(0.549)
0.0301
(0.0939)
0.131
(0.0912)
-0.0497
(0.0829)
-0.344***
(0.0967)
-1.98e-08***
(2.76e-09)
0.00141***
(0.000165)
-1.42e-05***
(2.40e-06)
-2.93e-07
(2.72e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.0153
(0.108)
0.359***
(0.0865)
-0.139
(0.149)
-0.101
(0.117)
2,696

-0.0378***
(0.00965)
-0.503
(0.547)
0.0302
(0.0938)
0.139
(0.0911)
-0.0538
(0.0828)
-0.360***
(0.0969)
-1.85e-08***
(2.76e-09)
0.00137***
(0.000165)
-1.46e-05***
(2.43e-06)
-2.07e-07
(2.72e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.0410
(0.108)
0.311***
(0.0856)
-0.106
(0.149)
-0.0793
(0.117)
2,696

Besides the hostility level as the dependent variable the eleven ordered logistic regression
models contain the same explanatory and control variables as the models in Table 14. Once
again, I find the expected negative relationship between U.S. IMET participation and
escalation, which provide support to H2 and H2a. I visually demonstrate the effects of U.S.
IMET participation on all 5 levels of MID escalation in Figure 8. To build this graph I
grouped the number of students in three categories. The first category shows the cases with
less than or equal to 500 students, the second category shows the cases with students between
500 and 1000, and the final category is all the cases with more than 1000 U.S. IMET
participants. Additionally, besides the U.S. IMET related findings the models also
demonstrate some additional interesting results. They show that the other U.S. military aid
variable does not have significant effects on conflict escalation and the results are mixed.
Furthermore, while alliance membership has no effect on whether a country escalates on
going MIDs to higher levels of hostilities neutral countries are less likely to escalate interstate
disputes.

The effects of U.S. IMET on MID Escalation
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
X<=500

501<X<=1000

No militarized action
Display of force
War

X>=1001

Threat use of force
Use of force

Figure 8. The effects of U.S. IMET participation on MID Escalation, 1976-2007
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The same relationship seems to exist between the size of military expenditure and iron and
steel production and MID escalation. capability and total population size. At the same time
states with larger armies and higher Gdps seems to be more likely to escalate MIDs once they
are involved in a conflict. Finally, those countries that are involved in civil wars are also
more likely to escalate MIDs.
The results of the two sets of analyses provide strong support to the proposed theory.
U.S. IMET participation consistently and significantly decreases the probability of MID
initiation as well as conflict escalation. However, to further support the argument it is
necessary to discuss some potential criticisms related to the proposed theory and the used
methodological approach.

Potential Criticisms and Alternative Explanations
It might be argued that the results of my models are simply statistical artifacts, or the U.S.
simply provides more aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs to countries that are less
conflict prone. In other words, states might not be less aggressive because they are getting US
military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs, but rather they are getting U.S. IMET
support because they are less likely to initiate conflict anyway. However, this explanation
does not seem to be plausible, because empirical evidence suggests that U.S. military aid has
been allocated to both aggressive countries as well as states that have never initiated interstate
conflicts. Simply looking at a map with those countries who have received IMET between
1976 and 2007 one can conclude that no clear pattern can be established regarding whether
only peaceful countries receive U.S. IMET support or countries that are located in peaceful
regions. Figure 9. shows the geographic location of those countries that have received IMET
sometimes between 1976 and 2009. For further evidence, I include a list with the names of
MID initiators in Appendix S.
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Other critics might argue that recipient countries simply do not initiate or escalate
interstate conflicts because they do not want to lose the free and the best military education
and training available to them.

Figure 9. IMET recipient countries from 1976 to 2007
This argument indeed seems appealing, however if one looks at the number of
students of these programs even in case of the largest recipient only a small percentage of its
military personnel goes through the U.S. IMET programs. The same is true when the dollar
value of the U.S. IMET programs is compared to the recipient states` overall military
expenditure (Savage and Caverley, 2017). These factors make it highly unlikely that
countries would not pursue their foreign policy goals in fear of losing some seats in these
programs. However, this argument brings up another challenge. If indeed only several
officers and non-commissioned officers attend the U.S. IMET programs from the recipient
countries than how realistic it is to claim that U.S. IMET programs have significant effects on
the recipient countries` political decision-making process. I argue that indeed the U.S. IMET
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programs can potentially have such effects on the recipient countries behavior for several
reasons.
First, the idea behind the U.S. IMET programs are the so called, train-the-trainer
concept. The idea behind this concept is to train people who can train and educate additional
personnel when they return to their home countries about the norms and values they learn in
the U.S. IMET programs. This process can be imagined as the spread of a disease. One
contract the virus, spreads it to others and soon many people are infected. Second, a major
part of the U.S. IMET programs is focusing on professional military education for senior
level military decision makers. Additionally, as Lefever (1976) argues U.S. IMET graduates
frequently return to their home countries to assume key policy positions (senior advisors to
politicians, Chief of Defenses, Service Commanders, etc.) which enables them to inject
themselves into foreign policy related decision-making process. Furthermore, based on
several interviews she conducted with Georgian military personnel who participated in
different U.S. IMET programs Phadnis (2019) finds these graduates are catalyzing and
leading their country`s defense transformation and argues that U.S. IMET graduates` “impact
at the highest levels of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and General Staff cannot be overstated”
(Phandis, 2019). In addition, there is a selection process preceding U.S. IMET participation.
Countries usually send (and the U.S. accepts) participants who are candidates of key
positions upon their returns, which once again allow U.S. IMET programs to influence
foreign militaries and through them the behavior of countries.
The next criticism might suggest that my argument is not specific enough, because
asking for and listening to military advise is conditional on regime type. According to this
argument U.S. IMET graduates are only able to influence political decision makers in
democratic countries and effect the probability of MID initiation and escalation. To address
this potential criticism I run several models where I include the interaction term between U.S.
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IMET participation and recipient states` regime type. Figure 10. visually demonstrates the
effects of this interaction on MID initiation.

Figure 10. Margins plot of interaction between Regime Type and U.S. IMET support, MID
Initiation, 1976-2007
As Figure 10. demonstrates democracies are less likely to initiate MIDs than
autocracies regardless of receiving U.S. IMET support or not. Additionally, the graph also
shows that when U.S. IMET support is provided to both regime types than the probability of
conflict initiation decreases in both autocracies and democracies. This means that the effects
of U.S. IMET participation on MID initiation is independent from the recipient countries`
regime type.

Conclusion
Foreign military aid programs have been used for decades to influence recipient states`
behavior in support of U.S. foreign policy goals. Understanding the effects of U.S. military
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aid has attracted some scholarly attention but this interest has been mostly limited to the
exploration of how military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers influence the
behavior of recipient states` international conflict behavior. This paper contributes to the
literature of U.S. military aid but approaches the question from a new angle. It assesses the
effects of U.S. military aid in the form foreign military education and training programs
(more specifically the U.S. IMET programs) on recipient states` international conflict
behavior.
Besides finding support to the proposed argument that U.S. IMET support is
associated with decreasing probability of MID initiation and escalation the results also show
that U.S. IMET participation effects both democracies and autocracies the same way.
Additionally, the findings of the analysis also provide some support to several prior studies`
arguments while also refuting some previous findings. While I find that U.S. military aid in
the form of arms and equipment transfers is indeed associated with an increased probability
of recipient states becoming the instigators of MIDs no support is found for the potential role
that alliances play in conflict initiation. The results of the analysis provide support to those
earlier works arguing that there is a positive relationship between national capabilities and the
presence of civil conflicts; and the probability of becoming MID initiator. The findings also
show that wealthier countries are less likely to start interstate conflicts. In addition to these
contributions to the ongoing debate the findings of this study also have some significant
policy implications.
Although the results are initial they still present strong evidence in support of the
argument that U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs fulfill their goals that
were established by the U.S. Congress. The results of this analysis show that U.S. IMET
programs improve the military human capital of the recipient states and with that it supports
the achievement of U.S. military strategy and foreign policy goals of supporting regional
139

stability and preventing interstate wars. These findings might urge policy makers to consider
paying more attention to this less tangible form of U.S. military aid and invest more efforts
and resources to support and to further improve these foreign education and training
programs.
Since this study is the first in assessing the relationship between the U.S. IMET
programs and the recipient states` international conflict behavior there is much more research
needed to be done on this topic. Future studies may expand and improve this research agenda
through better data collection efforts, by introducing country-level case studies and exploring
the conditions of how the U.S. allocates IMET program support to the recipient states. These
and many other questions need to be addressed to improve our understanding of the effects of
different forms of military aid on the recipient states` behavior and to help policy makers
make better informed decisions regarding the allocation and the content of foreign military
aid packages.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
This dissertation aimed to explore how U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs
affect the participating individuals and through them the recipient states` domestic and
international conflict behavior. The dissertation answered this research question through
investigating three independent but interrelated sub-questions.
First, the dissertation investigated the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET
programs and explored whether participation in these programs is associated with
improvement in individual qualities. While the studies that had investigated the effects of the
U.S. IMET programs at the participating individual level all seem to assume that participation
in these programs improves the personal qualities of the participants through the transmission
of the professional norms and values of the U.S. military such as respect for democratic
values, human rights and civil control, no studies have provided either a strong theory of
norm transmission or convincing empirical evidence whether this process actually happens.
In the first study I argued that the norms and values of the U.S. military are transmitted to
U.S. IMET participants through the mechanisms of formal learning, direct exposure and
common identity and with that the personal qualities of participants indeed improve. I tested
the proposed theory through the employment of an original survey conducted in Hungary
with 350 military respondents and in-depth interviews of 14 Hungarian U.S. IMET graduate.
The first contribution this study makes is an original dataset on the individual level effects of
the U.S. IMET programs, which can be used for further research by other scholars interested
in this research agenda. Next, my analysis of this dataset demonstrated that the professional
norms and values of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. Since
graduates of these programs demonstrated higher respect for human rights, democratic values
and civilian control than their non-U.S. IMET graduate peers the findings of this study
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supported the argument that U.S. IMET participation is associated with improved personal
qualities and with that better military human capital of the recipient states. The data analysis
also provided some promising initial results regarding whether the U.S. military`s norms and
values further diffuse within the recipient country`s military organization.
Beyond its contributions to the research agenda about the effects of U.S. military aid
the study has significant policy implications as well. Although the 1976 International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act clearly defines the goals of the U.S. IMET
program there are no measures of effectiveness in place to provide objective feedback about
the actual effects of these programs to policy makers. The timeliness of this issue is clearly
demonstrated in the fact that the 2017 National Defense Authorization Acts once again
codifies the requirement to establish a functioning evaluation mechanism for the investigation
of the effects of the U.S. security assistance programs. This study provided feedback directly
for this requirement and proposes that the U.S. IMET programs indeed meet the goals
established by Congress and with that effectively support the achievement of U.S. national
security and foreign policy goals.
Second, the dissertation also explored how improved military human capital due to
U.S. IMET participation affects recipient states` behavior during domestic conflicts. In this
part I introduced a new measure for state military capacity in the form of military human
capital. In contradiction to previous literature I argued that it is rather the availability of
highly trained and educated military personnel than military technology that effects the
duration of civil conflicts. I theorized that better military human capital increases the
government military`s capability which incentivize rebels to disperse, hide and minimize
their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I analyzed a new
dataset that included detailed information on civil conflicts and military human capital
between 1976 and 2003 and employed several statistical models. To provide further support
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to the findings of the statistical analysis I also illustrated the theoretical argument through a
case study of the civil conflict in El Salvador between 1979 and 1991. The findings of my
analysis contributed to the literature of civil conflicts in several ways. First, my results
supported the previous claim (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) that
better military capability is associated with longer civil wars. Second, I showed that when
military human capital is included in the models than neither military mechanization (Lyall
and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) nor the combined arms strategy (Caverley
and Secher, 2017) are significant predictors for civil conflict duration. Furthermore, my
analysis suggested that the level of ground mechanization and the level of combined arms
strategy only matters in determining the duration of civil conflicts when quality military
human capital is available for the government forces. Third, I find that better military human
capital is not only associated with longer civil wars, but it increases the probability of the
civil conflict being waged in an irregular manner. Fourth, by using U.S. IMET data as a
proxy for availability of quality military human capital I once again provided feedback about
the potential effects of these U.S. education and training programs and with that I contributed
to the literature of U.S. foreign military aid. Fifth, my study also shed some light on the
importance of bringing military human capital into the research programs of armed conflicts
in general. While many studies have explored the effects of military technology (Lyall and
Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) and strategy employed by the belligerents
(Biddle 2004; Balcells and Kalyvas 2012; Caverley and Secher, 2017) on the duration and
outcome of civil conflicts the question assessing the effects of who is employing those
technologies and strategies has remained mostly unexplored. Bringing the military human
capital into the analysis offers several questions that might be answered by future research.
Finally, the findings of this paper underscored the significance of including military human
capital into the theoretical models of civil conflict research programs. An effective
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explanation of the dynamics of civil conflict requires researchers to better understand how the
human factor interacts with military technology, terrain, political and economic factors.
Further exploring the role of military human capital is likely to highlight several new insights
helping scholars to better understand the dynamics of civil conflicts and potentially enable
policymakers to make more informed decisions when involved in such wars.
The last paper in my dissertation was the first attempt to investigate the relationship
between U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs and the recipient states`
international conflict behavior. In this paper I argue that American educated and trained
foreign military personnel return home with a better understanding about the role of the
military as an instrument of national power, civil-military relations, the value of cooperation
and the cost of war. These U.S. IMET graduates advise their political masters against the
offensive use of military force during international disputes leading to a decreased probability
of MID initiation. I tested this argument by merging U.S. IMET data with data from the
Correlates of War Project`s MID data set (version 4.3). The results of my analysis supported
the proposed argument that more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it
initiates MIDs. I also found that countries that receive more U.S. IMET support are less likely
to escalate ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility. Additionally, the findings of the
analysis also provided support to several prior studies` arguments because I found that U.S.
military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers was indeed associated with an
increased probability of recipient states becoming the instigators of MIDs.
Taken together, the results of this dissertation provided strong evidence that the U.S.
IMET programs indeed fulfill the goals established by the U.S. Congress. The results of my
analysis showed that participation in these programs improves the individual qualities of
participating foreign military personnel and with that the military human capital of the
recipient states. The improved military human capital affects the recipient states conflict
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behavior both domestically and internationally and with that supports the achievement of
U.S. military strategy and foreign policy goals.
There is still much to learn about the specifics of the effects of U.S. IMET programs.
Conducting similar surveys and interviews in other countries, addressing potential
confounding variables, assessing additional cases and collecting better individual and
aggregate level data about the U.S. IMET programs are just some potential future directions
for scholars interested in further exploring this research agenda. Although dissertation made
some significant steps forward the road ahead is still long and full of interesting challenges.
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Greetings Survey Participant,
This questionnaire is part of a research project aiming to identify the effects of military education and training
programs on the individuals participating in those programs. Your professional and honest input is very
important to me and would be much appreciated. Your active participation is expected to last no more than 10
minutes and your answers will remain completely anonymous.
Please complete the following survey.
1.

In which rank category do you belong? (NCO stands for Non-commissioned Officer)
Junior NCO Senior NCO
(enlisted-ssgt) (sfc-WO)

2.

26-35

College (Bachelor)

University(Master`s)

Doctorate

Army
Airforce
Special Operations

Where are you serving at this moment?
Land Unit
Special Forces Unit
Air Force Unit
Hungarian Defense Forces Command
Ministry of Defence
Military Educational Institution
Support Establishment
Other

Including your mother tongue, how many languages do you speak?
1

8.

Highschool

What is your branch of service?

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
e.
7.

55+

What is your highest education level?

a.
b.
c.
6.

46-55

Male
Female

Elementary school
5.

36-45

What is your gender?
a.
b.

4.

Mid-level Officer
Senior Officer
(Maj-Col)
(Generals)

In which age group do you belong?
18-25

3.

Junior Officer
(2ndLt-Cpt)

2-3

4-5

more than 5

How many years have you served in the military?
Less than 5

between 5 and 15 between 16 and 25
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more than 26

9.

Have your done any combat deployment during your military career (Iraq, Afghanistan,
Balkans, etc)?
a.
b.

10.

To your best knowledge have you ever served under the command of an officer/noncommission officer who graduated from an American military school?
a.
b.

11.

Yes
No

Yes
No

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
I have had a chance through my career to positively affect doctrinal change within my military.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

12.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
Based on the training and education I received during my career I feel confident in my military
skills that are relevant in a conventional war.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

13.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
Based on the training and education I received during my career I feel confident in my military
skills that are relevant in a counterinsurgency (intrastate war).
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

14.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
My military knowledge and skills make me completely interoperable with foreign military
personnel.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

15.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
My English language skills are adequate to make me completely interoperable with foreign
military personnel.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

16.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
I have had a chance through my career to positively affect the professional development of my
peers through training and educating them.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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17.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
I have had a chance through my career to positively affect organizational change within my
military.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

18.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
During my military education and training my instructors always made sure that me and my
fellow soldiers had a good understanding of human rights and democratic values such as
freedom of speech, free elections, and justice for all.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

19.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
Freedom of speech, free elections, and justice for all must be respected under every
circumstance.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

20.

To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
If the government does not respect democratic values domestically then it is a responsibility of
the military to intervene.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

21.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
Universal human rights must be respected under every circumstance.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

22.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
If the government does not respect Human Rights then it is a responsibility of the military to
intervene.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

23.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
The military should be involved in the formulation of domestic policies.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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24.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
The government should use the military more frequently domestically to support the police in
solving domestic issues.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

25.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
The military should be involved in the formulation of foreign policies.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

26.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
The government should use the military more frequently in international disputes.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

27.

Have you participated any education and training programs that you would consider “outside”
of your own service (a navy course for army guys, an army school for air force guys, etc.)?
a.
b.

28.

Have you ever participated in any foreign education and training programs other than an
American program?
a.
b.

29.

30.

Yes
No

Yes
No

Have you ever participated in U.S. International Military Education and Training program (U.S.
IMET)?
a. Yes
b. No
When did you finish your latest American education or training event?

More than 10 years ago Less than 10 years but more than 5 years ago
31.

If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following
question: How many U.S. IMET programs did you participate?
1

32.

Less than 5 years ago

2-3

4-5

more than 5

If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following
question: What type of U.S. IMET program did you participate last?
Language training Technical training NCO training Junior Officer Mid-level Officer Senior Officer
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33.

If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following
question: How many times were you invited to attend a breakfast/lunch/dinner with American
families?
1

34.

4-5

more than 5

Do you still keep in touch with any of your American classmates?
No

35.

2-3

Yes

If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following
question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
During my American education and training program there was more emphasis on human
rights and democratic values than during my national education and training.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

36.

If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following
question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
I have successfully shared the knowledge and skills that I acquired during my American military
education and training with my fellow Hungarian soldiers who has not participated in American
education and training.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

37.

If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following
question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
The participation in the U.S. IMET program(s) improved my military skills.
Strongly Disagree....................……………………………………………………………………….Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

This is the end of the survey.
Thank you very much for your time and input.
Very respectfully,
Sandor Fabian
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Variable#1 – Rank (ordinal variable) (Rank)
Range from 1 to 5.
Responses are coded based on which rank category the participant belongs.
Junior Non-Commissioned Officer – 1
Senior Non-Commissioned Officer – 2
Junior Officer – 3
Mid-level Officer – 4
Senior Officer – 5
Variable#2 – Age (ordinal variable) (Age)
Range from 1 to 5.
Responses are coded based on which age group the participant belongs.
18-25 – 1
26-35 – 2
36-45 – 3
46-55 – 4
55+ – 5
Variable#3 – Gender (binary variable) (Gender)
Responses are coded based on which gender the participant belongs.
Female – 0
Male – 1
Variable#4 – Education level (ordinal variable) (Edu)
Range from 1 to 5.
Responses are coded based on the highest education level of the participant.
Elementary school – 1
High school – 2
College – 3
Masters – 4
PhD – 5
Variable#5 – Military Service (nominal variable) (Service)
Range from 1 to 3.
Responses are coded based on which military service the participant belongs.
Army – 1
Air Force – 2
Special Forces – 3
Variable#6 – Military Unit (nominal variable) (Unit)
Range from 1 to 8.
Responses are coded based on which type of military unit the participant belongs at the time of the
survey.
Land Forces – 1
Special Forces– 2
Air Forces – 3
Higher Command – 4
Ministry of Defense – 5
Military Educational Institution – 6
Support Establishment – 7
Other – 8
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Variable#7 – Language (ordinal variable) (Language)
Range from 1 to 4.
Responses are coded based on how many languages the participant speaks.
1–1
2-3 – 2
4-5 – 3
5+ – 4
Variable#8 – Duration of Service (ordinal variable) (Dur_service)
Range from 1 to 4.
Responses are coded based on how many years the participant has served in the Hungarian military.
Less than 5 years – 1
Between 5 and 15 years – 2
Between 16 and 25 years – 3
25+ years – 4
Variable#9 – Combat Deployment (binary variable) (Deployment)
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in combat deployment.
No – 0
Yes – 1
Variable#10 – U.S. IMET C2 (binary variable) (U.S. IMET_C2)
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has been commanded by an U.S. IMET
graduate.
No – 0
Yes – 1
Variable#11 – 26 are all interval variables measured through a 1-10 Likert-scale, where 1 represent
strongly disagree while 10 means strongly agree. (Doctrine, Conventional, Unconventional,
Inter_Ops, Inter_Lan, Change_others, Org_change, Nat_Democ, Always_Democ, Milint_no_democ,
Always_human, Milint_no_human, Domestic_mil, Gov_mil_domestic, Foreign_mil, Gov_mil_foreign)
Variable#27 – Outside training (binary variable) (Outside_training)
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in national training outside of
their respective military service.
No – 0
Yes – 1
Variable#28 – Other Foreign Training (binary variable) (Non_UStraining)
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in international training that
was not provided by the U.S.
No – 0
Yes – 1
Variable#29 – U.S. U.S. IMET training (binary variable) (U.S. IMET)
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in U.S. U.S. IMET training.
No – 0
Yes – 1
Variable#30 – Time since graduation from U.S. U.S. IMET training (ordinal variable) (Grad_time)
Range from 1 to 3.
Responses are coded based on how long ago the participant graduated from U.S. U.S. IMET training.
Less than 5 years ago – 1
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Between 5 and 10 years ago – 2
More than 10 years ago – 3
Variable#31 – Number of U.S. U.S. IMET training (ordinal variable) (Num_U.S. IMET)
Range from 1 to 4.
Responses are coded based on how many U.S. U.S. IMET training events the participant attended.
1–1
2-3 – 2
4-5 – 3
5+ - 4
Variable#32 – Type of U.S. U.S. IMET training (binary variable) (PME)
Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in PME or not.
No – 0
Yes – 1
Variable#33 – Participation in social events (ordinal variable) (Social)
Range from 1 to 4.
Responses are coded based on how many times they participated in social events during their U.S.
U.S. IMET training.
1–1
2-3 – 2
4-5 – 3
5+ - 4
Variable#34 – Keeping contact with peers (binary variable) (Intouch)
Responses are coded based on whether the participant still keeps contact with his U.S.
classmates/peers.
No – 0
Yes – 1
Variable#35 – 37 are all interval variables measured through a 1-10 Likert-scale, where 1 represent
strongly disagree while 10 means strongly agree. (U.S. IMET_Democ, Diffusion, Prodev)
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The following questions were asked to learn about the participants` experience regarding their
participation in the U.S. IMET programs.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

What is your rank?
What is your age?
What is your gender?
What military service do you belong to?
What is your highest education?
How long have you been serving in the Hungarian military?
How many languages do you speak besides Hungarian?
Have you ever been deployed in combat? If yes, where were you deployed?
How many U.S. IMET course have you attended?
When did you graduate from your last course?
Did you participate in organized social events during your U.S. IMET participation? If yes,
how many such events did you participate?
Did you think that the U.S. military was a professional organization? If yes, explain, why you
thought that?
Do you think the U.S. IMET programs contain more democracy and human rights related
curricular content than your national training courses?
Did your participation in the U.S. IMET programs improve your professionalism? If yes,
please explain how?
Do you think you were able to share what you learned during the U.S. IMET programs with
your fellow Hungarian soldiers after your return home?
What are the most memorable events about your U.S. IMET participation and why?
Anything else you would like to tell about your U.S. IMET experience?
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Table 16. List of Interviewees
Rank

Gender

Service

Interview I.

Colonel

Male

Special Forces

Date of the
Interview
10/26/2019

Interview II.

Major

Male

Special Forces

10/28/2019

Interview III.

Second Lieutenant

Male

Special Forces

11/01/2019

Interview IV.

Warrant Officer

Female

Special Forces

11/01/2019

Interview V.

Sergeant First Class

Male

Special Forces

11/05/2019

Interview VI.

Colonel

Male

Land Forces

10/30/2019

Interview VII.

Major

Male

Land Forces

11/08/2019

Interview VIII.

Second Lieutenant

Female

Land Forces

11/12/2019

Interview IX.

Warrant Officer

Male

Land Forces

10/28/2019

Interview X.

Sergeant First Class

Male

Land Forces

11/08/2019

Interview XI.

Colonel

Female

Airforce

10/30/2019

Interview XII.

Major

Male

Airforce

11/08/2019

Interview XIII.

Second Lieutenant

Male

Airforce

11/12/2019

Interview XIV.

Warrant Officer

Male

Airforce

11/01/2019
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Table 17. Summary Statistics

Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Democracy

350

6.791429

2.50488

1

10

Human Rights

350

6.991429

2.285481

1

10

Military Intervention

350

3.362857

2.066874

1

10

U.S. IMET

350

.4

.4905993

0

1

Rank

350

2.645714

.9516515

1

4

Age

350

2.737143

.7790545

1

5

Gender

350

.1771429

.3823361

0

1

Edu

350

2.888571

.8440832

2

5

Language

350

1.96

.4056902

1

3

Dur_service

350

2.514286

.7709418

1

5

Deployment

350

.7685714

.4223494

0

1

Non-US Training

350

.5685714

.4959847

0

1

Land Forces

350

.5571429

.4974351

0

1

Air Forces

350

.3028571

.4601518

0

1

Special Forces

350

.14

.3474838

0

1

165

APPENDIX F: MILITARY SERVICE SPECIFIC RESULTS TO
CHAPTER THREE

166

Table 18. Military Service Specific Results

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET
Rank
Age
Gender
Edu
Language
Dur_service
Deployment
Non_UStraining
Land
Air
SOF
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Democracy Democracy Democracy
Human
Human
Land
Air
SOF
Rights Land Rights Air
1.535***
1.550***
1.505***
0.541**
0.575**
(0.282)
(0.283)
(0.283)
(0.269)
(0.270)
0.249
0.246
0.263
0.535**
0.526**
(0.279)
(0.280)
(0.280)
(0.267)
(0.267)
0.391*
0.375*
0.433*
0.110
0.0704
(0.221)
(0.224)
(0.223)
(0.212)
(0.214)
-0.191
-0.167
-0.179
-0.256
-0.225
(0.339)
(0.339)
(0.340)
(0.324)
(0.324)
-0.137
-0.134
-0.123
-0.350
-0.350
(0.312)
(0.312)
(0.313)
(0.298)
(0.298)
0.470
0.444
0.561*
0.245
0.173
(0.329)
(0.335)
(0.331)
(0.314)
(0.319)
-0.383*
-0.364
-0.372
0.0118
0.0370
(0.228)
(0.228)
(0.228)
(0.217)
(0.217)
0.884***
0.878***
0.838***
0.0831
0.0910
(0.318)
(0.319)
(0.318)
(0.304)
(0.305)
0.00419
0.0115
0.0123
0.358
0.366
(0.282)
(0.283)
(0.283)
(0.270)
(0.270)
-0.457*
-0.644***
(0.255)
(0.244)
0.357
0.654**
(0.285)
(0.272)
0.342
(0.363)
4.492***
4.166***
3.830***
5.697***
5.321***
(0.883)
(0.849)
(0.849)
(0.843)
(0.811)
350
350
350
350
350
0.175
0.171
0.169
0.094
0.091
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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VARIABLES
U.S. IMET
Rank
Age
Gender
Edu
Language
Dur_service
Deployment
Non_UStraining

(6)
Human
Rights SOF
0.511*
(0.272)
0.551**
(0.269)
0.154
(0.214)
-0.227
(0.327)
-0.329
(0.301)
0.346
(0.318)
0.0367
(0.220)
0.0212
(0.306)
0.373
(0.272)

Land
Air
SOF
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.237
(0.349)
4.865***
(0.816)
350
0.077

(7)
(8)
(9)
Intervention Intervention Intervention
Land
Air
SOF
-0.552**
-0.557**
-0.581**
(0.251)
(0.252)
(0.251)
0.158
0.162
0.169
(0.248)
(0.249)
(0.248)
0.237
0.245
0.274
(0.197)
(0.199)
(0.198)
0.0207
0.0356
0.0145
(0.302)
(0.302)
(0.301)
-0.303
-0.296
-0.295
(0.278)
(0.278)
(0.277)
0.508*
0.530*
0.583**
(0.293)
(0.298)
(0.293)
0.0327
0.0451
0.0282
(0.203)
(0.203)
(0.202)
-0.381
-0.400
-0.408
(0.283)
(0.284)
(0.282)
0.174
0.180
0.175
(0.251)
(0.252)
(0.251)
-0.240
(0.227)
0.0281
(0.254)
0.438
(0.322)
2.639***
2.380***
2.187***
(0.786)
(0.756)
(0.752)
350
350
350
0.038
0.035
0.040

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Propensity Score Matching Evaluation for Democracy, Human Rights and Military
Intervention Variables

. psmatch2 IMET Rank Age Gender Edu Language Dur_service Deployment Non_UStraining, out (Domestic_mil) common
Probit regression

Number of obs
LR chi2(8)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log likelihood = -197.91403

IMET

Coef.

Rank
Age
Gender
Edu
Language
Dur_service
Deployment
Non_UStraining
_cons

.3749269
.0924252
.2106959
-.2584831
.2949328
.0098498
.1429939
1.045202
-2.154858

psmatch2:
Treatment
assignment

Std. Err.
.1676916
.1361162
.2045384
.1886502
.208557
.1358255
.1936219
.1573607
.5412127

psmatch2: Common
support
Off suppo On suppor

z
2.24
0.68
1.03
-1.37
1.41
0.07
0.74
6.64
-3.98

P>|z|
0.025
0.497
0.303
0.171
0.157
0.942
0.460
0.000
0.000

Total

Untreated
Treated

0
5

210
135

210
140

Total

5

345

350

170

=
=
=
=

350
75.28
0.0000
0.1598

[95% Conf. Interval]
.0462575
-.1743576
-.1901919
-.6282308
-.1138314
-.2563632
-.2364979
.7367811
-3.215616

.7035964
.359208
.6115837
.1112645
.7036971
.2760628
.5224858
1.353624
-1.094101
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Table 19. Summary Statistics
Variable
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min
Max
Conflict Termination
1,562
.1581306 .3649803
0
1
Civil War Type
1,466
.7755798 .4173423
0
1
U.S. IMET (Students)
7,651
1.710107 3.718991 -2.302585 11.11419
U.S. IMET (Spending)
7,651
3.046359 4.837627 -2.302585 11.10763
Other U.S. Aid
7,021
.0753487 .1254612
0
2.223215
Distance to Capital
1,562
5.698553 1.296719 1.609438 8.121183
Conflict at Border
1,562
.7816901 .4132312
0
1
BorderXDistance
1,562
.0130604 1.016943 -4.090562 2.421183
Population
1,561
10.11732 1.552068 5.342334 13.86401
Regime Type
1,459
.4365789 .3597569
0
.9589228
GDP per Capita
1,552
6.824206 1.212623 3.871201 10.00951
Post-Cold War
1,562
.3975672 .4895518
0
1
Rebel Fighting Capacity
1,518
1.294466 .5169338
1
3
Rebel Strength
1,523
.1300066 .3364211
0
1
Insurgency
1,040
.5682692 .4955557
0
1
Natural Resources
1,054
.6982922 .459217
0
1
Rough Terrain
1,054
.4108159 .4922155
0
1
Ground Mechanization
783
6.466517 1.082524 3.218876 9.493095
Aircraft Mechanization
865
4.558787 1.14137 .5978368 7.388728
Combined Arms
693
29.13171 9.535191 8.168157 60.31901
External Support Rebel
2,612
.4728178 .4993562
0
1
External Support Government
2,612
.5451761 .4980503
0
1
Oil Exporter
1,400
.1457143 .3529456
0
1
Ethnic Fractionalization
1,400
.5809832 .2708404 .0355107 .9016318
Sons of Soil
2,905
.0595525 .2366966
0
1
Military Expenditure
6,784
3328235 1.35e+07
0
3.18e+08
Military Spending per Soldier
6,409
16706.56 42491.64
0
1722499
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Table 20. Accelerated failure time hazard analysis of the duration of civil conflicts, 1976-2003

VARIABLES
IMET (Spend.)

(40)
U.S. IMET
0.0640**
(.0305)

(41)
Other U.S. Aid
-1.289
(1.055)

Other Aid
Ground Mech.
Air Mech.
Combined Arm
Distance to Capital
Conflict at Border
Border X Distance

(42)
(43)
(44)
Total U.S. Aid Armor Geography
0.0903***
0.0776** 0.0712**
(0.0338)
(0.0334)
(0.0315)
-1.224
-1.535
-1.422
(0.968)
(2.060)
(2.143)
0.640
0.884
(0.825)
(0.789)
0.547
0.659
(0.938)
(0.912)
-0.136
-0.163
(0.138)
(0.136)
0.481***
(0.169)
0.971**
(0.425)
-0.476*
(0.248)

Rebel Fighting Cap.
Rebel Strength
Constant
Observations

7.294***
(0.181)
940

7.543***
(0.249)
800

7.078***
(0.243)
760

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.566
(5.448)
496

-0.223
(5.213)
496

(45)
Fighting Capacity
0.0744**
(0.0363)
-1.930
(1.684)
0.702
(0.739)
0.668
(0.872)
-0.149
(0.127)

-0.0512
(0.593)
-0.541
(0.930)
4.275
(4.978)
481

VARIABLES
IMET (Spend.)
Other Aid
Ground Mech.
Air Mech.
Combined Arm

(46)
Terrain
0.0827**
(0.0373)
-0.0930
(2.593)
0.624
(0.882)
0.604
(1.017)
-0.137
(0.149)

(47)
Regime
type
0.0696
(0.0494)
-1.184
(2.361)
0.890
(0.961)
0.673
(1.181)
-0.176
(0.170)

(48)
Economy
0.0905**
(0.0375)
-4.304*
(2.266)
0.653
(0.799)
0.429
(0.933)
-0.104
(0.136)

(49)
External
Support
0.0753**
(0.0348)
-1.650
(2.044)
0.658
(0.810)
0.561
(0.932)
-0.137
(0.137)

(50)
Sons of
Soil
0.0866**
(0.0355)
-1.277
(2.095)
0.983
(0.932)
1.091
(1.037)
-0.218
(0.161)

Dist. to Capital
Confl. at Border
Bord. X Dist.
Rebel Fight Cap.
Rebel Strength
Natural Res.
Rough Terrain

0.544*
(0.323)
0.617*
(0.353)

Incumb. Democ.

0.229
(0.854)

Gdp per capita

-0.747**
(0.341)

Ext. support gov.

-0.273
(0.449)
-0.0382
(0.325)

Ext. support reb.
Sons of soil

1.441*
(0.789)

Insurgency
Post-Cold War
Constant
Observations

3.694
(5.942)
496

3.440
(6.390)
466

9.776*
(5.940)
495

4.639
(5.399)
496

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.196
(5.964)
496

(51)
All
controls
0.114**
(0.0545)
-2.683
(2.438)
1.221
(1.136)
0.922
(1.492)
-0.192
(0.223)
0.637***
(0.178)
0.708
(0.460)
-0.686**
(0.290)
0.217
(0.787)
-0.793
(1.175)
0.331
(0.371)
0.437
(0.325)
-0.0742
(0.756)
-0.658*
(0.337)
-.0727
(.820)
-0.0727
(0.320)
1.000
(1.004)
0.505
(0.541)
-0.335
(0.573)
0.973
(8.843)
437
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Table 21. Logit Analysis of Civil War Termination, 1976-2003

VARIABLES
IMET (Spending)

(52)
U.S. IMET
-0.0476**
(0.0214)

(53)
Other U.S. Aid
0.951
(0.760)

(54)
Total U.S. Aid
-0.0628***
(0.0221)
0.920
(0.700)

(55)
Armor
-0.0577**
(0.0245)
0.825
(2.021)
-0.715
(0.652)
-0.540
(0.763)
0.130
(0.113)

-0.831***
(0.174)
940

-1.034***
(0.217)
800

-0.706***
(0.204)
760

2.496
(4.306)
496

Other Aid
Ground Mech.
Air Mech.
Combined Arm
Distance to Capital
Conflict at Border
Border X Distance
Rebel Fighting Cap.
Rebel Strength
Constant
Observations

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(56)
(57)
Geography Fighting Capacity
-0.0571**
-0.0586**
(0.0235)
(0.0255)
0.332
1.365
(2.419)
(1.865)
-0.936
-0.846
(0.668)
(0.666)
-0.706
-0.737
(0.801)
(0.792)
0.160
0.159
(0.118)
(0.118)
-0.328**
(0.145)
-0.740**
(0.304)
0.306
(0.191)
-0.0996
(0.493)
0.565
(0.822)
6.228
3.271
(4.538)
(4.476)
496
481

(58)
Terrain

(59)
(60)
(61)
(62)
(63)
VARIABLES
Regime Economy External
Sons of
All
type
Support
Soil
controls
IMET (Spend.)
-0.0566** -0.0557* -0.0701*** -0.0557** -0.0671*** -0.0736*
(0.0262) (0.0321) (0.0245)
(0.0250)
(0.0245)
(0.0418)
Other Aid
-0.250
0.917
2.919
1.039
0.368
1.639
(2.151)
(2.260)
(2.310)
(2.104)
(2.123)
(3.133)
Ground Mech.
-0.703
-0.824
-0.674
-0.755
-0.818
-1.601
(0.706)
(0.784)
(0.665)
(0.643)
(0.679)
(1.136)
Air Mech.
-0.584
-0.542
-0.410
-0.584
-0.781
-1.353
(0.833)
(0.965)
(0.804)
(0.755)
(0.794)
(1.497)
Combined Arm
0.130
0.145
0.101
0.136
0.162
0.259
(0.122)
(0.142)
(0.119)
(0.112)
(0.119)
(0.221)
Dist. to Capital
-0.486***
(0.184)
Confl. at Border
-0.635**
(0.323)
Border X Distance
0.540**
(0.253)
Rebel Fighting Cap.
-0.535
(0.706)
Rebel Strength
1.188
(1.154)
Natural Resources
-0.391
-0.363
(0.253)
(0.340)
Rough Terrain
-0.347
-0.343
(0.252)
(0.280)
Incumb. Democ.
-0.0763
-0.0214
(0.576)
(0.655)
Gdp per capita
0.480**
0.434*
(0.229)
(0.262)
Ext. support gov.
0.323
0.302
(0.313)
(0.422)
Ext. support reb.
-0.0312
-0.0398
(0.247)
(0.266)
Sons of soil
-1.206**
-1.091
(0.535)
(0.900)
Insurgency
-0.270
(0.446)
Post-Cold War
0.293
(0.468)
Constant
3.076
2.893
-1.152
2.558
3.415
8.727
(4.755)
(5.129)
(5.086)
(4.293)
(4.433)
(8.573)
Observations
496
466
495
496
496
437
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 22. Logit Analysis of Civil War Types, 1976-2003

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET

(64)
U.S. IMET
0.108***
(0.0157)

Military Aid

(65)
Other U.S. Aid

-2.864***
(0.606)

Ground mech.
Air mech.
Combined arms

(66)
Total U.S. Aid
0.181***
(0.0442)
-5.677***
(2.029)
1.164
(0.862)
2.518**
(1.206)
-0.366**
(0.167)

Distance to capital
Conflict at border
Border x Distance

(67)
(68)
Armor
Geography
0.133***
0.198***
(0.0193)
(0.0515)
-2.559***
-4.052*
(0.646)
(2.130)
1.385
(0.858)
3.526***
(1.247)
-0.484***
(0.172)
-0.501
(0.333)
-0.147
(0.562)
1.303***
(0.429)

Rebel fighting capacity
Rebel strength
Constant
Observations

0.805***
(0.0978)
1,014

1.629***
(0.104)
869

-6.368
(5.922)
284

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.907***
(0.140)
832

-5.909
(6.096)
284

(69)
Fighting Capacity
0.149***
(0.0565)
-6.925***
(2.366)
2.058**
(1.047)
3.080**
(1.431)
-0.501**
(0.205)

-0.683
(0.566)
-2.875***
(1.044)
-8.826
(7.171)
281

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET
Military Aid
Ground mech.
Air mech.
Combined arms

(70)
Terrain
0.160***
(0.0456)
-4.596**
(2.198)
1.193
(0.893)
3.276**
(1.315)
-0.435**
(0.177)

(71)
Regime
Type
0.131***
(0.0544)
-1.508
(2.438)
0.0782
(1.062)
2.793**
(1.346)
-0.284
(0.196)

(72)
Economy
0.156***
(0.0483)
-3.742
(2.416)
1.387
(0.908)
2.983**
(1.310)
-0.444**
(0.185)

(73)
(74)
External Sons of
Factors
Soil
0.184*** 0.205***
(0.0442) (0.0469)
-5.571*** -5.188**
(2.078)
(2.044)
1.281
1.094
(0.900)
(0.854)
2.722**
2.847**
(1.259)
(1.224)
-0.386** -0.383**
(0.173)
(0.165)

Dist. to capital
Confl. at border
Border x Distance
Rebel fight cap.
Rebel strength
Natural resources
Rough terrain

0.740
(0.520)
-0.755
(0.468)

Incumb. democ

2.701***
(0.971)

Gdp per capita

0.502
(0.356)

External sup. govt

-0.487
(0.451)
0.163
(0.408)

External sup. reb.
Sons of soil

1.316
(0.840)

Insurgency
Post-Cold War
Constant
Observations

-7.871
(6.134)
284

-3.973
(6.717)
263

-11.26
(7.163)
283

-7.253
(6.194)
284

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-7.097
(5.901)
284

(75)
All
Controls
0.365***
(0.128)
1.405
(4.678)
1.334
(2.254)
4.298
(3.129)
-0.581
(0.465)
-0.441
(0.601)
0.904
(1.154)
0.366
(0.907)
-1.344
(1.040)
-5.109*
(2.729)
-1.175
(1.470)
1.813
(1.213)
1.719
(1.617)
2.212**
(1.004)
-1.590
(1.059)
-0.303
(0.807)
0.337
(1.945)
-0.540
(0.866)
-3.205***
(1.230)
-18.59
(17.48)
254
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Table 23. Logit Analysis of Insurgency Occurrence, 1976-2003

VARIABLES
U.S. IMET

(76)
U.S. IMET
-0.0722***
(0.0140)

(77)
Total U.S. Aid
-0.137***
(0.0182)
-0.186
(0.696)

0.592***
(0.0927)
945

0.987***
(0.143)
761

Other U.S. Aid
Military Expenditure
Military Personnel
Population
Regime Type
GDP per Capita
Natural Resources
U.S. Affinity
Oil Exporter
Ethnic Fractionalization
Constant
Observations

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(78)
All Controls
-0.140***
(0.0428)
-3.548***
(1.360)
-2.35e-08**
(1.16e-08)
-1.02e-05
(7.91e-06)
-0.249**
(0.106)
-1.695***
(0.505)
-0.146
(0.264)
0.719**
(0.311)
1.303***
(0.452)
-0.0284
(0.453)
-1.738**
(0.725)
7.608***
(2.299)
378

APPENDIX P: SUMMARY STATISTICS TO CHAPTER FIVE

191

Table 24. Summary Statistics

Variable

Observations

Mean

Initiator
Hostility level
IMET (Binary)
IMET (students)
IMET (spending)
Other Aid
Defense
Non-aggression
Entente
Neutrality
Military Expenditure
Army Size
Iron and Steel Production
Total Population
GDP
Democracy
Civil War
Nuclear Capability
U.S. Affinity

3,558
3,558
10,436
10,436
10,436
8,435
3,558
3,558
3,558
3,558
8,589
3,558
3,558
3,558
8,435
8,946
10,436
3,558
9,218

.9100618
2.827712
.4535263
.4414376
1.615719
.0651867
.292018
.6231029
.589095
.3302417
2.07e+07
1071.714
43750.88
136880.3
2.14e+11
.4632238
.2363933
.5056211
-.303984
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Standard
Deviation
.2861334
1.182454
.4978594
3.098447
4.253173
.1165006
.4547544
.4846769
.4920672
.4703661
5.28e+07
1240.27
55506.38
202262.7
4.31e+11
.4986735
.4248868
.5000387
.4351709

Minimum Maximum
0
1
0
-2.302585
-2.302585
0
0
0
0
0
0
-9
0
63
1.60e+07
0
0
0
-1

1
5
1
10.42976
9.887631
2.223215
1
1
1
1
3.18e+08
4300
489712
1334344
4.75e+12
1
1
1
1
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Table 25. U.S. IMET and MID initiation, 1976-2007
(25)
(26)
VARIABLES
IMET
IMET
Binary
Students
IMET
-0.416***
(0.139)
IMET(stud.)
-0.0438**
(0.0217)
IMET(spend.)

(27)
IMET
Spending

(28)
Other
Aid

(29)
IMET
Binary
-0.514**
(0.217)

-0.0781**
(0.0335)
-0.0348**
(0.0157)

Other Aid

3.306**
(1.501)

Defense

-0.180
(0.243)
0.103
(0.201)
-0.319
(0.196)
-0.302
(0.236)
4.00e-09
(9.20e-09)
-0.000405
(0.000459)
2.91e-05**
(1.22e-05)
3.30e-06**
(1.66e-06)
-0***
(0)
-0.435*
(0.245)
1.368***
(0.206)
-0.0433
(0.402)
-0.965***
(0.248)
2.168*** 2.066***
(0.0893)
(0.297)
2,023
1,882

Non-aggr.
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.
Army size
Iron/Steel
Total Pop.
GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap.
U.S. Affinity
Constant
Observations

2.534***
(0.101)
2,573

2.360***
(0.0718)
2,573

(30)
IMET
Students

2.401***
(0.0782)
2,573

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.187
(0.243)
0.118
(0.201)
-0.295
(0.196)
-0.334
(0.236)
3.06e-09
(9.23e-09)
-0.000370
(0.000459)
2.99e-05**
(1.23e-05)
3.16e-06*
(1.68e-06)
-0***
(0)
-0.414*
(0.247)
1.433***
(0.210)
-0.0613
(0.403)
-1.007***
(0.250)
1.802***
(0.262)
1,882

VARIABLES

(31)
IMET
Spending

(32)
Other Aid

IMET

(33)
IMET
Binary
-0.660***
(0.221)

IMET(stud.)
IMET(spend.)

Non-aggr.
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.
Army size
Iron/Steel
Total Pop.
GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap.
U.S. Affinity
Constant
Observations

(35)
IMET
Spending

-0.101***
(0.0342)
-0.0544**
(0.0244)

Other Aid
Defense

(34)
IMET
Students

-0.172
(0.243)
0.122
(0.201)
-0.299
(0.196)
-0.320
(0.236)
3.31e-09
(9.20e-09)
-0.000399
(0.000459)
2.98e-05**
(1.22e-05)
3.26e-06*
(1.68e-06)
-0***
(0)
-0.438*
(0.245)
1.400***
(0.208)
-0.0434
(0.402)
-0.978***
(0.248)
1.885***
(0.269)
1,882

-0.0710***
(0.0248)
5.569***
6.892***
6.990***
6.967***
(2.122)
(2.245)
(2.290)
(2.290)
-0.363
-0.377
-0.386
-0.365
(0.251)
(0.253)
(0.253)
(0.253)
0.0685
0.00946
0.0267
0.0329
(0.202)
(0.204)
(0.203)
(0.203)
-0.393**
-0.370*
-0.339*
-0.343*
(0.196)
(0.199)
(0.199)
(0.199)
-0.325
-0.241
-0.282
-0.263
(0.233)
(0.237)
(0.237)
(0.237)
4.28e-09
3.32e-09
1.90e-09
2.24e-09
(9.04e-09) (9.33e-09)
(9.35e-09)
(9.32e-09)
-0.000411
-0.000462
-0.000425
-0.000453
(0.000453) (0.000460)
(0.000461)
(0.000460)
3.15e-05** 3.68e-05*** 3.79e-05*** 3.77e-05***
(1.23e-05) (1.23e-05)
(1.24e-05)
(1.24e-05)
3.16e-06* 3.74e-06** 3.54e-06** 3.67e-06**
(1.64e-06) (1.70e-06)
(1.72e-06)
(1.73e-06)
-0**
-0**
-0**
-0**
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
-0.423*
-0.263
-0.231
-0.265
(0.248)
(0.254)
(0.256)
(0.253)
1.344***
1.407***
1.490***
1.448***
(0.205)
(0.209)
(0.214)
(0.210)
0.122
-0.234
-0.247
-0.231
(0.378)
(0.407)
(0.407)
(0.406)
-0.862***
-0.822***
-0.889***
-0.845***
(0.250)
(0.252)
(0.252)
(0.251)
1.505***
1.830***
1.487***
1.598***
(0.275)
(0.304)
(0.278)
(0.281)
1,882
1,882
1,882
1,882
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX S: LIST OF MID INITIATOR COUNTRIES TO CHAPTER
FIVE
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Table 26. List of MID Initiator Countries, 1976-2007
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Benin
Bosnia And Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Canada
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
China
Chile
Republic Of Congo
The Democratic Republic Of Congo
Cote D'Ivoire
Croatia
Czech Republic
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Gambia
Georgia
Germany

Ghana
Grenada
Greece
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Hungary
India
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Republic Of
Iraq
Israel
Italy
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Republic Of
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lebanon
Liberia
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Lithuania
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Moldova, Republic Of
Morocco
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Poland
Qatar
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Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Slovakia
South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Zambia

